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Abstract
This dissertation examined the measurement and prevention of applicant faking on
personality tests. Study 1 compared how 12 different faking indices differentiated between the
same people’s personality scores during a job application and non-applicant condition, and how
these faking indices discriminated between separate groups of job applicants and non-applicants.
We found that researchers and practitioners should assess applicant faking using multiple faking
indices, including Idiosyncratic Item Responding, Blatant Extreme Responding, and Communal
Impression Management, and when possible, Residualized Change Scores. Interestingly, Bogus
Items—a common faking measure in the literature—were ineffective. Similarly, two covariance
indices, were also ineffective and failed to predict applicant faking or relate to any other measure
of applicant faking. The findings also suggest that we can disregard a few measures from future
analysis because they are inferior to existing options, and offer no utility, which include Percent
Agreement, Individual Change Scores, Within-Subject Correlations, and Within-Subject
Variances of the Differences. Studies 2 and 3 examined the efficacy of three new faking
dissuasion messages in reducing applicant faking compared to a traditional faking warning and a
no-warning control group. In Study 2, we found no evidence for any of the dissuasion messages,
including one adapted from the existing literature. In Study 3, we tested military recruits from
the Canadian Armed Forces. We found some evidence that an Immediate Authentication
Warning, which informed recruits that faking could be identified using reference checks and
internal integrity checks, helped reduce faking. However, none of the other faking dissuasion
messages were effective relative to the control group. We discuss several potential explanations
for these conflicted findings.
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Chapter 1
1. General Overview
Personality is defined as a consistent pattern of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors.
Assessment of personality has become common practice in pre-hire screening in organizational
settings (Mischel, 2004; Rothstein & Goffin, 2006). A survey of 84 large organizations—with an
average annual revenue of 45.7 billion dollars— found that 66% of the organizations used
personality testing for “high potential” employees, and 57% used personality testing for senior
executives (Church & Rotolo, 2013). Personality testing is now the second most common preemployment assessment practice (Fallaw & Kantrowitz, 2013). Further, 74% of US-based HR
professionals believe that personality testing can be useful (Fallaw & Kantrowitz, 2013; Society
of Human Resource Management, 2011).
Personality testing is used by many organizations because scores from such testing
predict the three pillars of job performance: (a) task performance, behaviors related to job-related
tasks; (b) organizational citizenship behaviors, behaviors that help support the organization but
that are outside of the immediate job-role; and (c) counterproductive work behaviors, the extent
that an employee interferes with the performance of colleagues or their organization. If used
correctly, personality tests predict between 9% and 16% of task performance (Tett, Jackson, &
Rothstein, 1991), up to 13% of organizational citizenship behaviors (Borman & Motowidlo,
1997), and up to 40% of counterproductive behaviors such as theft, time fraud, or bullying
(Marcus & Schuler, 2004).
The most favorable response to personality test items are often transparent to test-takers.
For example, imagine an applicant had to respond to the following personality items from the
International Personality Item Pool (Goldberg et al., 2006; Maples, Guan, Carter, & Miller,
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2014): “I start tasks right away,” “I remain calm under pressure,” and “I love to help others.” For
each item, it is obvious that answering “strongly agree” will appear more favorable to employers
than answering “strongly disagree.” This is problematic to hiring organizations because
applicants have incentive to answer dishonestly or to “fake” (Griffith, Chmielowski, & Yoshita,
2007). Faking is defined as deliberate provision of “inaccurate responses to personality items in a
manner that they believe will increase their chances of obtaining valued outcomes, such as a
favorable hiring decision” (Goffin & Boyd, 2009, p. 151). Between 30 and 50% of people
endorse more favorable personality scores when applying for jobs in comparison to nonapplicant self-reporting (Griffith et al., 2007), and up to 63% of applicants admit to “faking” on
personality tests (Dwight & Donovan, 2003). Faking distorts the rank order of applicants and
undermines hiring decisions (Goffin & Christiansen, 2003; Griffith et al., 2007). Fakers rise to
the top of the job applicant pool, and as a result, companies hire them. This is especially the case
for competitive job postings, where only a small number of people are hired (Donovan, Dwight,
& Schneider, 2013). Thus, the successful applicants may not possess the traits they claim to
have, and in turn, displace those that may be better suited for the position.
At first, these findings may seem counterintuitive. If applicants are faking, one may think
that all applicants will increase their scores, and in turn, we should see mean shifts instead of
rank order changes between honest and job application situations (J. Hogan, Barrett, & Hogan,
2007; R. Hogan, 2005). However, there are large individual differences in why and how
applicants fake. Faking exists on a continuum (Donovan, Dwight, & Hurtz, 2003): some people
respond honestly, answering the same way across situations; others fake a little, minimizing their
negative traits; and still, others fake a lot, engaging is total dissimulation. These differences exist
because applicants vary in their motivation to fake and perceived ability to fake, which are
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influenced by a variety of factors including moral values and need to fake (Goffin & Boyd,
2009). This is problematic because the least honest applicants rise to the top of the applicant
pool, and those who answer honestly or engage in lower levels of faking are severely
disadvantaged (Griffith et al., 2007; Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2003).
It is also important to qualify this review—faking does not always lead to more favorable
scores. The change in scores is context dependent. For example, in clinical populations, some
prospective patients may “fake bad”, making themselves look less favorable than their honest
answers would portray (Holden & Book, 2011; Sullivan, 2001). Faking bad may lead to a
clinical diagnosis that confers tangible benefits including workplace accommodations, insurance
benefits, or government social assistance. People may also fake bad when they apply for a work
position they are not really interested in (Boss, König, & Melchers, 2015). Imagine someone is
encouraged by their spouse to apply for a job in a city they do not want to move—they could
apply but sabotage their application by faking bad. In Switzerland, where mandatory military
service is required, recruits often fake bad on personality tests to be selected out of the military
(Boss et al., 2015).
Additionally, some people genuinely believe they have more desirable traits than they
really demonstrate. In the social desirability literature (Paulhus, 1984, 1991), scholars
differentiate between Impression Management, conscious dissimulation to appear more
favorable, and Self-Deception, when the person believes what they are reporting. The purpose of
this dissertation is to investigate motivated and intentional dissimulation where job applications
attempt to appear more favorably to their prospective employers. As a result, faking bad and selfdeception are not addressed in this dissertation.
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In the pre-employment context, faking diminishes the validity of personality tests in
hiring scenarios, which restricts the utility of test scores to make meaningful hiring predictions.
For example, faking impairs convergent validity, as self-peer correlations are lower during job
applications in comparison to responding in non-application scenarios (Robie, Taggar, & Brown,
2009). This suggests that applicant scores are less objectively verifiable, and in turn, should have
less utility in predicting performance. Faking also diminishes the test-retest reliability of
personality tests by introducing additional error variance into measurement (Hausknecht, 2010;
Landers, Sackett, & Tuzinski, 2011). This suggests that applicant personality scores are unstable,
and in turn, should have less utility in predicting important outcomes compared to non-applicant
scores. In support of this, Peterson et al. (2011) found that faking weakens the criterion-related
validity of personality tests in predicting counterproductive work behavior (M. H. Peterson,
Griffith, Isaacson, O’Connell, & Mangos, 2011). As a result, faking can lead to hiring less
optimal applicants, which is costly for hiring organizations.
To successfully protect organizations from applicants who fake, we need to appropriately
assess applicant faking, and subsequently prevent it. In the next section, I review the most
common faking assessments, discuss why further study is necessary, and describe how I plan to
improve faking assessment. Once I identify the best faking assessments to capture variance
related to applicant faking, I will use them to validate an innovative approach to dissuading
applicants from faking.
1.1

Detecting and Assessing Applicant Faking
There are two broad ways to detect faking on personality tests: covertly assessing faking

and assessing faking by analyzing inconsistencies or unlikely response patterns. The oldest, and
most prevalent, approach is to covertly measure faking during the application process using a
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Social Desirability Scale (Griffith & Peterson, 2008). In the job application context, Social
Desirability Scales are used to “indicate a deliberate choice to alter responses to appear more
socially favorable.” (Ellingson, Sackett, & Hough, 1999, p. 156). Social Desirability Scales
measure how often applicants endorse improbable—but desirable—items such as “I’ve never
forgotten to return something”, “I never swear”, and “I’ve never broken the law” (Paulhus,
1984). The use of a Social Desirability Scale in hiring assumes that when job applicants score
favorably on social desirability items, job applicants are also faking on the personality test
(Griffith & Peterson, 2008). There are several concerns with Social Desirability Scales. For
example, scores from such scales tend not to correlate highly with scores from other faking
assessments (Burns & Christiansen, 2006; Ellingson et al., 1999; Griffith & Peterson, 2008;
Kuncel & Tellegen, 2009) and are confounded with legitimate personality traits such as
extraversion (Uziel, 2010). Most detrimentally, items on Social Desirability Scales are obvious
to test takers, and so are easy to fake (Alex, 1965).
In another attempt to covertly assess faking, researchers investigated if they could predict
faking on personality tests by assessing the tendency to claim knowledge about fictitious topics.
Presumably, applicants who mispresent their knowledge to appear more desirable are also faking
on personality tests (Bing, Kluemper, Davison, Taylor, & Novicevic, 2011; Fan et al., 2012).
There are two main approaches to assessing knowledge about fictitious phenomena: Bogus Items
and Overclaiming. Bogus Items ask participants to endorse knowledge of things that do not exist,
but sound job-related. For example, for a customer service position, applicants could be asked
about their familiarity with point-of-sale machines (real) and customer first-order logic
(fictitious). A more nuanced version of Bogus Items is Overclaiming general knowledge about
broad topics including history, social science, and physics. Applicants rate their familiarity with
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things that exist and things that do not. Statistically controlling for Overclaiming on fictitious
things improves the criterion related validity of personality when predicting academic
performance (Bing et al., 2011); however, and despite these promising results, Overclaiming
fails to converge with other faking assessments in experimental settings (Feeney & Goffin,
2015), and is also confounded by legitimate personality traits (Dunlop et al., 2016).
The other main approach to assess applicant faking is to scrutinize applicants’ response
patterns for inconsistencies. There are three measures of response patterns that can be used in
employment settings as an index of faking: Idiosyncratic Item Responding, Covariance Indices,
and Blatant Extreme Responding. Idiosyncratic items are determined by finding personality
items that have different score distributions when filled out as an applicant than when completed
as a non-applicant (Kuncel & Borneman, 2007; Kuncel & Tellegen, 2009), and creating a scale
score across these idiosyncratic items. In theory, applicants who score more favorably on items
that distinguish applicants from honest responders are more likely to be faking. The second
approach is to examine the covariance between conceptually distinct personality items—such as
“I work long hours at work” and “I enjoy being the life of the party”—but that are desirable to
the target job (Burns & Christiansen, 2011). The underlying logic is that if an applicant is faking,
the covariance between conceptually distinct but job-related traits—such as conscientiousness or
extraversion— should increase when compared to non-applicants. This is because the faker is
trying to appear favorable to the employer and will likely improve their scores on dissimilar
items that are job-related. Finally, Blatant Extreme Responding is calculated by examining mean
scores on favorable personality trait—such as conscientiousness or emotional stability
(Birkeland, Manson, Kisamore, Brannick, & Smith, 2006)—where extreme scores may indicate
faking (Landers et al., 2011).

7
Like social desirability scales and overclaiming, these faking indices are not without their
conceptual concerns and methodological weaknesses (Burns & Christiansen, 2011). Chiefly,
each index only captures improbable sets of response patterns (Burns & Christiansen, 2011),
which can lead to misclassification of fakers as honest and honest responders as fakers. For
example, it is possible for an applicant to be genuinely emotionally stable and conscientious, and
therefore, have high covariance between the two measures. It would be equally possible for any
given applicant to score high on idiosyncratic items for either trait, as well as have an extreme
response profile. As a result, organizations may filter out potential high performers who are
responding honestly, and, unintentionally, create concerns about the legal defensibility of their
hiring practices (Catano, Wiesner, & Hackett, 2010).
There are also faking indices that examine consistency across personality testing sessions.
Researchers can best use these indices when they have a set of the same people’s job applicant
personality scores and non-applicant personality scores, where presumably, they are answering
more honestly. The most intuitive and common faking index is to examine Individual Change
Scores (Burns & Christiansen, 2011; Dilchert & Ones, 2011; McFarland, 2003), which assess the
degree of change between job application and non-application conditions. The more an applicant
changes their score in a favorable direction, the more the applicant is faking. A limitation of this
faking index is that it is confounded by legitimate personality traits, where, for example, a
difference score may be derived both from faking and the personality score itself (Burns &
Christiansen, 2011). A modified approach is to calculate Residualized Change Scores, which
controls for non-applicant personality scores, theoretically providing a pure index of applicant
faking (Burns & Christiansen, 2011; Feeney & Goffin, 2015). This index is not confounded by
legitimate personality scores, but its mean scores are difficult to interpret.
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There are also three uncommon faking indices that have been used or suggesting by
researchers. The first is Percent Agreement, which examines the number of items that an
applicant answers exactly the same across two testing sessions (Gordon & Gross, 1978), such as
answering “agree” to “I work hard” in both test sessions. This faking index is simple to calculate
and gives a categorical score for each personality item—the applicant response is consistent in
both conditions or not; however, Percent Agreement scores are insensitive to the magnitude of
the difference. Furthermore, Percent Agreement scores do not differentiate between extreme
faking, such as where an applicant answers strongly agree and strongly disagree to the same item
across test sessions, or less severe faking, such as when an applicant switches from answering
strongly agree to agree. As a result, the Percent Agreement faking index artificially restricts
variance relating to applicant faking (Burns & Christiansen, 2011), limiting its ability to serve as
an effective faking index. The second uncommon faking index is Within-Subject Correlations
(Lautenschlager, 1986), which examines the correlations between applicant responses to
personality items in job applicant and non-applicant conditions. This faking index is sensitive to
changes in an applicant’s rank-order between the two response conditions, which is practical,
because rank order changes influence hiring decisions (Goffin & Christiansen, 2003). However,
this faking index is likely to demonstrate particularly poor reliability when there are small
sample sizes, as small changes in scores could produce larges changes in rank order (Burns &
Christiansen, 2011).
Finally, researches have also suggested in addition to Individual Change Scores, faking
scholars can also assess the variance of those change scores. This faking index, known as
Within-Subject Variance of Difference Scores, examines an applicant’s consistency when
answering personality items across sessions (Burns & Christiansen, 2011). However, this
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approach can be insensitive to mean shifts, because applicants can consistently shift their scores
to be more favorable by a small amount, and have a small faking score. By contrast, someone
else could have high variance in their difference scores, but not significantly improve their mean
personality score. As a result, this faking index may be more prone to conflating reliability with
faking than are other measures.
The common goal of these faking indices is that they attempt to identify people who
exhibit substantial differences in personality between the job applicant and non-applicant
conditions; however, it is unlikely that an organization would be able to obtain both job applicant
and non-applicant responses from job applicants. Therefore, these faking indices may be better
suited for the study of faking as a theoretical construct and to validate more practical faking
assessments that can be used in employment settings (Feeney & Goffin, 2015).
1.2 Determining How to Assess Applicant Faking
In the first study in this dissertation, I address a gap in the current literature by examining
the 12 reviewed faking assessments in a single investigation. To do so, I examine which faking
assessments are best able to distinguish between job applicant and non-applicant personality
scores, and to determine the best faking assessment for research and practice. Researchers often
use faking assessments interchangeably, as they theoretically assess the same underlying
construct; however, this idea remains untested with a motivated sample of job applicants
(Bensch, Paulhus, Stankov, & Ziegler, 2017). Currently, researchers and practitioners employ
different assessments to examine faking. This means that practitioners often use a single faking
assessment (Griffith & Peterson, 2008), such as a Social Desirability Scale, potentially
misclassifying applicants, and reducing the accuracy of hiring decisions (Donovan et al., 2013).
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Researchers often use different faking assessments to study the same phenomenon because they
use different study designs, yielding contradictory conclusions.
Thus, there is a clear need to examine the extent that different faking assessments
measure the same underlying construct—applicant faking. If a faking assessment is deficient, it
should be abandoned. If no single faking assessment stands out, then faking scholars may need
more than one assessment to triangulate around the construct of faking to boost the credibility of
classification. To address this limitation, I presented participants with a potential job opportunity,
and investigated how well each faking assessment differentiated between people who were
interested in the job and those who were not. I also compared how well each faking assessment
discriminated between the same person’s personality scores as an applicant and as a nonapplicant. Findings from Study 1 informed how to best assess applicant faking in Studies 2 and
3.
1.3 Preventing Applicant Faking: Faking Dissuasion Messages
In contrast to detecting faking, some scholars have developed techniques to prevent
faking (Dilchert & Ones, 2011). Research suggests that, in general, faking dissuasion messages
are among the most promising faking prevention techniques (Pace & Borman, 2006). Faking
dissuasion messages are embedded into the instructions of personality tests and can take multiple
forms. The most common method is to craft threatening faking dissuasion messages that warn of
removal from the hiring process. But, faking dissuasion messages can also be written to gently
persuade applicants not to fake, such as reminding applicants about the immorality of applicant
faking (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; Pace & Borman, 2006; Uruena & Robie, 2011).
The most common faking dissuasion message is the faking warning, where best practice
is to inform applicants that faking can be detected and will lead to immediate disqualification
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from the selection process (Dilchert & Ones, 2011; Donovan et al., 2003; Pace & Borman,
2006). This approach can reduce faking by 30 to 50% (Converse et al., 2008; Dwight &
Donovan, 2003; Fan et al., 2012; Goffin & Woods, 1995; Kuroyama, Wright, Manson, &
Sablynski, 2010; Landers et al., 2011; McFarland, 2003; Robson, Jones, & Abraham, 2008;
Vasilopoulos, Cucina, & McElreath, 2005), can reduce applicant faking in both applied and
laboratory situations (Dwight & Donovan, 2003), and is inexpensive and easy to employ
(Dilchert & Ones, 2011).
Despite these advantages, faking dissuasion messages suffer from a few limitations. First,
they can create negative applicant reactions (Converse et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2012; McFarland,
2003). Faking dissuasion messages, by definition, alert applicants that their competition may
fake, and may subsequently decrease the face validity of the personality tests (Fan et al., 2012).
Negative applicant reactions should matter to organizations because they can reduce the
likelihood that an applicant accepts a job offer or recommends your organization to others
(McCarthy, Bauer, Truxillo, Anderson, et al., 2017). Second, faking dissuasion messages may be
more effective for applicants with lower general mental ability than for applicants with higher
general mental ability, partially confounding personality scores with variance from general
mental ability (Vasilopoulos et al., 2005). Finally, applicants still fake after reading faking
dissuasion messages—they just fake less often (Dwight & Donovan, 2003). Thus, it may be
beneficial to improve faking dissuasion messages by using theory from other branches of
psychology.
1.4 Improving Faking Dissuasion Messages
To improve the potency of faking dissuasion messages, I incorporate accountability
theory (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989) to more effectively guide
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applicants to consider the possibility of being caught for faking. I also leveraged morality theory
(Haidt, 2001) to better dissuade faking by appealing to their moral values about faking. The goal
was to devise faking dissuasion messages that are more effective and reduce negative applicant
reactions. In Study 2, I examined these new faking dissuasion messages using job applicants for
a customer service position. It is important to acknowledge that Studies 1 and 2 use the same
data. The two studies investigate different questions and it would be infeasible to write them up
as a single publication. As result, they are presented separately. In study 3, I replicated the same
faking dissuasion messages in a military setting to examine if the messages can reduce faking
across organizational settings.
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Chapter 2
2. Comparing the Efficacy of 12 Applicant Faking Indices in Discriminating between Job
Applicant and Non-Applicant Personality Scores
2.1. Abstract
This study examined the assessment of applicant faking on personality tests. We
compared how 12 different faking indices differentiated between the same people’s personality
scores during a job application and a non-applicant condition, and how these faking assessments
discriminated between separate groups of job applicants and non-applicants. We recruited
workers from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to participate in a multi-session research study, where
we then presented an ostensibly real job opportunity and asked if they were interested. We had
349 Interested Job Applicants and 169 participants who were uninterested in the position
(“Uninterested Applicants”). After the first session, we informed applicants that the job was
fictitious and invited them to complete the same personality measures one week later, as nonapplicants. The manipulation was successful, as Interested Applicants received more desirable
personality scores than Uninterested Applicants, but only when they believed there was a real
job. Our results suggest that scholars and practitioners should use multiple faking assessments to
properly detect faking, including Residualized Change Scores, Blatant Extreme Responding,
Idiosyncratic Item Responding, and Communal Impression Management. Implications for future
research are discussed.
2.2. Introduction
Personality tests are commonly used by employee as selection tools and have utility in
predicting performance; however, applicant faking supresses their potential (Converse, Peterson,
& Griffith, 2009). Two-thirds of large corporations utilize personality testing when selecting for
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high-level positions and surveys suggest that personality is one of the most commonly assessed
constructs (Fallaw & Kantrowitz, 2013). Personality tests are popular because their scores
predict the three pillars of job performance: task performance, organizational citizenship
behaviors, and counterproductive work behaviors (Borman & Motowidlo, 1997; Marcus &
Schuler, 2004; Tett et al., 1991). One obstacle to personality testing is that job applicants are
often able to identify favorable responses and answer accordingly, inflating their scores and
probability of being hired (Converse et al., 2009; Griffith et al., 2007; Holden, Lambert,
D’Agata, & Book, 2017). Faking obstructs the psychometric properties of personality tests in job
applications, as it decreases reliability, convergent validity, and criterion-related validity
(Landers et al., 2011; M. H. Peterson, Griffith, Isaacson, et al., 2011; Robson et al., 2008).
Therefore, it is critical that hiring organizations be able to thwart applicant faking to improve the
validity of their hiring decisions.
Researchers have tackled the issue of applicant faking on personality tests for nearly a
century, yet there is no consensus on best practices to detect faking (Alex, 1965; Zickar &
Gibby, 2006). Some hiring organizations use faking dissuasion messages to prevent faking,
which are test instructions that attempt to dissuade applicants from faking. Although the
literature is generally supportive of the use of dissuasion messages, there are some inconsistent
findings with null or trivial effects (Dwight & Donovan, 2003). One potential explanation for
discrepant findings is that the extant literature on faking dissuasion messages assess faking
differently across studies, including: Blatant Extreme Responding (Boss et al., 2015; Landers et
al., 2011; Vasilopoulos et al., 2005), Bogus Items (Dwight & Donovan, 2003; Fan et al., 2012),
Residualized Change Scores (Feeney, Daljeet, & Goffin, 2017), and Social Desirability Scales
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(Fan et al., 2012; McFarland, 2003). How can organizations draw firm conclusions from the
current literature?
2.2.1. Aims of the Present Study
There are many techniques to assess applicant faking (Burns & Christiansen, 2011; Griffith
& Robie, 2013); however, studies examining how such techniques compare to each other are
scarce and non-exhaustive. The purpose of the current study is to answer critical questions
regarding the assessment of applicant faking including: (1) which faking assessments best
discriminate between different people’s job applicant and non-applicant personality scores; (2)
which faking assessments best discriminate between the same people’s applicant and nonapplicant personality scores; and (3) which faking assessments should be advised for future
research and practice. Accordingly, results of the current study may help researchers and
practitioners decide on a single faking assessment or combination of assessments that can be
used in practice. In the following sections, we review the most common faking assessments, and
then review literature on how these assessments relate to each other. Researchers in the area
often devote little attention to how their assessment of faking may influence their results (Griffith
& Peterson, 2008).
2.2.2. Positivity Bias: Social Desirability and Overclaiming
The most common method to assess applicant faking is to measure Socially Desirable
Responding (Griffith & Peterson, 2008). There are many Social Desirability Scales (Blasberg,
Rogers, & Paulhus, 2013), but in the selection context, they are generally used to “indicate a
deliberate choice to alter responses to appear more socially favorable” (Ellingson et al., 1999, p.
156). These scales are embedded within a personality test to capture the tendency to endorse
unusual—but desirable—items such as “I’ve never broken the law” (Li & Bagger, 2006).
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Theoretically, if an applicant endorses many of these items, then they are likely mispresenting
themselves. Some test publishers integrate these scales into their personality measures and offer
regression formulas to “correct” for faking (Goffin & Christiansen, 2003).
There are several concerns with social desirability scales. First and most detrimental,
evidence suggests that Socially Desirable Responding does not converge with other faking
assessments (Burns & Christiansen, 2006; Ellingson et al., 1999; Kuncel & Tellegen, 2009). As a
result, Socially Desirable Scales may misclassify honest responders as fakers or the reverse.
Secondly, these items are obvious to test takers, and evading them can be easily taught (Alex,
1965). Third, Socially Desirable Responding positively correlates with personality traits such as
extraversion (Li & Bagger, 2006; Uziel, 2010), and in turn, removing high scorers or adjusting
their scores may confound personality measurement.
Bogus Items and Overclaiming. To resolve the shortcomings of Social Desirability
Scales, scholars have measured the extent that applicants overstate their knowledge of fictitious
phenomena (Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, & Lysy, 2003). Within this broad approach, there are two
specific approaches to measuring knowledge about fictitious things: Bogus Items and
Overclaiming. Bogus Items require participants to endorse their familiarity with things that do
not exist, which often sound job-related (Dwight & Donovan, 2003; Fan et al., 2012). For
example, for a financial investment position, an applicant could be asked about their familiarity
with “exchange traded funds” (real) or “reverse mutual funds” (fictitious). The second approach
is “Overclaiming”, which is claiming to have general knowledge about broad topics such as
books, poems, history, and science, to both legitimate and fictitious items. For example, an
applicant may be asked about their knowledge of Napoleon (legitimate) or Queen Alberta
(fictitious). Applicants rate their familiarity with real and fictitious phenomena, and the more
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they endorse fictitious phenomena, the more likely they are faking (Bing et al., 2011). There are
a variety of methods to calculate Overclaiming (see Paulhus et al., 2003), but a typical approach
is to average familiarly scores on items that assess fictitious phenomena (Bing et al., 2011;
Feeney & Goffin, 2015). Statistically controlling for Overclaiming strengthens the veracity of
personality when predicting university grades (Bing et al., 2011).
2.2.3. Response Patterns: Single Administration
An alternate approach to assessing faking is to examine response patterns to personality
items within a single test administration (Burns & Christiansen, 2011). These response patterns
can be used as faking indices in real hiring scenarios and do not require burdening respondents
with additional items. They are also invisible to test-takers and, in theory, should be more
difficult for applicants to evade. Three of these approaches include: Idiosyncratic Item
Responding, Covariance Indices, and Blatant Extreme Responding.
Idiosyncratic Item Responding. Idiosyncratic Item Responding reflects shifts in
response patterns on items that differentiate fakers and honest responders. Idiosyncratic Item
Responding scales are produced in three steps (Kuncel & Borneman, 2007; Kuncel & Tellegen,
2009). In the first step, the distribution of scores for each personality item are compared in nonapplicant and job applicant samples, and items that best distinguish between the two samples are
identified. In the second step, an idiosyncratic item responding scale is produced by including
personality items that have large mean differences across the two test administrations. In the
third and last step, scale scores for each applicant are calculated. Idiosyncratic Item Responding
scores have been used to successfully distinguish between people instructed to “fake good” and
honest applicants (Holden et al., 2017; Kuncel & Borneman, 2007; Kuncel & Tellegen, 2009);
however, this approach has some conceptual and practical barriers. It is unclear if idiosyncratic
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items generalize across samples. Each organization may need to generate their own Idiosyncratic
Item Responding scales, which would require access to both non-applicant and job applicant
personality scores.
Covariance Index. Another approach is to examine the covariance between items that
assess conceptually distinct traits, but that are perceived as desirable to the target job (Burns &
Christiansen, 2011; Christiansen, Robie, Burns, & Speer, 2017). The covariance between traits
that are conceptually distinct and desirable should increase for fakers, but not those who are
answering honestly. This is because fakers will increase their scores across traits to look more
desirable to hiring organizations, which will increase the covariance between the traits. In our
literature review, only one study used a Covariance Index to measure faking (Christiansen et al.,
2017), but it is a measure that would be easy and practical to conduct in applied settings;
however, this approach is also not without its limitations. It is easy to imagine an applicant who
genuinely scored high on two conceptually distinct, yet job-related personality traits (e.g.,
Extraversion and Conscientiousness), and in turn, some of the best applicants may be incorrectly
identified as faking.
Blatant Extreme Responding. Blatant Extreme Responding is calculated by examining
the frequency of extreme answers—Strongly Agree or Strongly Disagree—throughout the
personality test. The assumption is that many extreme answers reflects faking (Landers et al.,
2011) because most people show variation in their responses under normal conditions
(Levashina, Weekley, Roulin, & Hauck, 2014). Blatant Extreme Responding has evidence of
construct validity (Levashina et al., 2014). Blatant Extreme Responding also has an intuitive
appeal: this approach is designed to catch the most severe misrepresentation. Removing
applicants with high scores on Blatant Extreme Responding is also unlikely to deflate the
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criterion-related validity of personality testing. This is because extreme scores can be detrimental
to performance (Le et al., 2011). Logical concerns with Blatant Extreme Responding are that it is
insensitive—detecting only extreme fakers—and it is easy for skilled applicants to evade
(Landers et al., 2011).
2.2.4. Response Patterns: Multiple Administrations
In contrast to the previously reviewed approaches, scholars have developed faking
indices that can be used when they have both job applicant and non-applicant personality scores
(Burns & Christiansen, 2011). These faking indices include: Individual Change Scores,
Residualized Change Scores, Percent Agreement, Within-Subject Correlations, Within-Subject
Variance Of The Differences. The unifying goal of these faking indices is to identify applicants
who exhibit differences between responding as a job applicant and when responding as a nonapplicant, where there is presumably less motivation to fake. That being said, it is unlikely that
an organization would have both sets of scores in a real hiring scenario, and in turn, these faking
indices are ideal for researchers to study faking as a theoretical construct, or to validate more
practical techniques (Feeney & Goffin, 2015). However, faking indices derived from repeated
measures designs of applicant faking are touted as being superior both conceptually and
empirically when compared to faking indices derived from a single test administration (Burns &
Christiansen, 2011; Dilchert, Ones, Viswesvaran, & Deller, 2006; Feeney & Goffin, 2015;
Gordon & Gross, 1978; Lautenschlager, 1986).
Individual Change Scores. Perhaps the most intuitive repeated measures faking index is
calculated by assessing the difference in personality scores when the same people complete the
personality measure as a job applicant and as a non-applicant. If applicant scores are more
favorable than non-applicant scores, than the difference is likely due to faking—with larger

28
differences reflecting more faking. Individual Change Scores have been used in many
investigations and exhibit strong psychometric properties (Dilchert et al., 2006; Feeney &
Goffin, 2015; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; M. H. Peterson, Griffith, Converse, & Gammon, 2011).
The major obstacle with Individual Change Scores is that the score, at least in theory, can be a
result of faking or legitimate personality scores (Burns & Christiansen, 2011). For example, a
difference score may reflect an applicant’s tendency to fake, but it also reflects their “room” to
fake—the extent that an applicant is able to make themselves look more favorable than their
honest score would permit. That is, someone with a favorable non-applicant score may have
limited capacity to improve their scores, whereas the reverse is true for someone with a naturally
unfavorable score. As a result, difference scores have limited use in theoretical studies of
applicant faking because their relationships with other variables may be due to either faking or
the legitimate personality trait that underlies them.
Residualized Change Scores. Residuals are computed by individually regressing
applicant responses to each personality item on the same personality item when completed in a
non-applicant condition. This process removes variance associated with honest scores, and in
theory, the residual reflects a purer assessment of faking than Individual Change Scores—
reducing inferential errors (Burns & Christiansen, 2011). Residualized Change Scores are
computed by averaging residuals across items. Thus, a high score reflects more faking than does
a low score (Feeney & Goffin, 2015); however, the limitation of these scores is that they are
ambiguous. For the same reason that Residualized Change Scores are uncontaminated by
legitimate personality variance, they have no discernable unit of measurement, and it is
impossible to draw meaningful comparisons between scores on distinct traits (Burns &
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Christiansen, 2011). Residualized Change Scores are also still possibly contaminated by
measurement error associated with the personality scale filled out during the job application.
Percent Agreement. As a measure of consistency across repeated administrations, we
can examine the percent of answers that stay the same. For example, agreement is achieved if
respondents answer “strongly agree” to “I like to keep things clean and tidy” as an applicant or
non-applicant (Gordon & Gross, 1978). Percent Agreement is sensitive to all sources of
measurement error and is also insensitive to the magnitude of the disagreement—outcomes for
each item are dichotomous (agreement or no agreement). If an applicant answered “5” as an
applicant, a non-applicant score of “1” or “4” would generate the same disagreement outcome. In
our search, Percent Agreement was rarely used in the faking literature. Thus, Percent Agreement
is a limited version of Individual Change Scores, that is unable to capture magnitude of change.
Within-Subject Correlation.
Another approach to examining applicant faking between multiple test administrations is
to examine the correlation between same person’s job applicant and non-applicant scores on the
same personality dimension, such as conscientiousness (Burns & Christiansen, 2011;
Lautenschlager, 1986). If an applicant is faking during a job application, the rank order of their
responses should vary from when the same applicant filled the same questions without
motivation to fake. For example, a job applicant may answer strongly agree to "I complete tasks
successfully," "I keep my promises", and "I work hard," because each item may look favorable to
a job. However, as a non-applicant, the same person may answer disagree, strongly agree, and
strongly disagree to the same items. Thus, the Within-Subject Correlation between the two sets
of responses would be low. By contrast, if someone completed the same personality test twice as
a non-applicant, their responses are likely to remain similar both times, resulting in higher
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Within-Subject Correlations. Thus, Within-Subject Correlations are inversely related to faking—
where lower scores are more indicative of applicant faking. The limitation of this index is that it
is insensitive to mean shifts. If an applicant increases their scores uniformly across items, they
may be undetected as a faker, and in turn, it may be best used when paired with other faking
assessments. Additionally, Within-Subject Correlations will be unstable with small sample sizes
or shorter personality inventories (Burns & Christiansen, 2011), which may be a limitation for
practitioners.
Within-Subject Variance of the Differences. The Within-Subject Variance of the
Differences faking index is similar to, but more sensitive, than Within Subject Correlations
(Lautenschlager, 1986). This measure “relies on computing the variance of the difference scores
across test administrations at the individual level” (Burns & Christiansen, 2011, p. 366). For
example, two job applicants may answer strongly agree to "I complete tasks successfully," "I
keep my promises", and "I work hard," because each item may look favorable to a job. However,
as non-applicants, one person may strongly agree, neutral, agree, and the other person might
answer strongly disagree, neutral, agree. In contrast to the within-subject correlation, we would
examine the difference for each response and calculate the variance of those difference scores. In
this example, the second applicant would be identified as faking more than the first applicant,
because there is more variation in their difference scores. The benefit of this measure is it
indexes change in both rank-order and overall variability (Burns & Christiansen, 2011). This
measure has some evidence of construct validity, although our review found only one study that
used it (Lautenschlager, 1986); however, this index is imperfect, as it also conflates faking and
measurement error. In the next section, we develop our specific research questions.
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2.2.5. Differentiating Applicant and Non-Applicant Personality Scores
The main purpose of this study is to determine which faking assessment(s) should be
advised for use in research and practice. We accomplished this using two approaches. First, we
sought to examine how each faking assessment predicts the same people’s applicant and nonapplicant scores on each personality dimension. We call this approach “Within-Subjects Faking
Sensitivity.” A faking index will have higher Within-Subjects Faking Sensitivity if there is a
significant difference in its correlation with the same people’s applicant and non-applicant
personality scores. A faking index will have lower Within-Subjects Faking Sensitivity if it
correlates similarly with both job applicant and non-applicant personality scores. Therefore,
Within-Subject Faking Sensitivity scores range on a continuum from 0 (no sensitivity) to 1 (high
sensitivity). Within-Subjects Faking Sensitivity scores were calculated separately for each
personality dimension and then averaged for a composite score. If a faking assessment has low
Within-Subjects Faking Sensitivity, it will have limited utility in screening out applicants who
successfully fake during a job application—those who increase their scores on desirable
personality traits relative to their non-applicant scores.
One potential concern is that faking assessments that utilize repeated measures designs
(i.e., applicant vs. mon-applicant assessments) should demonstrate higher Within-Subjects
Faking Sensitivity than faking assessments that are derived from applicant scores only. We argue
that this is a feature of the Within-Subjects Faking Sensitivity score, not a limitation or inherent
bias. The current “gold standard” of applicant faking measures—Residualized Change Scores—
take personality scores from a job application and remove all shared variance with personality
scores during non-applicant conditions (Feeney & Goffin, 2015). This leaves a residual, that in
theory, represents pure faking. This is precisely why faking scholars favor Residualized Change
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Scores and it makes sense that Residualized Change Scores should demonstrate high WithinSubjects Faking Sensitivity. Moreover, Within-Subjects Faking Sensitivity can still be used to
determine which faking assessments should be used in practical settings when repeated measures
designs are infeasible. Being able to identify applicants who distort their scores during a job
application is, ultimately, the overarching goal of assessing applicant faking (Donovan et al.,
2013).
Research Question 1: To what extent will the faking indices demonstrate WithinSubjects Faking Sensitivity?
The second approach to assess the efficacy of the faking assessments was to examine the
extent that that they discriminate between job applicants and non-applicants. We call this
“Between-Subjects Faking Sensitivity”, and calculated it by comparing mean scores on each
faking assessment between job applicants and non-applicants and then calculated Cohen’s D
effect size estimates (Christiansen et al., 2017). In theory, if a faking assessment is capturing
faking, then job applicants, who are presumably faking more than non-applicants, should score
significantly higher on that measure than non-applicants. The more effective the faking
assessment, the higher the effect size should be.
Research Question 2: To what extent will the faking indices demonstrate BetweenSubjects Faking Sensitivity?
2.2.6. Determining Faking Assessments for Future Research and Practice
Once we identify faking assessments that demonstrate both Within-Subjects Faking
Sensitivity and Between-Subjects Faking Sensitivity, it is also important to examine how these
faking assessments relate to each other. For example, if two faking assessments demonstrate high
faking sensitivity, but do not correlate highly with one another, then both faking assessments
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need to be used to detect applicant faking. By contrast, if two faking assessments demonstrate
have similar validity, but are also highly correlated, then the assessment that is most convenient
can be used. Another concern is that many of the most promising faking assessments in the
extant literature require repeated measures designs, such as Individual Change Scores, which are
not useful in applied settings (Burns & Christiansen, 2011). Therefore, it is important to find
practical faking assessments that can be used to approximate them for practitioners who use
personality testing for hiring decisions. As a result, we also examine the bivariate correlations
between each of our faking assessments.
Research Question 3: Which Faking Assessments should be recommended for future
research and practice?
2.3. Method
2.3.1. Participants and Procedure
We recruited 779 people for a two-session study on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mTurk).
Participants were paid $2 for their time, which is consistent with the mTurk average rate of $1.17
per hour (Mason & Suri, 2012). All participants were presented with a fictitious job opportunity
for a remote customer service position that would enable them to work from home—consistent
with the work they do on mTurk. After viewing the posting (see Appendix A), applicants
indicated if they were interested in the position (“Interested Applicants”) or not (“Uninterested
Applicants”). Interested Applicants were informed that successful candidates would be recruited
for a video-conferenced job interview. We modelled the job posting from a real customer-service
job posting and the Customer Service Representatives section of the Occupational Information
Network (O*NET; Listing #43-4051.00; N. G. Peterson et al., 2001). From our initial sample,
572 applicants completed both sessions (73.4%). We dropped applicants who did not participate
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in both sessions as we would not be able to calculate many of our faking indices for these
applicants. We subsequently dropped and additional 38 applicants for failing careless responding
checks.
The resulting sample included 357 Interested Applicants (Mage = 35.10, SD = 10.64). The
majority were female (n = 223), employed full time (n = 225) or part-time (n = 71). Our
Interested Applicants reported a modal income of $30,000 to $39,999 USD (n = 69), and a modal
education of a four-year university degree (n = 135). We also had 177 Uninterested Applicants
that were used in our analyses (Mage = 34.14, SD = 11.82). The majority were female (n = 96),
employed full-time (n = 131), the modal income was $20,000 to $29,000 USD (n = 24), and the
modal education (n = 57) was a four-year university degree. Interested and Uninterested
Applicants reported similar demographics, although the modal income was slightly lower for
Uninterested Applicants than for Interested Applicants.
The present study emerged from an interest in comparing how four different faking
dissuasion messages were able to reduce the extent that applicants faked on the personality
assessment. As a result, applicants were assigned at random to one of the five conditions: an
immediate authentication message (n = 90), which explained that answers could be verified using
internal integrity check and references; a future authentication warning (n = 117) that mentioned
that personality items would be verified against future job behavior; a moral suasion prompt (n =
103) that reminded applicants that faking was morally wrong; a traditional warning (n = 119)
that emphasised both the risk of being identified and disqualified from the selection process; and
finally, a no-warning control group (n = 105). Applicants in the four dissuasion message
conditions read their respective personality test instructions prior to completing personality
measurement, whereas the control group read standard instructions without a warning. As shown
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in our preliminary analyses below, there were no mean differences in personality scores and the
conclusions from the present study were generally consistent across conditions. As a result, we
proceeded with comparing how the different faking assessments measured applicant faking
across conditions.
The personality measure included a Social Desirability Scale and careless responding
checks. Applicants also rated their endorsement of Bogus Items. As a reminder, many of the
faking assessments in our study are derived from the personality scores. Upon completion of the
first session, applicants were informed that we were not working with a real company. We
informed all applicants—interested and uninterested—that they would have the opportunity to
take part in a second session in exchange for payment. Applicants were invited to the second
survey one week later to reduce carryover effects, which has been used in previous faking
research in repeated measures designs (M. H. Peterson, Griffith, Isaacson, et al., 2011). At the
beginning of the second session, we reminded them that the employment opportunity was
fictitious and to respond as honestly as possible. Similar to the first session, participants in the
second session completed measures of personality, which included a Social Desirability Scale
and careless responding checks. For all applicants, we refer to the sessions as “Time 1” and
“Time 2”. For the Interested Applicants, Time 1 scores are equivalent to job applicant scores and
Time 2 are equivalent to non-applicant scores. For Uninterested Applicants, Time 1 and Time 2
scores are both equivalent to non-applicant scores.
2.3.2. Measures
Personality. Personality was assessed using the International Personality Item Pool
(IPIP; Goldberg et al., 2006), which examines: Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional
Stability, Extraversion, And Openness. These dimensions were assessed using 120 items on a 5-
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point response scale (from 1 = “Strongly Disagree” to 5 = “Strongly Agree”). Internal
consistencies for the five dimensions of personality range between .87 and .90 on the 120-item
IPIP (Maples et al., 2014). Additionally, all five dimensions on the 120-item scale were found to
correlate meaningfully with respective NEO Personality Inventory dimension, with coefficients
ranging between .87 and .90 (Maples et al., 2014). We acknowledge that there are many other
personality measures used in research and practice, but we used the five-factor model for greater
parsimony with the broader faking literature (Birkeland et al., 2006).
Careless Responding. Following best practices in measuring careless responding
(Meade & Craig, 2012), we asked applicants to answer six verifiable items (e.g., how much they
agree with “The sum of 2+ 2 is 10.”) that were dispersed throughout the personality test. We also
asked our participants whether we should include their data in our final analyses, with a
guarantee that they would receive payment regardless of their answer. These approaches are
generally sufficient in detecting careless responders.
Faking.
As we will review, many of the faking assessments in this study were derived from
personality scores, which can be computed for specific traits or across traits. For example, we
could create an Idiosyncratic Item Responding scale that consists of just idiosyncratic
conscientiousness items, or we could create an Idiosyncratic Item Responding scale with
idiosyncratic items from all five personality dimensions. In theory, the former scale should have
an advantage when predicting faking on just Conscientiousness, which would be an unfair
comparison to faking measures such as Impression Management or Bogus Items that supposedly
predict faking more generally. Thus, when personality scores were required, we used personality
scores on all five personality traits to ensure that some measures were not given an unfair
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advantage in predicting faking. However, if a practitioner is only using one or two personality
dimensions for hiring, they may be interested in crafting a measure from only these dimensions.
Individual Change Scores. Individual Change Scores measure the extent that
someone changes their scores across repeated sessions (Burns & Christiansen, 2011). Individual
Change Scores can be calculated for separately for personality traits (Feeney & Goffin, 2015;
McFarland & Ryan, 2006). Individual Change Scores also demonstrate high internal consistency
and convergent validity with other faking assessments, including self-reported faking admission
(Feeney & Goffin, 2015). For all applicants, we subtracted scores on each personality item
during Time 2 from the same item’s score during Time 1. We would expect Individual Change
Scores should be positively related to applicant faking.
Residualized Change Scores. Residualized Change Scores are similar to
Individual Change Scores, except that variance related to legitimate personality traits are
removed (Burns & Christiansen, 2011). For each applicant, we calculated Residualized Change
Scores by regressing each personality item score during Time 1 on the same personality item
score during Time 2, and saved the residuals. These residuals reflect Time 1 personality scores
without variance associated with Time 2 personality scores. We then computed the mean across
these residuals, where higher scores reflect faking. In theory, Residualized Change Scores are a
“pure” faking assessment that is no longer conflated with legitimate personality variance (Feeney
& Goffin, 2015). This allows faking scholars to examine how faking relates to other traits. If a
faking scholar examines how Individual Change Scores relate to other variables, the relationship
could be driven by faking or the personality variables used to calculate them. By contrast,
relationships between RCS and other traits are not confounded by applicant personality.
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Residualized Change Scores have a high internal consistency (alpha = .86) and have been used
successfully in other investigations (Feeney & Goffin, 2015).
Bogus Items. We crafted six Bogus Items that sound related to the customer
service job, which included: “customer first-order logic”, “remote method invocation”, “remote
procedure call”, “inverse body language”, “DCM”, and “customer service intelligence test”.
Knowledge of these items were measured using 5-point response scales (0 = “Very Unfamiliar”,
4 = “Very familiar”). These items were randomly mixed with a scale of 24 legitimate customer
service terms that were derived from a customer service training book (Leland & Bailey, 2006),
and foils were sought out on multiple search engines to ensure they were not real customer
service terms. This process to create Bogus Items is consistent with the extant literature (Dwight
& Donovan, 2003; Levashina, Morgeson, & Campion, 2009). The full scale is included in
Appendix B.
Social Desirability. We measured Social Desirability using the Bi-Dimensional
Impression Management Index (Blasberg et al., 2013). This scale assesses two distinct forms of
impression management: agentic, which involves “exaggerating one’s social or intellectual
status” (e.g., “I’m usually the one to come up with the big ideas”; and communal, which involves
“denying socially deviant impulses and claiming pious attributes” (e.g., “I don’t gossip about
other people’s business” (Blasberg et al., 2013, p. 523). Both Agentic Impression Management
and Communal Impression Management subscales are assessed using 10 items measured on a 5point response scales (1 = “Strongly Disagree” to 5 = “Strongly Agree”). Internal consistencies
exceeded .70 across two studies, and there is evidence of both convergent and discriminant
validity (Blasberg et al.). These items were embedded randomly throughout the Personality
assessment.
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Idiosyncratic Item Responding. Idiosyncratic personality items are those that
differentiate job applicant responses from non-applicant responses (Kuncel & Borneman, 2007).
Prior studies identified idiosyncratic items by visually comparing score distributions for the same
items in job applicant and non-applicant samples (Kuncel & Borneman, 2007; Kuncel &
Tellegen, 2009). We preferred an empirical approach to visual inspections for the detection of
idiosyncratic items, because we found eyeballing differences were unreliable. To identify
idiosyncratic items, we examined mean differences for each item during Time 1 in the interested
applicant and uninterested applicant samples. We selected the items with the 10 largest mean
differences for our Idiosyncratic Item Responding scale. Items and data are reported in Appendix
C. In theory, higher Idiosyncratic Item Responding scores should reflect higher levels of faking.
One potential concern with this approach is that when a scale is created and used
within the same sample, the scale will capitalize on sample specific variance (Cureton, 1950).
This is problematic if a practitioner plans to use the same scale for future job applicant pools
without first validating it. Before an Idiosyncratic Item Responding scale can be generalized to
future applicant pools, it must follow appropriate scale creation guideline—developed in one
sample and validated in a second sample (Hinkin, 1995, 1998). As a result, findings from the
present study could potentially overestimate the efficacy of Idiosyncratic Item Responding.
Blatant Extreme Responding. We calculated Blatant Extreme Responding by
summing the frequency that applicants endorsed the most favorable response (i.e., strongly agree
or strongly disagree) on each conscientiousness item during Time 1. Thus, for each item, an
applicant received a score of 1 (extreme) or 0 (not extreme), and we calculated the sum of those
extreme responses. This approach differs from the Blatant Extreme Responding used by Landers
et al. (2011), who assigned scores (0, .25, .5, .75, 1) for each level of the Likert scale (1 to 5,

40
respectively) and then calculated the sum. One limitation of the Landers approach is that it is a
transformation of the mean, and in turn, is logically conflated with legitimate personality scores.
The main utility of measuring faking is to differentiate between those who are genuinely high on
a trait and those who are not, so companies know who to hire and who to screen out—the
Landers approach fails to do this. Our approach measures the tendency to answer with the most
extreme answer, rather than just achieving a high overall score. This should lessen—but not
eliminate—the chief limitation of the Landers approach to calculating Blatant Extreme
Responding, which may flag the very people a firm wants to hire as fakers. Thus, we counted the
frequency of extremely favorable responses across all five personality dimensions, where higher
scores should reflect more faking.
Covariance Indices. We calculated two covariance indices based on prior
studies (Christiansen et al., 2017). The first, Covariance Index-Personality examines the
covariance between personality items, during Time 1, that are desirable to the job, but are also
uncorrelated under non-applicant conditions. In theory, higher scores on Covariance IndexPersonality reflects more faking. Increased covariance between job-related personality items
during a job application suggests that applicants are responding to the conceptually distinct
personality items as if they are measuring the same construct.
To calculate Covariance Index-Personality, we conducted an expert judgment panel to
determine the job-relatedness of our personality items across all traits. Our sample consisted of
15 experts in industrial and organizational psychology—familiar with both personality
measurement and personnel selection: two recent doctoral graduates, nine doctoral students, and
four master’s students. Each expert provided a set of job-relatedness ratings (5-point scale from 1
= “Not at all Important” to 5 = “Extremely Important”) and were paid $10 for their assistance.
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For job relatedness, one expert was dropped for having unacceptably low inter-rater reliability (r
< .50). The ICC (3, k; Shrout & Fleiss, 1979) for job-relatedness ratings was .96. We
subsequently selected all personality items that had a mean job-relatedness score higher than
four, which was equivalent to “Important” in the expert judgment survey.
We then searched for items that were generally uncorrelated (-.1 to .1) in our
Uninterested Applicant sample. Since these applicants were uninterested in the job, there is less
concern that their data are contaminated by the potential of a job offer. We chose a range of -.1
to .1 as correlations below.10 are less than Cohen’s guidelines for a small effect size, suggesting
that there is no relationship between the variables (Cohen, 1992). Given that we were interested
in reducing the potential that the job application influenced responses, we examined the
covariance of personality scores during Time 2. We found a total of 35 uncorrelated item pairs.
Once we identified our uncorrelated item pairs, we standardized Time 1 personality scores
separately for Interested and Uninterested Applicants, computed the cross-products for all itempairs, and calculated the average. This procedure produced in a composite Covariance IndexPersonality for each applicant (as describd by Christiansen et al., 2017). As done in Christiansen
et al. (2017), we also derived a second index, Covariance Index-Impression Management from
our Agentic and Communal Impression Management items using the same guidelines. We
crafted a list of 57 uncorrelated item pairs, standardized Impression Management scores during
Time 1 separately for Interested Applicants and Uninterested Applicants, computed the crossproducts for all item-pairs, and calculated the average. For both Covariance Index-Personality
and Covariance Index-Impression Management, with higher scores reflecting more faking.
Percent Agreement. To measure Percent Agreement, we examined the number of
personality item scores that remained consistent across Time 1 and Time 2 for both our
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Interested Applicants and Uninterested Applicants, and calculated the average (Burns &
Christiansen, 2011; Lautenschlager, 1986). Thus, for each pair of responses, we coded if the
answer remained consistent (1) or inconsistent (0), summed the number of items that remained
consistent, and divided it by the number of personality items. The final indicator suggests the
percentage of responses to our personality measure that changed between the two times, where
lower scores theoretically reflecting more faking.
Within-Subject Correlation. An additional approach to assessing applicant
faking is to determine the extent that the rank order of responses remain consistent across Time 1
and Time 2 (Burns & Christiansen, 2011). We evaluated rank-order consistency for each
applicant by calculating the correlation between their two sets of personality scores separately
for each dimension (Time 1 and Time 2). Next, we calculated the average Within-Subject
Correlation across the five personality dimensions to receive a final composite score. Thus, each
applicant received a single score ranging from -1 to 1, where negative or smaller Within-Subjects
Correlations should indicate more faking.
Within-Subject Variance of the Differences. The final approach we used to
measure applicant faking is examining the Within-Subject Variance of the Differences (Burns &
Christiansen, 2011; Lautenschlager, 1986). To calculate this measure, we summed the variance
for each personality dimension during Time 1 and Time 2, and then subtracted the covariance for
the same personality dimension’s scores between the two times. The result is a measure of rankorder consistency for each personality dimension that is sensitive to changes in variance between
the two personality assessments. We then calculated the average of the Within-Subject Variance
of the Differences scores across personality dimensions to derive a single composite score.
Theoretically, higher scores should suggest more faking.
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2.4. Results
2.4.1. Preliminary Analysis
One potential concern is that this dataset was part of an investigation that examined the
efficacy of four different faking dissuasion messages on personality assessment when compared
to a no-warning control group. The faking dissuasion messages were ineffective, and in turn,
mean personality scores did not significantly differ across conditions. As a result, for this
investigation, we aggregated across faking dissuasion message conditions to analyze the faking
measures. There are no theoretical reasons to believe the efficacy of faking assessments should
vary based on ineffective faking dissuasion messages. Still, to test for this potential confound, we
conducted a MANOVA with faking dissuasion condition as the independent variable and each of
our 12 faking measures as the dependent variables to ensure that faking assessment scores did
not differ as a function of the warning condition. The MANOVA analysis was insignificant,
suggesting there were no differences in faking across the faking dissuasion messages, F(48,
1893.42) = .89, p = .70, Wilk’s Λ = .92. In the interest of transparency, we report the main
within-subjects and between-subjects faking sensitivity analyses for each condition (Appendix
D).
Many of our faking assessments are derived from change in personality scores overtime
and one potential concern with our study design is carryover effects. If our job application
manipulation was successful, we would expect that Interested Applicants would receive
significantly more favorable personality scores than Uninterested Applicants during Time 1, but
not Time 2—when applicants were told that the job was fictitious. We conducted a repeated
measures MANOVA with job interest as the between subjects, time as the within-subjects
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Table 1. Pairwise Comparisons of Personality Scores by Job Interest in Time 1 and Time 2
Time 1
Time 2
Personality
Uninterested
Uninterested
Interested Applicants
Interested Applicants
Dimension
Applicants
Applicants
d
d
M
SE
95% CI
M
SE
95% CI
M
SE
95% CI
M
SE
95% CI
Conscientiousness
4.30 0.03
[4.25,
4.03 0.04
[3.96,
.52 3.95 0.03
[3.89,
3.91 0.04
[3.83,
.07
4.36]
4.11]
4.01]
4.00]
Agreeableness
3.95 0.02
[3.90,
3.75 0.04
[3.68,
.42 3.73 0.03
[3.67,
3.67 0.04
[3.59,
.11
4.00]
3.82]
3.78]
3.75]
Emotional Stability
3.87 0.04
[3.80,
3.60 0.05
[3.50,
.39 3.43 0.04
[3.35,
3.47 0.06
[3.36,
3.94]
3.70]
3.51]
3.58]
.05
Openness
3.47 0.03
[3.42,
3.49 0.04
[3.42,
- 3.45 0.03
[3.39,
3.48 0.04
[3.39,
3.52]
3.57]
.05
3.51]
3.56]
.05
Extraversion
3.65 0.03
[3.59,
3.44 0.04
[3.35,
.38 3.38 0.03
[3.31,
3.36 0.05
[3.26,
.04
3.71]
3.52]
3.44]
3.45]
Note. This table includes the estimated marginal means, standard errors, and 95% confidence intervals for each personality dimension
in Time 1 and in Time 2. Ns for Interested and Uninterested Applicants were 357 and 177 respectively. Cohen’s D were calculated
using the descriptive statistics, which may vary slightly from the estimated marginal means.
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variable, and the Big Five personality dimensions scores as the dependent variables. There were
significant multivariate effects for both job interest, F(5, 528) = 3.82, p = .002, Wilk’s Λ = .97.
and time, F(5, 528) = 41.33, p < .001, Wilk’s Λ = .72. Main effects were qualified by a
significant multivariate interaction, F(5, 528) = 10.75, p < .001, Wilk’s Λ = .91. Univariate tests
of the interaction effects were significant for: Agreeableness, F(1, 532) = 20.84, p < . 001, p =
.04; Conscientiousness, F(1, 532) = 40.48, p < . 001, p = .07; Extraversion, F(1, 532) = 27.30,
p < . 001, p = .05; and Emotional Stability, F(1, 532) = 44.11, p < .001, p = .07. There were
no significant effects for Openness. This is consistent with the literature, as job applicants fake
the least on Openness (Birkeland et al., 2006). Pairwise comparisons of the estimated marginal
means compared Interested Applicants and Uninterested Applicants for each personality
dimension at Times 1 and 2. Interested Applicants received significantly more favorable
personality scores on Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, Extraversion, and Agreeableness
than Uninterested Applicants during Time 1, but not during Time 2. The results of the pairwise
comparisons are reported in Table 1.
2.4.2. Within-Subjects Faking Sensitivity
To explore our first research question about the extent that each faking measure
differentiates between our Interested Applicants Time 1 and Time 2 personality scores, we
calculated a Within-Subjects Faking Sensitivity index separately for each personality dimension,
by subtracting how well each faking index predicted personality scores during Time 2, from how
well the same faking index predicted the same personality score during Time 1. Table 2 presents
the means, standard deviations, bivariate correlations, internal consistencies, of our faking and
personality measures for the Interested Applicant sample (n = 357). We then conducted Fisher’s
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Table 2. Interested Applicants: Descriptive Statistics, Bivariate Correlations, and Internal Consistencies
Measure
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

M

BER
8.62
BIMI-A
2.92
BIMI-C
3.27
Bogus
15.48
CVI-P
0.17
CVI-IM
0.13
ICS
0.26
IIR
4.07
PCT
0.56
RCS
0.06
WSC
0.43
WSVD
1.34
T1-C
4.30
T2-C
3.95
T1-A
3.95
T2-A
3.73
T1-N
3.87
T2-N
3.43
T1-O
3.47
T2-O
3.45
T1-E
3.65
T2-E
3.38

SD

1
(.87)
.45
.55
.14
.18
.28
.30
.72
.04
.73
-.10
.51
.74
.48
.51
.29
.68
.37
.28
.25
.60
.32

2

Bivariate Correlations
3
4
5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

4.93
(.73)
0.59
.49 (.80)
0.77
.31
.18 (.83)
5.85
.08
.17
.09
0.46
.18
.12
.15 .30
0.33
.09
.28
.02
.05
.07
(.93)
0.32
.49
.57
.20 -.02 .18 .27 (.83)
0.62
.01
.01
-.11
.05 .09 -.61
.05 (.84)
0.14
.36
.54
.10 .01 .17 .76
.73 -.29 (.93)
0.28
-.18
-.21 -.18 -.11 -.02 -.47 -.16
.56 -.33 (.57)
0.15
.19
.26
.12 .17 .12 .44
.20 -.33
.38 -.59
0.72
(.75)
.45
.62
.08 -.01 .16 .28
.79
.10
.71 -.08
.20 (.92)
0.51
.35
.37
.06 -.02 .09 -.36
.55
.48
.17
.20
-.04
.71
0.59
-.01
.42 -.09 -.03 .09 .31
.54
.07
.62 -.04
.12
.51
0.43
-.04
.25
-.05
-.09
.02
-.30
.32
.39
.11
.27
-.18
.30
0.49
.55
.54
.18 -.05 .15 .18
.83
.11
.66 -.15
.18
.70
0.67
.38
.25
.13
-.07
.09
-.48
.52
.51
.07
.19
-.15
.41
0.76
.00
-.03 -.05 .03 .11 .14
.02
.05
.32 -.01
-.02
.02
0.52
.01
.01 -.08 .03 .08 -.08
.02
.05
.17
.06
-.09
.02
0.57
.50
.33
.31 .05 .19 .18
.63 -.02
.59 -.13
.17
.42
0.56
.37
.07
.26 -.01 .14 -.38
.37
.29
.08
.13
-.12
.18
0.64
Note. N = 357. Internal consistencies are bolded along the diagonal. T1 = Time 1. T2 = Time 2. C =
Conscientiousness. A = Agreeableness. N = Emotional Stability. O = Openness. E = Extraversion. M = Average
Faking Sensitivity Score. BER = Blatant Extreme Scores. BIMI-A = Agentic Impression Management. BIMI-C =
Communal Impression Management. IIR = Idiosyncratic Item Responding. RCS = Residual Change Scores. PCT =
Percent Agreement. ICS = Individual Change Scores. WSC = Within Subjects Correlation. WSVD = Within-Subject
Variance of the Differences. CVI-P = Covariance Index-Personality. CVI-IM = Covariance Index-Impression
Management. p < .01 if r > |.13|. p < .05 if r > |.11|.
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Table 2 Continued.
Measure
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

BER
BIMI-A
BIMI-C
Bogus
CVI-P
CVI-IM
ICS
IIR
PCT
RCS
WSC
WSVD
T1-C
T2-C
T1-A
T2-A
T1-N
T2-N
T1-O
T2-O
T1-E
T2-E

14

15

16

(.91)
.25
.40
.52
.63
-.09
.01
.28
.36

(.83)
.69
.40
.12
.18
.18
.22
-.02

(.83)
.23
.31
.07
.20
.08
.14

Bivariate Correlations
17
18
19

(.93)
.71 (.93)
.01 -.09
.04 -.01
.57
.37
.39
.55

(.83)
.86
.24
.16

20

(.85)
.18
.17

21

22

(.90)
.76 (.91)
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r-to-z transformations for dependent correlations to determine if these differences were
statistically significant (Steiger, 1980).
The formula we used to calculate these scores were:
(1)

Within-Subjects Faking Sensitivity = rt1(Faking Index, Time 1 Personality) - rt2 (Faking Index, Time 2 Personality)

We then averaged the scores across personality dimensions to develop a composite WithinSubjects Faking Sensitivity score. As shown in Table 3, both Individual Change Scores (WithinSubjects Faking Sensitivity = .54) and Residualized Change Scores (Within-Subjects Faking
Sensitivity = .46) performed the best discriminating between the same interested applicant’s
Time 1 and Time 2 personality scores. However, both Idiosyncratic Item Responding (WithinSubjects Faking Sensitivity = .21) and Blatant Extreme Responding (Within-Subjects Faking
Sensitivity = .22) performed reasonably well, which is informative for practitioners because
these measures can be calculated without non-applicant scores. The results suggest that WithinSubjects Variance of the Differences, Communal Impression Management, Within-Subjects
Correlations, and Percent Agreement discriminated between interested applicant’s Time 1 and
Time 2 personality scores. Bogus Items, Covariance Index-Personality, Covariance IndexImpression Management, and Agentic Impression Management all performed poorly relative to
other faking assessments.
2.4.3. Between-Subjects Faking Sensitivity
An additional approach to assess how well faking assessments capture faking on
personality tests is to compare mean faking scores between Interested Applicants and
Uninterested Applicants during Time 1. If a faking assessment is truly capturing variance
relating to faking, Interested Applicants should receive higher scores on that assessment than
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Table 3. Within-Subject Faking Sensitivity
Within-Subjects Faking Sensitivity (rd = rt1-rt2)
C
A
N
O
E
M
1. ICS
.64***
.61***
.66*** .22**
.56***
.54
2. RCS
.54***
.51***
.59*** .15*
.51***
.46
3. WSVD
.24**
.30***
.33*** .07
.29***
.25
4. BER
.26***
.22***
.31*** .03
.28***
.22
5. IIR
.24***
.22***
.31*** .00
.26***
.21
6. BIMI-C
.25***
.17*
.29*** -.04
.26***
.19
7. BIMI-A
.10
.03
.17**
-.01
.13*
.08
8. CVI-IM
.07
.07
.06
.03
.05
.06
9. CVI-P
.01
.06
.02
.00
.06
.03
10. Bogus
.02
-.04
.05
.03
.05
.02
11. WSC
-.28*** -.31***
-.34*** -.07
-.26*** -.25
12. PCT
-.38*** -.32***
-.40*** -.11
-.31*** -.30
Note. N = 357. BER = Blatant Extreme Scores. BIMI-A = Agentic Impression
Management. BIMI-C = Communal Impression Management. IIR =
Idiosyncratic Item Responding. RCS = Residual Change Scores. PCT =
Percent Agreement. ICS = Individual Change Scores. WSC = Within Subjects
Correlation. WSVD = Within-Subject Variance of the Differences. CVI-P =
Covariance Index-Personality. CVI-IM = Covariance Index-Impression
Management. We tested for the difference between two dependent correlations
for each of the personality dimensions using two-tailed r-to-z transformations.
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05
Faking Index
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would Uninterested Applicants. We conducted a MANOVA with job interest as the independent
variable and the 12 faking assessments as the dependent variables. The MANOVA revealed a
significant multivariate effect, F(12, 494) = 9.76, p < .001, Wilk’s Λ = .81. Interested Applicants
scored significantly higher on Blatant Extreme Responding, Agentic Impression Management,
Communal Impression Management, Bogus Items, Individual Change Scores, Idiosyncratic Item
Responding, Residualized Change Scores, and Within-Subject Variance of the Differences than
did Uninterested Applicants. Interested Applicants had significantly lower Percent Agreement
and Within-Subjects Correlations than did Uninterested Applicants. Covariance IndexPersonality and Covariance Index-Impression Management did not differ significantly between
Interested and Uninterested Applicants. Means, standard deviations, and effect sizes are reported
in Table 4. The effect sizes provide an index of Between-Subjects Faking Sensitivity.
2.4.4. Uninterested Applicants
Finally, in Table 5, we present the means, standard deviations, bivariate correlations, and
internal consistencies for all faking indices and personality measures for our Uninterested
Applicants.
2.4.5. Supplemental Analysis: Covariance Indices
An anomalous finding is that neither the Covariance Index-Personality or Covariance
Index-Impression Management performed well in our study. Both measures showed limited
Within-Subjects Faking Sensitivity and neither measure demonstrated significant BetweenSubjects Faking Sensitivity. One major difference between Christiansen et al.’s (2017) study and
the current one is that in their study, the researchers used a “fake good” experimental design with
university students, and these samples tend to have considerably higher levels of faking
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Table 4. Between-Subjects Faking Sensitivity
Interested Applicants
Uninterested Applicants
d
M
SE
95% CI
M
SE 95% CI
1. IIR
4.07
.04 [4, 4.14]
3.58
.05 [3.48, 3.68]
.76***
2. RCS
.06
.01 [.03, .08]
-.13
.02 [-.17, -.09]
.72***
3. BIMI-C
3.27
.04 [3.19, 3.35]
2.83
.06 [2.72, 2.95]
.59***
4. ICS
.26
.02 [.23, .29]
.09
.02 [.05, .13]
.61***
5. BER
8.53
.26 [8.02, 9.04]
6.13
.37 [5.41, 6.86]
.51***
6. Bogus
15.38
.31 [14.78, 15.99] 12.81
.44 [11.95, 13.67] .45***
7. BIMI-A
2.91
.03 [2.85, 2.97]
2.72
.04 [2.63, 2.8]
.33**
8. WSVD
1.33
.04 [1.26, 1.4]
1.13
.05 [1.03, 1.23]
.31**
9. CVI-IM
.14
.02 [.10, .17]
.09
.03 [.04, .15]
.14
10. CVI-P
.17
.03 [.11, .22]
.18
.04 [.10, .25]
-.02
11. WSC
.43
.01 [.42, .45]
.46
.01 [.44, .49]
-.20*
12. PCT
.56
.01 [.54, .57]
.61
.01 [.59, .63]
-.37***
Note. This table presents the estimated marginal means, standard errors, and confidence
intervals from the MANOVA analysis that compares faking scores by job interest.
Cohen’s D were calculated using the descriptive statistics, which may vary slightly from
the estimated marginal means. BER = Blatant Extreme Scores. BIMI-A = Agentic
Impression Management. BIMI-C = Communal Impression Management. IIR =
Idiosyncratic Item Responding. RCS = Residual Change Scores. PCT = Percent
Agreement. ICS = Individual Change Scores. WSC = Within Subjects Correlation.
WSVD = Within-Subject Variance of the Differences. CVI-P = Covariance IndexPersonality. CVI-IM = Covariance Index-Impression Management.
*p<.05,**p<.01,***p<.001.
Faking Measure
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Table 5. Uninterested Applicants: Descriptive Statistics, Bivariate Correlations, and Internal Consistencies
Measure

M

SD

Bivariate Correlations
2
3
4
5

1
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
1. BER
6.39 4.83 (.88)
2. BIMI-A 2.74
.57
.35
(.74)
3. BIMI-C 2.85
.75
.42
.34 (.81)
4. Bogus
12.85 5.43
.01
.37
.13 (.80)
5. CVI-P
.18
.55 -.19
-.14 -.05
.06
6. CVI-IM
.10
.42 -.03
-.42 -.07 -.04 .32
7. ICS
.09
.21
.28
.16
.16
.04 -.07 .02 (.85)
8. IIR
3.62
.74
.66
.54
.41
.21 -.31 -.20 .25 (.85)
9. PCT
.61
.13
.06
-.11 -.04 -.15 .01 .16 -.30
.14 (.82)
10. RCS
-.12
.25
.77
.42
.43
.10 -.33 -.08 .62
.81
.03 (.91)
11. WSC
.47
.14
.01
-.20 -.14 -.17 -.05 .22 -.30 -.09
.52 -.11
(.53)
12. WSVD
1.13
.54
.50
.13
.16 -.10 -.07 -.08 .36
.12 -.45
.27
-.47 (.66)
13. T1-C
4.03
.54
.75
.37
.46
.08 -.34 -.11 .24
.81
.19
.79
.01
.21 (.92)
14. T2-C
3.91
.56
.62
.32
.39
.10 -.31 -.11 -.17
.71
.35
.53
.14
.02
.85 (.91)
15. T1-A
3.75
.54
.54
-.04
.45 -.02 -.29 .20 .22
.41
.18
.62
.15
.10
.53
.42
16. T2-A
3.67
.56
.42
-.10
.41 -.02 -.24 .20 -.08
.30
.26
.40
.26 -.08
.41
.41
17. T1-N
3.60
.72
.63
.51
.43
.08 -.25 -.23 .13
.84
.21
.70
-.04
.10
.69
.64
18. T2-N
3.47
.75
.49
.39
.30
.04 -.19 -.21 -.29
.68
.33
.41
.04 -.02
.54
.65
19. T1-O
3.49
.50
.34
.08
.01
.00 -.17 .01 .17
.16
.04
.41
-.06
.03
.17
.11
20. T2-O
3.48
.51
.27
.10
.06
.01 -.16 .01 -.08
.13
.06
.27
.04 -.05
.15
.15
21. T1-E
3.44
.59
.47
.58
.08
.21 -.25 -.26 .20
.65 -.03
.61
-.07
.10
.42
.35
22. T2-E
3.36
.61
.36
.48 -.02
.16 -.23 -.30 -.18
.54
.08
.34
.05
.01
.34
.38
Note. N = 177. Internal consistencies are bolded along the diagonal. T1 = Time 1. T2 = Time 2. C = Conscientiousness. A =
Agreeableness. N = Emotional Stability. O = Openness. E = Extraversion. M = Average Faking Sensitivity Score. BIMI-A =
Agentic Impression Management. BIMI-C = Communal Impression Management. IIR = Idiosyncratic Item Responding.
RCS = Residual Change Scores. PCT = Percent Agreement. ICS = Individual Change Scores. WSC = Within Subjects
Correlation. WSVD = Within-Subject Variance of the Differences. CVI-P = Covariance Index-Personality. CVI-IM =
Covariance Index-Impression Management. BER = Blatant Extreme Scores. p < .01 if r > |.17|. p < .05 if r > |.12|.
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Table 5 Continued.
Measure
1. BER
2. BIMI-A
3. BIMI-C
4. Bogus
5. CVI-P
6. CVI-IM
7. ICS
8. IIR
9. PCT
10. RCS
11. WSC
12. WSVD
13. T1-C
14. T2-C
15. T1-A
16. T2-A
17. T1-N
18. T2-N
19. T1-O
20. T2-O
21. T1-E
22. T2-E

15

(.89)
.89
.31
.20
.30
.30
.11
.01

16

Bivariate Correlations
17
18
19
20

21

(.89)
.22
.22
.28
.32
.02
-.02

(.94)
.87
.04
.05
.54
.49

(.91)
.85 (.91)

(.94)
.01
.07
.46
.55

(.81)
.87
.20
.08

(.81)
.15
.09

22
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than do field studies (Hough, 1998). The Covariance Index-Personality and Covariance IndexImpression Management might not be sensitive enough to discriminate between faking with
more realistic estimates. To test this, we standardized our Individual Change Score measure and
included only participants with measures larger than 1 to approximate a lab sample with much
higher levels of faking. Independent samples t-tests showed that Interested Applicants now
scored significantly higher than non-Interested Applicants on Covariance Index-Impression
Management, t(76) = 2.19, p = .03, d = .50. There was a marginal difference for Covariance
Index-Personality, t(76) = 1.82, p = .07, d = .42. These results suggest that Covariance IndexPersonality and Covariance Index-Impression Management perform much better when
discriminating among severe faking, more often seen in experiments that often overestimate the
prevalence of faking.
2.5. Discussion
Our investigation had two primary purposes: (1) examine the extent that different faking
indices are able to discriminate between personality scores from same people when they respond
as an applicant and as a non-applicant (Within-Subjects Faking Sensitivity), as well discriminate
between personality scores from interested applicant and non-applicant samples (BetweenSubjects Faking Sensitivity); and (2) determine which faking indices should be recommended for
future research and practice.
We identified seven faking assessments that demonstrated both Within-Subjects Faking
Sensitivity and Between Subjects Faking Sensitivity, which included: Blatant Extreme
Responding, Communal Impression Management, Individual Change Scores, Idiosyncratic Item
Responding, Percent Agreement, Residualized Change Scores, and Within-Subjects Variance of
the Differences. Overall, Residualized Change Scores performed consistently across both sets of
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analyses, but was not the best within each analysis. This research is consistent with existing
research that Residualized Change Scores are the “gold-standard” in assessing applicant faking
(Feeney & Goffin, 2015). Unfortunately, Residualized Change Scores are an impractical measure
that can only be used by faking scholars, but has limited utility for practitioners. By contrast,
Idiosyncratic Item Responding had the highest Between-Subjects Faking Sensitivity and also had
the fifth highest Within-Subjects Faking Sensitivity. Our findings suggest that Idiosyncratic Item
Responding is the single best measure for practitioners.
That being said, using the best faking assessment does not necessarily preclude the use of
other assessments. If two effective faking assessments do not overlap to the point that they are
redundant, then it may be advised to use both assessments. For example, both Idiosyncratic Item
Responding and Residualized Change Scores only explained a quarter of the variance in
Communal Impression Management (rs = .57 and .54 respectively), which demonstrated both
types of faking sensitivity. This provides some evidence that they are all assessing the same
underlying construct, but there is also some divergence. As a result, Communal Impression
Management and Idiosyncratic Item Responding should be used at the same time. Blatant
Extreme Responding also demonstrated both Within-Subjects Faking Sensitivity and BetweenSubjects Faking Sensitivity, but only explained 50% of the variance associated with
Idiosyncratic Item Responding (r = .72) and 25% of the variance with Communal Impression
Management (r = .55). As a result, we argue that Idiosyncratic Item Responding, Blatant
Extreme Responding, and Communal Impression Management should all be used in conjunction
to assess unique variance relating to applicant faking. In academic research designs, Residualized
Change Scores should be used as well.
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One concern is that Communal Impression Management, Idiosyncratic Item Responding,
and Blatant Extreme Responding all have significant correlations with our Interested Applicants
personality scores during Time 2, when the job opportunity was revealed as fictitious, suggesting
these faking assessments may be contaminated by legitimate personality variance. These
relationships also held for our Uninterested Applicants during Time 2. Therefore, there is the
practical concern that each measure may potentially identify a faker as a non-faker, or the
reverse, and a practitioner may unwittingly remove strong candidates from the applicant pool.
Given the practicality and utility of each measure, we recommend that practitioners use all three
faking assessments and exclude applicants who are identified as fakers on at least two of them.
Filtering out job applicants without a valid basis for that decision could open a company up to
human rights complaints or legal challenges (Catano, Wiesner, Hackett, & Methot, 2010).
Fortunately, Residualized Change Scores are calculated by removing variance associated with
legitimate personality variance, and in turn, had weak or non-significant correlations with
Interested Applicants personality scores during Time 2.
What about the other measures that showed faking sensitivity? Communal Impression
Management outperformed Agentic Impression Management—higher faking sensitivity and
correlations with other faking assessments. As a result, we recommend the use of Communal
Impression Management instead of Agentic Impression Management for the detection of
applicant faking. Percent Agreement, Within-Subjects Correlations and Within-Subject Variance
of the Differences are all impractical since they require repeated measures designs and were
inferior to Residualized Change Scores. There appears to be little reason for researchers to
calculate these additional faking indices. Individual Change Scores were empirically similar to
Residualized Change Scores (r = .76), but are theoretically less pure, and were much more
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contaminated with Time 2 personality scores. Therefore, there is no reason to recommend the use
of Individual Change Scores. Finally, Bogus Items showed Between-Subjects Faking Sensitivity,
but not Within-Subjects Faking Sensitivity, and generally had weak to non-significant
correlations with other faking assessments. As a result, we are unable to draw strong
conclusions. It is possible that Bogus Items are measuring a form of faking that is truly unique,
but is also possible that they are just an inferior faking assessment. More research is required to
validate Bogus Items as a valid faking assessment.
Both the Covariance Index-Personality and Covariance Index-Impression Management
performed poorly in our study when compared to existing studies (Christiansen et al., 2017). As
reviewed in our results section, both measures performed considerably better when restricted to
more extreme faking, more comparative to lab study environments. These results cast some
doubt on the utility of these measures in field environments. However, there may also be some
unique attributes of our sample that do not generalize to applications for more substantial jobs.
Another major difference between our study and Christensen et al. is that they used an adjective
checklist personality inventory and we used a more conventional personality inventory. It is
possible that the use of different personality measures and different experimental designs account
for the difference between the two studies. As a result, future research will need to examine the
value of Covariance Index-Personality and Covariance Index-Impression Management more
closely.
One anomaly is that we observed inter-trait correlations that are generally higher than
reported in the personality literature (Lee & Ashton, 2004). One potential explanation is that
mTurk workers tend to score higher on social desirability and may use a socially desirable
response set (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). This would explain why we found that favorable traits
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such as Emotional Stability, Extraversion, and Conscientiousness were more correlated with
each other, whereas neutral traits such as Openness exhibited more typical inter-trait correlations.
Similarly, we found that Residualized Change Scores exhibited moderate to large correlations
with both Time 1 and Time 2 personality scores for Uninterested Applicants, but not for
Interested Applicants. This is difficult to tease apart. What do residuals represent is the absence
of real motivation to fake? What is Conscientiousness after controlling for Conscientiousness?
Perhaps the residuals now assess a social desirability response set, which may explain the low
correlations with between Residualized Change Scores and Openness. This interpretation
suggests that it may be inappropriate to use or attempt to interpret faking indices in unmotivated
conditions.
2.5.1. Limitations
This is a novel investigation that has provided some unique insight into the assessment of
applicant faking. However, the study is not without its limitations. The primary limitation is that
the dataset was part of a broader investigation into the effects of different faking dissuasion
messages. This meant that our applicants received different personality test instructions. That
being said, the faking dissuasion messages were ineffective and the finding in this investigation
were generally consistent across conditions. For example, Residualized Change Scores, Blatant
Extreme Responding, Idiosyncratic Item Responding, and Communal Impression Management
all performed similarity well at discriminating between the same people’s applicant and nonapplicant scores. A secondary limitation is that we used an mTurk sample for a low-complexity
job, and it is possible that these findings may not generalize to higher level management
positions. Still, the literature suggests that mTurk users provide high quality data when rigorous
data screening are conducted (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Casler, Bickel, & Hackett,

59
2013; Landers & Behrend, 2015). Third, for each personality construct, including the Big 5 and
social desirability, there are different measures that could be selected (c.f., Bensch et al., 2017).
That being said, there is considerable evidence that the measures used converge with other
common personality measures (Goldberg et al., 2006) and social desirability measures (Blasberg
et al., 2013).
2.5.2. Conclusion
Our study has provided a novel contribution to the literature by providing guidance for
the best faking measures to use in research and practice, and through illuminating how faking
measures relate to each other. Our findings suggest that researchers and practitioners should
assess faking using multiple faking indices including: Idiosyncratic Item Responding, Blatant
Extreme Responding, Communal Impression Management, and when possible, Residualized
Change Scores. Additionally, we also demonstrated that it is useful to assess faking both within
subjects, and between subjects, using mean differences, in order to evaluate the merit of newer
faking measures. As we illustrated, robust faking assessments such as Residualized Change
Score, Idiosyncratic Item Responding, and Communal Impression Management were effective in
both instances. If a measure only succeeds with one approach, it may be biased or limited in its
ability to accurately assess faking.
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Appendix A: Job Posting

Remote Customer Service Representative (Job Posting)

We're looking for a Remote Customer Service Representative!
We are a research team that works with a large international firm. This firm is
looking for remote customer service representatives who will help customers
with online inquiries and hold live chat sessions. If you are interested, your
answers to our survey will be used as a preliminary screening for employment.
The candidates with the strongest person-job fit will be considered for an
interview and an employment opportunity.
This person will be responsible for:
• Communicating with customers by live web chat session or by e-mail to
provide information about products or services, take or enter orders,
cancel accounts, or obtain details of complaints.
•

Following up with purchases to ensure that customers are satisfied and
offering individualized promotions

•

Diligently check to ensure that appropriate changes were made to resolve
customers' problems

•

Keeping records of customer interactions or transactions, recording
details of inquiries, complaints, or comments, as well as actions taken.

•

Completing contract forms, prepare change of address records, or issue
service discontinuance orders, using remote web interface.

•

Referring unresolved customer grievances to designated departments for
further investigation
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•

Determining charges for services requested, collect deposits or payments,
or arrange for billing

•

Contacting customers remotely to respond to inquiries or to notify them
of claim investigation results or any planned adjustments

Consider applying if you:
• Enjoy working from home with flexible hours.
•

You enjoy communicating with customers and making customers
feel valued

•

You like writing e-mails and live online conversations

•

Enjoy problem solving and helping customers with novel solutions

•

Developing individualized promotions for previous customers and
following up on previous purchases

What We Offer:

- Contractual services that pay you for answering customer e-mails and
following up with customers
- The opportunity to learn and develop in a growing company
-Access to Health and Dental Benefits
-A profit-sharing program
-A positive and respectful work environment
If you are interested in this opportunity, your answers will be used for both
research purposes and for employment screening. You will also still receive
payment for completing the HIT.

If you are not interested in this opportunity, your answers will only be
used for research purposes and you are still eligible to complete the HIT.
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Appendix B: Bogus Item Scale
Item
active listening
customer queue
Access online communication
portal for the International
Customer Service Excellence
Group (ICSEG)
Remote Method Invocation
(FOIL)
internal customer
first call resolution
speech recognition
reflection
CRM
Utilize murray-web system to
locate effective customer service
solutions
virtual call center
contact center
customer lifecycle
spend management
Open body language
Remote Procedure Call (FOIL)
Closed body language
collaborative browsing
CSR
Inverse Body Language (FOIL)
Customer Care
customer chain
external customer
DCM (FOIL)
Customer Relationship
Management
Customer Service Culture
customer first-order logic (FOIL)
customer is always a customer
top-down customer service
customer service oriented company
Read the manual
Customer Service Intelligence
Test (FOIL)

Never
Heard of It
0
0

Not Sure
1
1

2
2

3
3

Very
Familiar
4
4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4

0

1

2

3

4

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

0

1

2

3

4

0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4

0

1

2

3

4
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Appendix C: Idiosyncratic Item Responding Scale

Item
1. I start tasks right
away.
2. I need a push to get
started.
3. I love excitement.
4. I have difficulty
starting tasks.
5. I am able to stand up
for myself.
6. I get irritated easily.
7. I find it difficult to
get down to work.
8. I remain calm under
pressure.
9. I love to help others.
10. I rarely get irritated.

Interested Applicants (Time 1) Uninterested Applicants (Time 1) Mean Difference
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
4.24
0.84
3.70
1.06
0.54
4.15

1.04

3.66

1.13

0.50

4.03
4.17

0.98
0.97

3.55
3.69

1.19
1.15

0.48
0.48

3.78

1.11

3.31

1.21

0.47

3.97
4.22

1.07
0.94

3.51
3.80

1.15
1.08

0.46
0.42

4.26

0.84

3.84

1.00

0.42

4.43
3.48

0.77
1.21

4.02
3.06

0.90
1.22

0.42
0.41
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Appendix D: Main Analyses by Faking Dissuasion Message Condition
Within-Subject Faking Sensitivity for Traditional Faking Warning Condition
Within-Subjects Faking Sensitivity (rd = rt1-rt2)
C
A
N
O
E
M
1. ICS
.79
.57
.74
.32
.49
.58
2. RCS
.72
.44
.73
.26
.44
.52
3. WSVD
.39
.14
.39
.04
.31
.26
4. BER
.40
.05
.41
.05
.26
.23
5. BIMI-C
.39
.17
.38
-.07
.24
.22
6. IIR
.33
.10
.36
.10
.20
.22
7. CVI-IM
.16
.13
.23
-.03
.12
.12
8. BIMI-A
.16
-.10
.33
-.04
.17
.10
9. CVI-P
.11
.11
.18
-.14
.15
.08
10. BOGUS
.12
-.05
.11
.08
.06
.07
11. WSC
-.35
-.32
-.41
-.11
-.24
-.28
12. PCT
-.37
-.34
-.47
-.19
-.24
-.32
Note. N = 79. BER = Blatant Extreme Scores. BIMI-A = Agentic Impression
Management. BIMI-C = Communal Impression Management. IIR =
Idiosyncratic Item Responding. RCS = Residual Change Scores. PCT =
Percent Agreement. ICS = Individual Change Scores. WSC = Within Subjects
Correlation. WSVD = Within-Subject Variance of the Differences. CVI-P =
Covariance Index-Personality. CVI-IM = Covariance Index-Impression
Management.
Faking Index
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Within-Subject Faking Sensitivity for Immediate Authentication Warning Condition
Within-Subjects Faking Sensitivity (rd = rt1-rt2)
C
A
N
O
E
M
1. ICS
.81
.82
.86
.25
.78
.70
2. RCS
.73
.78
.81
.17
.72
.64
3. BER
.45
.48
.50
.04
.45
.38
4. BIMI-C
.50
.45
.49
.05
.36
.37
5. IIR
.42
.47
.50
.03
.43
.37
6. WSVD
.37
.48
.42
.10
.46
.37
7. CVI-IM
.32
.23
.24
.11
.19
.22
8. BOGUS
.26
.20
.26
.06
.28
.21
9. BIMI-A
.28
.19
.34
-.06
.25
.20
10. CVI-P
.15
.31
.14
.08
.12
.16
11. WSC
-.39
-.41
-.42
-.08
-.39
-.34
12. PCT
-.44
-.37
-.46
-.13
-.49
-.38
Note. N = 75. BER = Blatant Extreme Scores. BIMI-A = Agentic Impression
Management. BIMI-C = Communal Impression Management. IIR =
Idiosyncratic Item Responding. RCS = Residual Change Scores. PCT =
Percent Agreement. ICS = Individual Change Scores. WSC = Within Subjects
Correlation. WSVD = Within-Subject Variance of the Differences. CVI-P =
Covariance Index-Personality. CVI-IM = Covariance Index-Impression
Management.
Faking Index
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Within-Subject Faking Sensitivity for Future Authentication Warning Condition
Within-Subjects Faking Sensitivity (rd = rt1-rt2)
C
A
N
O
E
M
1. ICS
.45
.41
.45
.18
.42
.38
2. RCS
.31
.26
.34
.09
.35
.27
3. WSVD
.10
.17
.15
.13
.16
.14
4. BER
.12
.10
.12
.04
.18
.11
5. BIMI-C
.11
.07
.14
-.05
.18
.09
6. IIR
.06
.07
.15
-.06
.12
.07
7. CVI-P
.05
.04
-.05
.06
.02
.02
8. BIMI-A
.00
-.07
.03
.02
.03
.00
9. CVI-IM
-.06
-.01
-.06
.04
-.07
-.03
10. BOGUS
-.03
-.11
.01
-.06
.01
-.04
11. WSC
-.15
-.22
-.21
-.07
-.17
-.16
12. PCT
-.34
-.29
-.34
-.04
-.29
-.26
Note. N = 73. BER = Blatant Extreme Scores. BIMI-A = Agentic Impression
Management. BIMI-C = Communal Impression Management. IIR =
Idiosyncratic Item Responding. RCS = Residual Change Scores. PCT =
Percent Agreement. ICS = Individual Change Scores. WSC = Within Subjects
Correlation. WSVD = Within-Subject Variance of the Differences. CVI-P =
Covariance Index-Personality. CVI-IM = Covariance Index-Impression
Management.
Faking Index
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Within-Subject Faking Sensitivity for Moral Suasion Prompt Condition
Within-Subjects Faking Sensitivity (rd = rt1-rt2)
C
A
N
O
E
M
1. ICS
.50
.66
.57
.19
.60
.50
2. RCS
.45
.61
.50
.16
.59
.46
3. WSVD
.27
.50
.33
.18
.27
.31
4. BER
.25
.35
.24
.09
.32
.25
5. CVI-P
.23
.34
.17
.05
.25
.21
6. IIR
.21
.22
.21
.01
.33
.20
7. BIMI-A
.06
.19
.05
.05
.22
.11
8. BIMI-C
.14
.13
.11
-.11
.23
.10
9. CVI-IM
.06
.03
.02
-.01
-.03
.01
10. BOGUS
-.20
-.22
-.08
-.04
-.15
-.14
11. WSC
-.18
-.36
-.30
-.13
-.23
-.24
12. PCT
-.33
-.32
-.40
-.06
-.33
-.29
Note. N = 60. BER = Blatant Extreme Scores. BIMI-A = Agentic Impression
Management. BIMI-C = Communal Impression Management. IIR =
Idiosyncratic Item Responding. RCS = Residual Change Scores. PCT =
Percent Agreement. ICS = Individual Change Scores. WSC = Within Subjects
Correlation. WSVD = Within-Subject Variance of the Differences. CVI-P =
Covariance Index-Personality. CVI-IM = Covariance Index-Impression
Management.
Faking Index
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Within-Subject Faking Sensitivity for Control Condition
Within-Subjects Faking Sensitivity (rd = rt1-rt2)
C
A
N
O
E
M
1. ICS
.53
.49
.61
.09
.43
.43
2. RCS
.39
.32
.53
.03
.38
.33
3. IIR
.21
.14
.34
-.05
.28
.18
4. BIMI-C
.11
.00
.34
-.05
.23
.13
5. BER
.10
.05
.30
-.09
.19
.11
6. WSVD
.01
.07
.31
-.12
.18
.09
7. BIMI-A
-.01
-.11
.05
-.01
.02
-.01
8. CVI-IM
-.09
-.09
-.11
.00
-.07
-.07
9. BOGUS
-.12
-.14
-.11
.04
-.04
-.07
10. CVI-P
-.23
-.24
-.14
-.08
-.13
-.16
11. WSC
-.20
-.13
-.34
.04
-.23
-.17
12. PCT
-.38
-.32
-.35
-.10
-.21
-.27
Note. N = 70. BER = Blatant Extreme Scores. BIMI-A = Agentic Impression
Management. BIMI-C = Communal Impression Management. IIR =
Idiosyncratic Item Responding. RCS = Residual Change Scores. PCT =
Percent Agreement. ICS = Individual Change Scores. WSC = Within Subjects
Correlation. WSVD = Within-Subject Variance of the Differences. CVI-P =
Covariance Index-Personality. CVI-IM = Covariance Index-Impression
Management.
Faking Index
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Between-Subjects Faking Sensitivity: Traditional Warning Condition
Faking
Measure
BER
BIMI-A
BIMI-C

Interested Applicants
Non-Interested Applicants
n
M
SE
95% CI
n
M
SE
95% CI
d
79 9.06 .53 [8.02, 1.10]
40 5.43 .69 [4.07, 6.78]
.80***
79 2.97 .07 [2.83, 3.10]
40 2.69 .08 [2.53, 2.85]
.49*
79 3.26 .09 [3.08, 3.43]
40 2.76 .13 [2.50, 3.01]
.65**
79 15.70 .71 [14.30,
40 12.80 .87 [11.09,
BOGUS
17.09]
14.51]
.48*
CVI-P
78
.13 .04 [.05, .21]
36
.20 .08 [.04, .36]
-.18
CVI-IM
77
.17 .05 [.07, .26]
39
.13 .06 [.01, .25]
.10
ICS
79
.29 .04 [.21, .36]
40
.06 .03 [0, .12]
.75***
IIR
79 4.13 .06 [4.01, 4.25]
40 3.58 .10 [3.38, 3.78]
.99***
PCT
79
.55 .02 [.51, .58]
40
.63 .02 [.59, .67]
-.57**
RCS
79
.09 .03 [.03, .15]
40 -.16 .04 [-.24, -.08]
.96***
WSC
79
.43 .02 [.39, .47]
40
.48 .02 [.44, .52]
-.34
WSVD
79 1.32 .08 [1.17, 1.48]
40
.95 .07 [.81, 1.09]
.58**
Note. This table presents the means, standard errors, and confidence intervals from the
independent t-test analyses that compares faking scores by job interest. Cohen’s D were
calculated using the descriptive statistics, which may vary slightly from the estimated marginal
means. BER = Blatant Extreme Scores. BIMI-A = Agentic Impression Management. BIMI-C =
Communal Impression Management. IIR = Idiosyncratic Item Responding. RCS = Residual
Change Scores. PCT = Percent Agreement. ICS = Individual Change Scores. WSC = Within
Subjects Correlation. WSVD = Within-Subject Variance of the Differences. CVI-P = Covariance
Index-Personality. CVI-IM = Covariance Index-Impression Management.
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Between-Subjects Faking Sensitivity: Immediate Authentication Warning Condition
Faking
Measure
BER
BIMI-A
BIMI-C

Interested Applicants
Non-Interested Applicants
n
M
SE
95% CI
n
M
SE
95% CI
d
75 8.21 .55 [7.12, 9.29] 23 7.56 1.19 [5.23, 9.89]
.13
75 2.90 .07 [2.76, 3.04] 23 2.83 .10 [2.63, 3.02]
.12
75 3.22 .08 [3.05, 3.38] 23 2.71 .14 [2.43, 2.99]
.72***
75 15.23 .71
[13.84,
23 13.43 1.25 [1.99,
.30
BOGUS
16.61]
15.88]
CVI-P
74
.16 .04
[.08, .24]
23
.05 .10 [-.15, .25]
.28
CVI-IM
74
.11 .03
[.04, .17]
22 -.07 .07 [-.20, .06]
.62*
ICS
75
.23 .05
[.14, .32]
23
.20 .07 [.06, .33]
.08
IIR
75 4.02 .07 [3.88, 4.16] 23 3.71 .15 [3.42, 4.01]
.49
PCT
75
.54 .02
[.51, .58]
23
.61 .03 [.55, .66]
-.46
RCS
75
.02 .04
[-.05, .1]
23 -.05 .06 [-.17, .07]
.22
WSC
75
.42 .02
[.38, .45]
23
.43 .03 [.37, .49]
-.06
WSVD
75 1.43 .10 [1.24, 1.62] 23 1.40 .17 [1.07, 1.74]
.04
Note. This table presents the means, standard errors, and confidence intervals from the
independent t-test analyses that compares faking scores by job interest. Cohen’s D were
calculated using the descriptive statistics, which may vary slightly from the estimated marginal
means. BER = Blatant Extreme Scores. BIMI-A = Agentic Impression Management. BIMI-C =
Communal Impression Management. IIR = Idiosyncratic Item Responding. RCS = Residual
Change Scores. PCT = Percent Agreement. ICS = Individual Change Scores. WSC = Within
Subjects Correlation. WSVD = Within-Subject Variance of the Differences. CVI-P = Covariance
Index-Personality. CVI-IM = Covariance Index-Impression Management.

80
Between-Subjects Faking Sensitivity: Future Authentication Warning Condition
Faking Measure Interested Applicants
Non-Interested Applicants
n
M
SE
95% CI
n
M
SE
95% CI
d
1. BER
73 8.59 .62 [7.37, 9.81]
36 6.73 .81 [5.14, 8.32]
.37
2. BIMI A
73 2.98 .06 [2.86, 3.1]
36 2.66 .08 [2.50, 2.82]
.63**
3. BIMI C
73 3.24 .10 [3.04, 3.44]
36 2.87 .12 [2.63, 3.11]
.47*
4. BOGUS
73 15.30 .63 [14.07, 16.53] 36 12.06 .96 [1.18, 13.94]
.59**
5. CVI-P
71
.16 .07 [.02, .30]
34
.15 .06 [.03, .27]
.02
6. CVI-IM
73
.12 .04 [.04, .20]
35
.09 .03 [.03, .15]
.11
7. ICS
73
.23 .03 [.17, .29]
36
.04 .02 [.00, .08]
.93***
8. IIR
73 4.12 .07 [3.98, 4.26]
36 3.66 .10 [3.46, 3.86]
.75***
9. PCT
73
.58 .02 [.54, .62]
36
.61 .02 [.57, .65]
-.24
10. RCS
73
.05 .03 [-.01, .11]
36 -.13 .04 [-.21, -.05]
.79***
11. WSC
73
.45 .01 [.43, .47]
36
.48 .02 [.44, .52]
-.25
12. WSVD
73 1.26 .07 [1.12, 1.4]
36 1.11 .07 [.97, 1.25]
.26
Note. This table presents the estimated marginal means, standard errors, and confidence intervals
from the independent t-test analyses that compares faking scores by job interest. Cohen’s D were
calculated using the descriptive statistics, which may vary slightly from the estimated marginal
means. BER = Blatant Extreme Scores. BIMI-A = Agentic Impression Management. BIMI-C =
Communal Impression Management. IIR = Idiosyncratic Item Responding. RCS = Residual
Change Scores. PCT = Percent Agreement. ICS = Individual Change Scores. WSC = Within
Subjects Correlation. WSVD = Within-Subject Variance of the Differences. CVI-P = Covariance
Index-Personality. CVI-IM = Covariance Index-Impression Management.
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Between-Subjects Faking Sensitivity: Moral Suasion Prompt
Faking
Measure
1. BER
2. BIMI A
3. BIMI C

Interested Applicants
Non-Interested Applicants
n
M
SE
95% CI
n
M
SE
95% CI
d
60 8.89 .63 [7.65, 1.13]
43 7.11 .79 [5.57, 8.65]
.36
60 2.94 .08 [2.79, 3.09]
43 2.84 .09 [2.66, 3.02]
.17
60 3.40 .10 [3.21, 3.59]
43 2.98 .12 [2.74, 3.22]
.54**
60 16.33 .79 [14.79,
43 13.30 .76 [11.81,
4. BOGUS
17.88]
14.80]
.54**
5. CVI-P
54
.17 .06 [.06, .28]
42
.18 .07 [.03, .32]
-.02
6. CVI-IM
58
.09 .03 [.03, .16]
43
.14 .07 [.00, .28]
-.14
7. ICS
60
.27 .04 [.19, .34]
43
.12 .03 [.06, .18]
.58**
8. IIR
60 4.20 .08 [4.05, 4.35]
43 3.70 .12 [3.45, 3.94]
.73***
9. PCT
60
.57 .02 [.53, .61]
43
.59 .02 [.55, .64]
-.14
10. RCS
60
.09 .03 [.03, .16]
43 -.07 .04 [-.15, .01]
.65**
11. WSC
60
.42 .02 [.38, .46]
43
.45 .02 [.41, .50]
-.20
12. WSVD
60 1.34 .09 [1.16, 1.52]
43 1.16 .07 [1.03, 1.30]
.30
Note. This table presents the estimated marginal means, standard errors, and confidence intervals
from the independent t-test analyses that compares faking scores by job interest. Cohen’s D were
calculated using the descriptive statistics, which may vary slightly from the estimated marginal
means. BER = Blatant Extreme Scores. BIMI-A = Agentic Impression Management. BIMI-C =
Communal Impression Management. IIR = Idiosyncratic Item Responding. RCS = Residual
Change Scores. PCT = Percent Agreement. ICS = Individual Change Scores. WSC = Within
Subjects Correlation. WSVD = Within-Subject Variance of the Differences. CVI-P = Covariance
Index-Personality. CVI-IM = Covariance Index-Impression Management.
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Between-Subjects Faking Sensitivity: Control Condition
Faking
Measure
1. BER
2. BIMI A
3. BIMI C

Interested Applicants
Non-Interested Applicants
n
M
SE
95% CI
n
M
SE
95% CI
d
70 8.36 .61 [7.16, 9.56]
35 5.48 .70 [4.11, 6.85]
.60**
70 2.81 .07 [2.67, 2.95]
35 2.71 .13 [2.46, 2.96]
.15
70 3.26 .09 [3.08, 3.44]
35 2.84 .12 [2.60, 3.08]
.57**
70 14.99 .63 [13.76,
35 12.80 .90 [11.04,
4. BOGUS
16.23]
14.57]
.42*
5. CVI-P
67
.24 .07 [.10, .38]
34
.28 .14 [.01, .56]
-.06
6. CVI-IM
70
.16 .04 [.08, .24]
35
.14 .10 [-.06, .34]
.05
7. ICS
70
.29 .03 [.23, .35]
35
.06 .03 [.00, .12]
.99***
8. IIR
70 3.92 .09 [3.74, 4.09]
35 3.45 .15 [3.16, 3.73]
.62**
9. PCT
70
.56 .02 [.52, .59]
35
.64 .02 [.60, .68]
-.62**
10. RCS
70
.05 .03 [-.01, .12]
35 -.18 .04 [-.26, -.10]
.84***
11. WSC
70
.44 .02 [.40, .47]
35
.47 .02 [.43, .51]
-.23
12. WSVD
70 1.36 .08 [1.20, 1.52]
35 1.14 .10 [.94, 1.34]
.34
Note. This table presents the estimated marginal means, standard errors, and confidence intervals
from the independent t-test analyses that compares faking scores by job interest. Cohen’s D were
calculated using the descriptive statistics, which may vary slightly from the estimated marginal
means. BER = Blatant Extreme Scores. BIMI-A = Agentic Impression Management. BIMI-C =
Communal Impression Management. IIR = Idiosyncratic Item Responding. RCS = Residual
Change Scores. PCT = Percent Agreement. ICS = Individual Change Scores. WSC = Within
Subjects Correlation. WSVD = Within-Subject Variance of the Differences. CVI-P = Covariance
Index-Personality. CVI-IM = Covariance Index-Impression Management.
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Chapter 3
3. Faking Dissuasion Messages in the Applicant Screening Context
In this chapter, we investigated whether new faking dissuasion messages that incorporate
accountability theory and morality theory can be used to reduce applicant faking. As existing
faking dissuasion messages are associated with heightened negative reactions from applicants,
we aimed to test messages that reduce faking without evoking such negative reactions.
3.1 Abstract
The applicant faking literature suggests that faking dissuasion messages—brief messages
that informs applicants that faking can be detected—can be an effective tool at combatting faking
on personality tests. Faking dissuasion messages can reduce faking by up to 50% (Fan et al.,
2012). However, warnings are typically atheoretical and these threatening messages can cause
applicants to feel negatively about the personality test (Converse et al., 2008; Goffin & Boyd,
2009). We tried to improve the efficacy of faking dissuasion messages, while minimizing
negative applicant reactions, by leveraging the accountability and morality literatures. We
conducted a study using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, with 518 participants who believed they
were considered for a real employment opportunity for a remote customer service position.
Compared to participants not interested in the job, participants who were interested in the job had
significantly more favorable personality scores. After informing participants that the position
was fictitious and asking them to fill out the same personality measure as honestly as possible,
the same previously interested participants received significantly less favorable personality
scores. However, there were no differences in faking across the different faking dissuasion
message conditions, suggesting the faking dissuasion messages were ineffective. After a review
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of the literature, we speculated that faking dissuasion messages may be less effective in
screening scenarios than when used later in the selection process.

Keywords
Personality assessment; job applications; faking; faking warnings; mTurk
3.2 Introduction
Imagine you are being considered for a coveted job—one that has everything you want—and
the hiring company requests that you complete a personality test. The test asks about your
punctuality—a trait that you know is highly desirable, but one that is a personal weakness of
yours. Do you answer honestly or lie? Job applications generate incentive for applicants to
“fake” to be more competitive in selection contexts. Faking has been defined as applicants
deliberately providing “inaccurate responses to personality items in a manner that they believe
will increase their chances of obtaining valued outcomes, such as a favorable hiring decision”
(Goffin & Boyd, 2009, p. 151)
There is compelling evidence that a large percentage of applicants fake their responses to
personality tests (Donovan et al., 2013; Holden et al., 2017; Jeong, Christiansen, Robie, Kung, &
Kinney, 2017). Applicant faking on personality tests reduces the psychometric validity of such
tests. For example, applicants that fake obtain reduced self-peer correlations on personality tests
(Robie et al., 2009) and reduced criterion-related validity (M. H. Peterson, Griffith, Isaacson, et
al., 2011). Reductions in psychometric validity may have grave consequences for organizations
by reducing the accuracy of hiring decisions.
Several methods exist to mitigate the negative outcomes of applicant faking (Griffith &
Robie, 2013). One popular technique is to include faking dissuasion messages, messages placed
prior to or during the personality test, to dissuade individuals from faking on the test. The current
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best practice is to inform applicants that faking can be detected and that detection will lead to
immediate disqualification from the selection process (Dilchert & Ones, 2011). Several studies
suggest that faking dissuasion messages may reduce the extent that each applicant fakes by
between 30% and 50% (Fan et al., 2012; Landers et al., 2011; Robson et al., 2008). That being
said, there are some studies that suggest faking dissuasion messages are much less effective in
reducing faking (Fisher, Robie, Christiansen, & Komar, 2018; Vasilopoulos et al., 2005).
3.2.1 Present Study: Improving Faking Dissuasion Messages
One potential reason that faking dissuasion messages vary in their efficacy is that they
tend to be atheoretical and do not leverage the psychological processes that underlie faking
(Goffin & Boyd, 2009), thus limiting their potential applicability. See Appendix A for an
example of a Traditional Faking Warning (TFW) adapted from the existing literature (Dwight &
Donovan, 2003). Several scholars have suggested the development of new faking dissuasion
messages should be derived from theory to improve their efficacy (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; Pace &
Borman, 2006).
In the present study, we presented a job opportunity to participants and asked if they were
interested in the position. We instructed participants that interested participants would be
contacted if they were a good fit for the position and provided them a personality test. As
reviewed in more detail later, we randomly assigned participants to different faking dissuasion
conditions where participants read different test instructions. These instructions included
traditional faking warnings and as well as a control group. They also included new faking
dissuasion messages that capitalized on either accountability or morality theory.
We examined if we could bolster the efficacy of faking dissuasion messages by crafting
them to incorporate core lessons from accountability theory (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). The
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accountability literature revealed two methods that might enhance the potency of faking
dissuasion messages: applicants should feel more accountable when they believe (a) there is a
credible process in place to check the validity of their answers, and (b) they will need to defend
their answers on an item-by-item basis—rather than just their overall score.
We composed two faking dissuasion messages that capitalized on these methods. The
first warning is an Immediate Authentication Warning (IAW; Appendix B), which recommends
applicants answer honestly because the hiring organization can verify their responses. We inform
the applicants that the organization can verify responses by contacting references, employing
“internal methodological procedures” (the term we used to describe social desirability scales)
and explain how these procedures work to boost credibility. The second warning is a Future
Authentication Warning (FAW; Appendix C), which advises applicants to answer honestly
because the hiring organization will compare their test responses to future behaviors during
interviews or on-the-job performance. The FAW also tries to reduce faking by instructing
applicants that answering honestly is in their best interest, as faking may lead to being hired for a
position for which they are not qualified, and hence diminishing their career potential. Both the
IAW and FAW informs applicants that the consequence of being detected is a one-on-one
interview, where they will need to defend their answers.
In contrast to threatening faking dissuasion messages, scholars have also suggested
appealing to the test-takers’ morality to reduce applicant faking (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; Pace &
Borman, 2006; Robie, Brown, & Beaty, 2007). Goffin and Boyd (2009) postulated that morality
is the first issue that test-takers consider when faking on personality test items. Therefore, the
efficacy of faking dissuasion messages to reduce faking might be enhanced by appealing to
applicants’ morality. Consistent with this assertion, Uruena and Robie (Uruena & Robie, 2011, p.

87
17) found that applicants who read the test instructions “dishonest or distorted self-descriptions
are simply wrong and do not adhere to commonly accepted standards of behavior” scored lower
on a measure of conscientiousness than applicants who did not read them (d = .23). These results
suggest that being prompted to consider the morality of faking may lead to reductions in
applicant faking. To enhance the efficacy of this approach, we created a moral suasion appeal
(MSA; Appendix D) that utilizes theoretical work on morality, and principles from the
persuasion literature, to increase its salience with applicants.
Morality researchers in the morality literature suggest that people use a special set of
rules to make morality judgments as opposed to judgements about less sensitive issues (Haidt,
2001). People form moral judgements based on intuitive opinions that stem from their emotional
reactions to events or thoughts, instead of reaching a position through rationality. Across several
studies, people are unable to provide rational explanations for their moral judgments, but instead,
their judgments tend to be predicted by negative emotional responses (Haidt, 2001; Haidt &
Hersh, 2001; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). For example, people tend to be morally opposed to
cleaning a toilet using a national flag, despite their inability to rationally defend why such
behavior is wrong (Haidt et al., 1993). Subsequently, arguments that defend morality positions
are often developed post-hoc rather than informing the morality decision, and in turn, people
only generate arguments that support their position (Haidt, 2001). Accordingly, we may be able
to reduce faking by prompting negative emotional reactions to faking on personality tests.
In addition to explaining that faking is morally wrong, we composed a MSA to elicit
negative emotions toward faking and positive emotions toward answering honestly by utilizing
affective messages. This is supported by the persuasion literature, which shows that arousing
affective states can influence people’s cognitions and, in turn, affect desired outcomes (Cialdini
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& Goldstein, 2004). Our intention was that prompting applicants to feel negative emotions about
faking may get them to think negatively about faking, and therefore, persuade applicants to
answer honestly. Additionally, pictures have been shown to help elicit negative and positive
emotions when they cause viewers to think of unpleasant or pleasant thoughts respectively, so
we also included photographs to illustrate the text of our MSA (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, &
Hamm, 1993; Schimmack, 2005).
Research Question 1: To what extent will applicants fake on a personality test when
presented with one of our newly developed faking dissuasion messages (IAW, FAW,
MSA) as compared to a traditional faking waring (TFW) or no warning (NW)?
3.2.2 The Role of Verifiability
One potential concern is that the efficacy of increased accountability may vary as a function
of how verifiable applicants perceive each personality item to be. Goffin and Boyd (2009)
suggest that applicants consider the risk of being caught for faking for each personality item.
Therefore, the IAW and FAW should be most effective when the applicant perceives the
personality item as verifiable, because the threat of verification should appear more credible than
when the applicant thinks the item is unverifiable. For example, if an applicant were to respond
to the item “I would be quite bored by a visit to an art gallery”, the applicant may not believe
there is a credible method to verify a response to this item, because it assesses behavior outside
of the workplace. By contrast, the item “I avoid making ‘small talk’ with people” is something
work references are likely able to evaluate. Thus, we expect that the IAW, FAW, and TFW
should be more effective for items that appear verifiable because the warnings will appear more
credible.
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Research Question 2: Will item verifiability moderate the efficacy of our faking
dissuasion messages?
3.2.3 Applicant Reactions
Faking dissuasion messages that threaten applicants can have the unintended
consequence of increasing test-taking anxiety (Converse et al., 2008). In addition, warnings
increase the difficulty of filling out the personality test—especially for those with low GMA
(Vasilopoulos et al., 2005)—and therefore, applicants may form negative reactions about the
fairness or appropriateness of the test. Applicant reactions are important because applicants
crystallize negative impressions about the organization, and this could, in turn, facilitate
undesired outcomes such as discouraging others from applying to the organization (McCarthy,
Hrabluik, & Jelley, 2009).
Both the IAW and FAW threaten applicants with multiple sources of verification and
may instigate higher levels of test-taking anxiety and negative perceptions of procedural justice.
For example, applicants may think it is unfair to use their references or on the job performance to
verify their personality responses, or become anxious of future detection. By contrast, our MSA
may lead to less anxiety and more favorable perceptions of procedural justice, because it omits
threatening language. That being said, honest respondents might find the threats in the IAW or
FAW reassuring, because they may believe that fakers will be detected and punished, making the
personality test more fair and accurate. Similarly, the MSA may also alert applicants that the
competition is faking and does not provide any corrective mechanism, which could weaken
perceptions of accuracy and fairness. As a result, it is difficult to draw clear hypotheses of how
the new faking dissuasion messages will affect applicant reactions. This investigation presents a

90
novel contribution to the literature because few studies have examined how faking dissuasion
messages impact applicant reactions.
Research Question: To what extent, if any, will the IAW, FAW, or MSP influence testtaking anxiety and procedural justice?
3.3 Method
3.3.1 Participants
A total of 779 participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mTurk) online
marketplace for a two-session research study. Participants were paid $2 for their time, which is
consistent with the mTurk average rate of $1.17 per hour (Mason & Suri, 2012). From our initial
sample, 572 participants completed both sessions (73.4%). We also excluded responses from 38
applicants for careless responding, including failing attention checks and self-reported
inattentiveness. These measures are reviewed in the materials section.
The final sample retained 357 participants (Mage = 35.10, SD = 10.64) who indicated they
were interested in the position (“Interested Applicants”). The majority were female (n = 223),
employed full time (n = 225) or part-time (n = 71). Interested Applicants had a modal income of
$30,000 to $39,999 USD (n = 69), a modal education of a four-year university degree (n = 135).
We had 79, 75, 73, 60, and 70 Interested Applicants in the TW, IAW, FAW, MSA, and NFW
conditions respectively.
The final sample also retained 177 participants (Mage = 34.14, SD = 11.82) who were not
interested in the position (“Uninterested Applicants”). The majority were female (n = 96),
employed full-time (n = 131), the modal income was $20,000 to $29,000 USD (n = 24), and the
modal education was a four-year university degree (n = 57). We had 40, 23, 36, 43, and 35
Uninterested Applicants in the TW, IAW, FAW, MSA, and NFW conditions respectively.
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3.3.2 Procedure
Participants were recruited for a personality measurement study on mTurk and after
signing their consent forms—but before they completed the questionnaires—we informed
participants of a job opportunity. We told participants that a company was looking to hire
contractual customer-service representatives who would be allowed to work from home.
Participants were presented with the job posting (see Appendix E) and asked to indicate if they
would like to be considered for the job. We informed them that if their answers suggested they
were well-suited to the position, they would be selected for a video-conferenced job interview.
The job posting was modeled on an actual customer-service job posting, and the Customer
Service Representatives section of the Occupational Information Network (Listing #43-4051.00;
N. G. Peterson et al., 2001). Uninterested applicants were still permitted to complete the study
and receive compensation, thus serving as a control group for our job application manipulation.
In the preliminary analyses, we examine if our Interested Applicants received more favorable
personality scores than did Uninterested Applicants.
During the first session (“Time 1”), all participants were randomly assigned to one of five
experimental conditions: TFW, IAW, FAW, MSA, and NW. All of the faking dissuasion
messages had a Reading Ease score and a Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level that were appropriate for
a typical 13 to 15 year old (Flesch, 1948; Kincaid, Fishburne Jr, Rogers, & Chissom, 1975).
Participants in the faking dissuasion conditions read their assigned message and were asked to
fill out the personality and careless responding measures described below. Participants in the
NW condition viewed a page that asked them to click “continue” to begin their personality
assessment and careless responding measures. At the end of our survey, participants were
informed that we were not working with a real company. We invited all participants to a follow
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up study one week later for an additional dollar of compensation. At the beginning of the followup survey (“Time 2”), participants were reminded that there was no employment opportunity and
were asked to respond, as honestly as possible, to our personality test and post-experiment
survey.
3.3.3 Measures
Careless Responding. One potential concern with mTurk is that some people respond
carelessly (Buhrmester et al., 2011). In accordance with Meade and Craig (2012), participants
were asked to respond to six objectively verifiable items (e.g., how much they agree with “The
sum of 2+ 2 is 10.”) placed throughout our personality test. Meade and Craig also found that
some careless responders will admit at the end of the study that their data should not be used in
final analyses, so long as there is no penalty for doing so. Consistent with this recommendation,
we asked participants if we should include their results in the analyses of the present study.
Faking. We examined applicant faking using the four faking assessments discussed in
Study 1.
Blatant Extreme Responding. Blatant Extreme Responding was calculated by
summing the number of times participants endorsed the most favorable response (i.e., strongly
agree) on each personality item during Time 1. Thus, applicants received scores of 1 (extreme)
or 0 (not extreme) for each item, which were then summed to compute a composite index of
Blatant Extreme Responding. In theory, Blatant Extreme Responding should be positively
related to applicant faking. Blatant Extreme Responding has been used in previous investigations
and is an effective measure of applicant faking (Landers et al., 2011; Levashina et al., 2014).
Idiosyncratic Item Responding. Idiosyncratic items differentiate job applicant
responses from non-applicant responses (Kuncel & Borneman, 2007). We identified
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idiosyncratic items by selecting the 10 items with the largest mean differences between our
Interested Applicant and Uninterested Applicant samples. Idiosyncratic Item Responding scale
scores should be positively correlated with applicant faking. Example items include “I start tasks
right away” and “I find it difficult to approach others.” The items from this scale are part of the
personality measure and are scored during the job application session.
Communal Impression Management. We measured impression management
using Communal Impression Management, which involves “denying socially deviant impulses
and claiming pious attributes” (Blasberg et al., 2013, p. 523). The Communal Impression
Management is assessed using 10 items measured on 5-point response scales (1 = Strongly
Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree). An example item is “I don’t gossip about other people’s
business.” Internal consistencies exceeded .70 across two studies, and there is evidence of both
convergent and discriminant validity (Blasberg et al.). These items were embedded randomly
throughout the Personality assessment.
Residualized Change Scores. We measured Mean Shifts using Residualized
Change Scores (Burns & Christiansen, 2011; Feeney & Goffin, 2015). Residualized Change
Scores are calculated by individually regressing the same person’s score on each personality item
during a job application, on the same person’s score during a non-applicant condition—and
saving the residuals. These residuals reflect applicant scores without variance associated with
honest scores. Residualized Change Scores are a more accurate faking index than Individual
Change Scores because they are not contaminated by legitimate personality variance. If a faking
index reflects underlying personality traits, then scores may be due to either faking or the
personality trait (Burns & Christiansen, 2011), creating inferential errors.
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Faking Dissuasion Message Viewing Time. To ensure that applicants read our faking
discussion messages, we recorded the number of seconds each participant spent viewing them.
The TFW, IAW, FAW, and MSA consisted of 76, 394, 334, and 228 words respectively, and are
located in Appendices A through D.
Job Relatedness and Verifiability. We conducted an expert judgment panel to
determine the job-relatedness and the verifiability of our personality items. Our sample
consisted of 15 experts in industrial and organizational psychology—familiar with both
personality measurement and personnel selection: two recent doctoral graduates, nine doctoral
students, and four master’s students. Each expert provided a set of job-relatedness ratings (5point scale: Not at all Important to Extremely Important) and verifiability (5-point scale:
Extremely Difficult to Extremely Easy) and were each paid $10 CAD for their assistance. For job
relatedness, scores for one expert were excluded for having unacceptably low inter-rater
reliability (r < .50). The ICC (3, k; Shrout & Fleiss, 1979) for job-relatedness was .96. The mean
ratings were: Conscientiousness, 4.01; Agreeableness, 3.19; Emotional Stability, 3.10;
Extraversion, 3.00; and Openness, 1.90. For verifiability, we dropped four experts for having low
inter-rater reliability (r < .50), suggesting some disagreement among our reviewers. The resulting
ICC (3, k) for verifiability was .90. We created a 9-item item composite by including items that
experts rated as being both job-related (M > 4) and verifiable (M > 3.5). The resulting scale was
reliable (α = .86) and included items from each personality dimension, except Openness.
Personality. Personality was assessed using the International Personality Item Pool
(IPIP; Goldberg et al., 2006), which examines: Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional
Stability, Extraversion, And Openness. These dimensions were assessed using 120 items on a 5point response scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree). The 120-item scale has strong
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internal consistencies between .87 and .90 for the five dimensions (Maples et al., 2014).
Additionally, all five dimensions on the 120-item scale were found to parallel their respective
NEO Personality Inventory dimension with correlations between .87 and .90 (Maples et al.,
2014).
Procedural Justice Perceptions. Procedural justice perceptions was assessed using three
dimensions from the Selection Procedural Justice Scale (Bauer et al., 2001), which were: JobRelatedness, Information Known, and Chances to Perform. The resulting measure contains nine
items that use a 5-point response scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree). An example
item from the job-relatedness scale is “Doing well on this test means a person can do the retail
manager job well.” The Selection Procedural Justice Scale (SPJS) possesses excellent reliability
(α = .88), and predicts meaningful outcomes such as whether applicants would recommend the
organization to others and their perceptions of organizational attractiveness (Bauer et al., 2001;
McCarthy et al., 2013, 2009).
Test-Taking Anxiety. We assessed Test-Taking Anxiety using the comparative anxiety
subscale from the Test Attitude Survey (Arvey, Strickland, Drauden, & Martin, 1990). This scale
is measured using 10 items on a five 5-point response scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly
Agree). The scale has good evidence of reliability (α = .80) and criterion-related validity (Arvey
et al., 1990)
3.4 Results
Prior to assessing whether our faking dissuasion messages reduced faking, we assessed the
strength of our manipulations. First, we examined if our fictitious job posting was successful in
prompting applicants to fake. Second, we examined if our applicants read the faking dissuasion
messages.
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3.4.1 Preliminary Analyses: Job Manipulation Check
If our job manipulation was effective, we would expect that Interested Applicants
received more favorable personality scores than Uninterested Applicants during Time 1, when
the job opportunity was presented, but not during Time 2, when the job opportunity was revealed
as fictitious. Repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant interaction effect between job
interest (Interested Applicants and Uninterested Applicants) and time (Time 1, and Time 2). On
average, Interested Applicants scored significantly higher on Emotionality Stability,
Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and Extraversion than did Uninterested participants during
Time 1, but not during Time 2, F(5, 528) = 10.75, p < .001, Wilk’s Λ = .91. Interested
Applicants received significantly more favorable personality scores on Conscientiousness,
Emotional Stability, Extraversion, and Agreeableness than Uninterested Applicants during Time
1, but not during Time 2. The results of the pairwise comparisons are reported in Table 6. These
results suggest that our job manipulation was successful in inducing applicant faking.
3.4.2 Preliminary Analyses: Did Applicants Read the Faking Dissuasion Messages?
To examine if applicants read the faking dissuasion messages, we conducted a univariate
ANOVA, with job interest and faking dissuasion condition as the between subject variables and
reading time as the dependent variable. There was a main effect for faking dissuasion condition,
F(4, 522) = 49.15, p < .001, p = .27. Tukey’s B post hoc tests revealed that applicants in IAW
condition spent longer reading the faking dissuasion message (M = 150.32) than applicants in
the MSA (M = 50.14s) and FAW (M = 61.09s) conditions, who spent significantly longer
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Table 6. Pairwise Comparisons of Personality Scores by Job Interest in Time 1 and Time 2
Time 1
Time 2
Personality
Uninterested
Uninterested
Interested Applicants
Interested Applicants
Dimension
Applicants
Applicants
d
d
M
SE
95% CI
M
SE
95% CI
M
SE
95% CI
M
SE
95% CI
Conscientiousness
4.30 0.03
[4.25,
4.03 0.04
[3.96,
.52 3.95 0.03
[3.89,
3.91 0.04
[3.83,
.07
4.36]
4.11]
4.01]
4.00]
Agreeableness
3.95 0.02
[3.90,
3.75 0.04
[3.68,
.42 3.73 0.03
[3.67,
3.67 0.04
[3.59,
.11
4.00]
3.82]
3.78]
3.75]
Emotional Stability
3.87 0.04
[3.80,
3.60 0.05
[3.50,
.39 3.43 0.04
[3.35,
3.47 0.06
[3.36,
3.94]
3.70]
3.51]
3.58]
.05
Openness
3.47 0.03
[3.42,
3.49 0.04
[3.42,
- 3.45 0.03
[3.39,
3.48 0.04
[3.39,
3.52]
3.57]
.05
3.51]
3.56]
.05
Extraversion
3.65 0.03
[3.59,
3.44 0.04
[3.35,
.38 3.38 0.03
[3.31,
3.36 0.05
[3.26,
.04
3.71]
3.52]
3.44]
3.45]
Note. This table includes the estimated marginal means, standard errors, and 95% confidence intervals for each personality dimension
in Time 1 and in Time 2. Ns for Interested and Uninterested Applicants were 357 and 177 respectively. Cohen’s D were calculated
using the descriptive statistics, which may vary slightly from the estimated marginal means.
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reading the faking dissuasion message than applicants in the TFW (M = 19.23s) and NW
conditions (M = 1.79s). The main effect for job interest was significant, F(1, 522) = 4.80, p =
.03, p = .01. Interested Applicants spent marginally more time reading the faking dissuasion
message (M = 63.95s) than Uninterested Applicants did (M = 49.06s).
3.4.3 Main Analyses: Faking Dissuasion Message Efficacy
To examine the efficacy of the faking dissuasion message, we conducted a MANOVA
with job interest and faking dissuasion message condition as the independent variables and
Blatant Extreme Responding, Idiosyncratic Item Responding, Communal Impression
Management, and Residualized Change Scores as the dependent variables. The MANOVA
revealed a significant main effect of job interest, F(4, 521) = 17.78, p < .001, Wilk’s Λ = .880.
Interested applicants scored significantly higher on Blatant Extreme Responding, Idiosyncratic
Item Responding, Communal Impression Management, and Residualized Change Scores (Ms =
8.62, 4.08, 3.27, and .06, respectively) than did Uninterested Applicants (Ms = 6.46, 3.62, 2.83,
and -.12, respectively). There were no effects of faking dissuasion message condition , F(16,
1592.32) = 1.17, p = .28, Wilk’s Λ = .97. The interaction was also nonsignificant, F(16, 1592.32)
= .74, p = .76, Wilk’s Λ = .98. Examination of the means across the faking dissuasion message
conditions revealed no hint of a significant effect for Blatant Extreme Responding, Idiosyncratic
Item Responding, Communal Impression Management, or Residualized Change Scores. Means,
standard errors, and confidence intervals are reported in Table 7.
3.4.4 Main Analyses: Faking Dissuasion Message Efficacy for Verifiable Items
To examine if our faking dissuasion messages were more effective for personality items
that are job-related and verifiable, we conducted a univariate ANOVA with job interest and
faking dissuasion message condition as the independent variable, and Residualized Change
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Scores for our 9-item verifiability composite as the dependent variable. The results indicated that
there was a main effect for job interest, F(1, 524) = 61.52, p < .001, p = .11. Again, Interested
Applicants (M = .09) scored significantly higher than did Uninterested Applicants (M = -.17).
However, there was no main effect for Faking dissuasion message condition and the interaction
was also non-significant.
3.4.5 Main Analyses: Procedural Justice Perceptions and Test-Taking Anxiety
Our final research question was concerning how job applicants would react to our new
faking dissuasion messages. To answer this question, we conducted a MANOVA with job
interest and faking dissuasion message condition as the independent variables, and our applicant
reaction measures including test-taking anxiety and perceptions of procedural justice as the
dependent variables. The analyses revealed that there was a significant main effect of job
interest, F(4, 508) = 5.11, p < .001, Wilk’s Λ = .96, and Faking dissuasion message condition,
F(16, 1552.60) = 2.30, p = .002, Wilk’s Λ = .93. There was also a significant multivariate
interaction between job interest and Faking dissuasion message condition, F(16, 1552.60) = 1.78,
p = .03, Wilk’s Λ = .95. See Table 8 for estimated marginal means, standard errors, and
confidence intervals.
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Table 7. Faking by Job Interest and Faking dissuasion message condition
Faking
dissuasion
Job Interest
M
Std. Error
95% CI
message
condition
BER
Yes
TFW
9.06
0.55
[7.98, 10.15]
IAW
8.21
0.57
[7.09, 9.32]
FAW
8.59
0.57
[7.46, 9.72]
MSA
8.89
0.63
[7.64, 10.13]
NW
8.36
0.59
[7.20, 9.51]
BER
No
TFW
5.43
0.78
[3.90, 6.95]
IAW
7.56
1.02
[5.55, 9.57]
FAW
6.73
0.82
[5.13, 8.34]
MSA
7.11
0.75
[5.64, 8.58]
NW
5.48
0.83
[3.85, 7.11]
IIR
Yes
TFW
4.13
0.07
[3.98, 4.27]
IAW
4.02
0.08
[3.87, 4.17]
FAW
4.12
0.08
[3.97, 4.27]
MSA
4.20
0.08
[4.03, 4.37]
NW
3.92
0.08
[3.76, 4.07]
IIR
No
TFW
3.58
0.10
[3.38, 3.78]
IAW
3.71
0.14
[3.44, 3.98]
FAW
3.66
0.11
[3.45, 3.88]
MSA
3.70
0.10
[3.50, 3.89]
NW
3.45
0.11
[3.23, 3.67]
BIMI-C
Yes
TFW
3.26
0.09
[3.09, 3.43]
IAW
3.22
0.09
[3.04, 3.39]
FAW
3.24
0.09
[3.07, 3.42]
MSA
3.40
0.10
[3.21, 3.60]
NW
3.26
0.09
[3.08, 3.44]
BIMI-C
No
TFW
2.76
0.12
[2.52, 3.00]
IAW
2.71
0.16
[2.40, 3.02]
FAW
2.87
0.13
[2.62, 3.12]
MSA
2.98
0.12
[2.75, 3.21]
NW
2.84
0.13
[2.59, 3.10]
RCS
Yes
TFW
0.09
0.03
[0.03, 0.15]
IAW
0.21
0.03
[-0.04, 0.08]
FAW
0.05
0.03
[-0.01, 0.11]
MSA
0.09
0.03
[0.03, 0.16]
NW
0.05
0.03
[-0.01, 0.11]
RCS
No
TFW
-0.16
0.04
[-0.24, -0.08]
IAW
-0.05
0.06
[-0.16, 0.06]
FAW
-0.13
0.04
[-0.22, -0.05]
MSA
-0.07
0.04
[-0.15, 0.01]
NW
-0.18
0.05
[-0.26, -0.09]
Note. This table displays the estimated marginal means, standard errors, and 95% confidence intervals for
BER, BIMI-C, and RCS by Job Interest and Faking dissuasion message condition. These results were
generated from a MANOVA that revealed only a significant main effect of Job Interest.
Faking
Measure
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Table 8. Applicant Reactions by Job Interest and Faking dissuasion message condition
Interested Applicants
Test-Taking Anxiety
PJ – Job Relatedness
PJ – Information Known PJ – Chances to Perform
Condition
M
SE
95% CI
M
SE
95% CI
M
SE
95% CI
M
SE
95% CI
TFW
3.17 0.13 [2.91, 3.42] 3.05 0.11 [2.83, 3.28] 3.49 0.11 [3.27, 3.71] 2.81 0.12 [2.57, 3.05]
IAW
3.19 0.13 [2.94, 3.45] 3.09 0.12 [2.86, 3.31] 3.42 0.11 [3.20, 3.64] 2.61 0.12 [2.36, 2.85]
FAW
3.05 0.13 [2.79, 3.31] 3.11 0.12 [2.88, 3.34] 3.51 0.11 [3.28, 3.73] 3.13 0.13 [2.88, 3.38]
MSA
3.10 0.15 [2.81, 3.39] 3.05 0.13 [2.80, 3.31] 3.44 0.13 [3.19, 3.69] 3.00 0.14 [2.73, 3.28]
NW
3.39 0.13 [3.13, 3.66] 2.85 0.12 [2.61, 3.08] 3.23 0.12 [3.00, 3.46] 2.64 0.13 [2.39, 2.90]
Uninterested Applicants
Test-Taking Anxiety
PJ – Job Relatedness
PJ – Information Known PJ – Chances to Perform
Condition
M
SE
95% CI
M
SE
95% CI
M
SE
95% CI
M
SE
95% CI
TFW
3.32 0.18 [2.97, 3.67] 2.96 0.16 [2.65, 3.27] 3.26 0.15 [2.96, 3.57] 2.60 0.17 [2.27, 2.94]
IAW
3.73 0.23 [3.27, 4.19] 2.52 0.21 [2.12, 2.93] 3.07 0.20 [2.68, 3.47] 2.57 0.22 [2.13, 3.00]
FAW
2.83 0.19 [2.45, 3.20] 2.54 0.17 [2.21, 2.88] 3.16 0.17 [2.83, 3.48] 2.36 0.18 [2.00, 2.72]
MSA
2.83 0.17 [2.50, 3.16] 2.85 0.15 [2.55, 3.15] 3.21 0.15 [2.92, 3.50] 2.70 0.16 [2.38, 3.02]
NW
3.77 0.19 [3.40, 4.14] 2.34 0.17 [2.01, 2.67] 3.28 0.16 [2.96, 3.60] 2.59 0.18 [2.23, 2.94]
Note. This table displays the estimated marginal means, standard errors, and 95% confidence intervals for each applicant
reaction measure by job interest and faking dissuasion message condition. PJ = Perceptions of Procedural Justice. These
results were generated from a MANOVA analysis.
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Univariate analyses revealed significant main effects for all three perceptions of
procedural justice subscales including Job-Relatedness, F(1, 511) = 17.20, p < .001, p = .03,
Information Known, F(1, 511) = 6.03, p = .01, p = .01, and Chances to Perform, F(1, 511) =
7.51, p = .006, p = .01. Interested Applicants rated the personality test as having higher levels
of Job-Relatedness, Information Known, and Chances to Perform (Ms = 3.03, 3.42, and 2.84)
than did Uninterested Applicants (Ms = 2.64, 3.20, and 2.56, respectively). Univariate analyses
revealed significant main effects of faking dissuasion message condition on test-taking anxiety,
F(4, 511) = 6.06, p < .001, p = .05, and perceptions of job relatedness, F(4, 511) = 2.49, p =
.045, p = .02. Pairwise comparisons of the estimated marginal means suggest that applicants in
the FAW condition experienced significantly less test-taking anxiety (M = 2.94) than applicants
in the IAW (M = 3.46) or NW (M = 3.58) conditions. These tests showed that applicants in the
TFW condition had higher perceptions of job-relatedness (M = 3.01) than did applicants in the
NW condition (M = 2.60). None of the univariate interaction tests were significant.
3.5 Discussion
Some studies demonstrated that faking dissuasion messages are one of the most effective
tools to combat applicant faking on non-cognitive tests (Fan et al., 2012; Landers et al., 2011).
However, the results from our study suggest that faking dissuasion messages might not be
effective in all situations—as all four faking dissuasion messages did not reduce faking or
influence applicant reactions.
As a partial test of our manipulations, we found that the time applicants spent reading the
faking dissuasion messages corresponded to the length of those warnings—spending longer on
lengthy warnings (e.g., IAW, FAW) and less time on the shorter ones (NW, TFW). The main
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effect was also large (p = .27), suggesting the faking dissuasion message condition was a
primary determinant of viewing time. We also found that interested applicants had significantly
more favorable personality scores than did uninterested applicants. Interested applicants also
scored significantly more favorably when they thought there was a job (Time 1) than after they
learned the job was fictitious (Time 2). These results suggest that our interested applicants faked
to appear more favorable. In sum, interested applicants appeared to be attentive, indicated
interest in the job, and faked accordingly, indicating that the failure of the faking dissuasion
messages may not be due to our study design.
In their meta-analysis on faking dissuasion messages, Dwight and Donovan (2003)
concluded that effective faking dissuasion messages must inform test-takers that faking can be
identified and that faking will lead to consequences, such as being withdrawn from the selection
process. Their recommendations have been successful in some studies (e.g., Fan et al., 2012). In
our study, both the IAW and FAW explicitly informed applicants how faking could be identified
and that being detected could lead to being withdrawn from the selection process. Yet, none of
our faking dissuasion messages—including the TFW used in earlier studies—significantly
reduced faking. There was also no evidence that the MSA was effective.
Job applicants are likely to fake when they believe it is advantageous for them to do so,
and will not fake when they believe it will lead to negative consequences, such as being removed
from the hiring pool (Goffin & Boyd, 2009). However, what about situations where the applicant
believes they have little chance of being hired? In the current study, all applicants were told that
they we were working with a company that would contact applicants with desirable results. One
possibility is that our interested applicants viewed the situation as a competitive screening
scenario with hundreds of other applicants, where they had little to lose by faking. Applicants
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may have believed that the benefits of faking outweighed the risks of being caught faking. By
contrast, applicants may perceive personality tests differently when encountered later in the
selection process, when they have more to lose by being caught for faking. Thus, the utility of
faking dissuasion messages may depend on job applicants’ perceptions of how competitive the
selection process will be.
To probe this explanation, we conducted a post-hoc review of faking dissuasion message
studies since the last published meta-analysis (Dwight & Donovan, 2003). As reviewed in Table
9, we found that these studies could be categorized into three methodological categories. In the
first category, “Accusation”, faking dissuasion messages were successful in reducing faking
when job applicants were told in real-time that they had been identified for faking based on how
they had scored on preliminary personality and/or social desirability scales. These studies were
instrumental in showing how technology can be used to bolster the efficacy of faking dissuasion
messages. However, a primary concern with this approach is that it requires the provision of
unique test instructions to only a subset of the applicant pool. More concerning, these warnings
are generated based on response patterns that have not been fully validated in the faking
literature. For example, Fan et al. (2012) issued faking warnings based on social desirability
scores, which have been widely criticized in the literature (Griffith & Peterson, 2008). Issuing
different test instructions, let alone when based on questionable criteria, may open an
organization to potential legal challenges (Catano, Wiesner, & Hackett, 2010). This concern is
amplified further if the warning is presented disproportionately to protected groups, which was
not investigated in any of the studies in the Accusation category.
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Table 9. Review of Faking Dissuasion Message Studies since 2003
Authors

Sample

Warning Design Faking
Design
Identification
Fake job
and
that
consequences;
applicants
Moral Suasion
thought was
real

Present Study

349 mTurk
applicants who
believed they were
applying for a job

Fisher et al.
(2018)

275 Undergraduate Identification
Business Students and
consequences

Burns et al.
(2015)

457 Undergraduate Identification,
Students
consequences,
Accusation

Fan et al.
(2012): Study
#1
Fan et al.
(2012): Study
#2
Landers et al.
(2011)

157 applicants for
10 staff positions
at university
386 applicants for
a student study
group
16,779 internal
applicants for
promotion for
initial sample; 488
applicants for
retesting

Accusation
based on test
scores
Accusation
based on test
scores
Accusation
based on test
scores

$20 for
highest
scorer; Fake
Good
Repeated
measures;
Fake Good
for Cash
Prize
Single
session, real
applicants
Single
session, real
applicants
Repeated
sessions

Faking Assessment

Outcome

Category

Residualized Change
Score, Idiosyncratic
Item Responding,
Blatant Extreme
Responding,
Impression
Management
Difference Scores

Ineffective

Screening

Ineffective

Screening

Mean personality
scores controlled for
“pre-warning”
personality

Experimental
& In-test
Accusation

Bogus Items and Social
Desirability

Small effect
sizes, with
exception for
“accusation”
condition
Faking warning
highly effective

Bogus Items and Social
Desirability

Faking warning
highly effective

In-test
Accusation

Blatant Extreme
Responding

Large initial
effects,
weakened
overtime

In-test
Accusation

In-test
Accusation
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Robie et al.
(2009)

329 undergraduate
students

Identified and
consequences

Robson et al.
(2008)

464 undergraduate
students

Identified and
consequences

Converse et
al. (2008)

293 undergraduate
students

Vasilopoulos
et al. (2005):
Study #1

366 applicants for
a federal law
enforcement
position
124 undergraduate
students

Vasilopoulos
et al. (2005):
Study #2

Single
session, cash
prize “fake
good”
Single
session, cash
prize “fake
good”

Mean
conscientiousness
score; agreement with
observer scores
Mean personality
scores; Agreement with
observer ratings

Identified and
consequences

Single
session, cash
prize “fake
good”

Faking not reported by
warning condition;
focused on validity
outcomes

Identified and
consequences

Real
Applicants

Mean personality
scores

Identified and
consequences

Single
Mean personality
session, cash scores; Impression
prize “fake
Management
good”

Large effect

Experimental

Medium to large Experimental
effects;
weakened
convergent
validity
No improvement Experimental
in convergent
validity or
incremental
validity
Null to small
Screening
effects

Null to medium Experimental
effects; no
significant effect
for Impression
Management
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In the second category, “Experimental”, faking dissuasion messages tended to be successful. A
major concern with this category is that lab scenarios produce significantly more faking than is
found in field studies (Hough, 1998), and as a result, faking warnings have far more potential to
decrease faking in simulation studies than in field environments. This is problematic because
faking warnings may be able to produce artificially high effects sizes that would not be
replicated with more realistic levels of faking. Even more problematic, participants in simulated
studies may be subject to demand effects when they read warnings and constrict their faking
more than a job applicant would. It may be apparent to some participants that the experimenter
wants them to fake less. As a result, these studies may have oversold the potential for general,
non-accusatory, faking warnings to thwart applicant faking.
In the third category, “Screening”, there are applicant scenarios with a high motivation
and minimal downside to faking—such as during screening—where the applicant may view their
chances of the desired outcome as small. For example, in a recent study (Fisher et al., 2018),
undergraduate students were told that only the highest scorer would receive a cash prize. This
low selection ratio meant that applicants had nothing to lose by being detected for faking, since
they were likely aware that faking was their only chance to secure the cash prize. Similarly, in
the present study, applicants were explicitly presented with a screening opportunity, where only
high scorers would be contacted by the hiring organization. In our study, there was little to lose
by being detected for applicant faking. In a job screening with real job applicants for a federal
government position in the United States, Vasilopoulos et al. (2005) found significant, but small
reductions due to faking dissuasion messages (ds = .07 to .19) overall. They also found that
faking dissuasion messages were only effective for applicants with lower general mental
ability—applicants with higher general mental ability were unaffected by the faking warning.
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Taken together, these findings present some reason to caution the value of faking dissuasion
messages as an effective tool in combatting applicant faking on personality tests.
Interestingly, the FAW appeared to reduce test-taking anxiety when compared to the
IAW and NW, but not the TFW and MSA. One possibility is that the FAW reassured applicants
that they would have the opportunity to demonstrate the personality on the job, providing them a
sense of control over the outcome. By contrast, the IAW was threatening and placed the outcome
on references and tricky test questions, which may have increased test-taking anxiety. The NW
group was given no information about how test questions were verified and may also have
provoked some test-taking anxiety. These results provided some preliminary support for
including a preamble of how personality items are verified using future job behavior, as
applicants may believe they are capable of performing those behaviors and it relieves them of the
worry that they will be filtered using other approaches. By contrast, threatening warnings that
place the outcome on other sources such as references or internal “integrity checks” may provoke
test-taking anxiety. Similarly, providing no information about how information is verified may
also allow applicants to ponder how their responses will be verified—increasing test-taking
anxiety. The TFW increased perceptions of job-relatedness relative to the other faking dissuasion
message conditions. One possibility is providing vague or general information about test
verification actually appeared the most credible, whereas the other faking dissuasion messages
were less compelling. That being said, the difference was small and may reflect an underlying
difference in the conditions.
3.5.1 Limitations
This is a novel investigation that has provided some unique insight into the efficacy of
faking dissuasion messages. However, there are a couple of limitations. The primary limitation is
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that we examined the efficacy of faking dissuasion messages using a low-complexity job with
mTurk users, and our findings may not generalize to more executive positions. That being said,
mTurk often provide high quality data when rigorous data screening are conducted (Buhrmester
et al., 2011; Casler et al., 2013; Landers & Behrend, 2015). The second limitation is that we only
presented the faking dissuasion messages during initial screening, and our post-hoc literature
review suggests that the timing of presentation is likely more important than the content of the
faking dissuasion messages. Future studies will need to examine this more closely by
manipulating when the faking dissuasion messages are presented.
3.5.2 Conclusion
Faking dissuasion messages may be effective when applicants are reporting factual and
objectively verifiable information or when applicants truly believe that faking may cost them the
job opportunity (Fan et al., 2012; Landers et al., 2011). However, in our study, faking dissuasion
messages seem to have limited effect in job applications even when those items are rated as nonverifiable or when applicants believe the consequences of faking are outweighed by the benefits
(e.g., early screening scenarios). This is problematic, since researchers have argued that
personality tests should be used during screening rather than during final selection, in order to
minimize the impact of applicant faking (Mueller-Hanson et al., 2003). Yet, this may be the type
of situation when applicants are most likely to fake their responses. Future research will need to
examine, more directly, if the efficacy of faking dissuasion messages is due to their content or to
the characteristics of the assessment situation.
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Appendix A: Traditional Faking Warning

Workstyle Survey: Important Instructions
The test you are going to complete calls for your honest
responses. Be aware of the following two points:
1. The test contains questions that are designed to identify
those who attempt to fake their responses. Research has
shown that these questions are an effective way of identifying
individuals who provide inaccurate information about
themselves.
2. Dishonest or distorted self-descriptions may invalidate your
results. Also, faking might result in you not being considered
for the position.
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Appendix B: Immediate Authentication Warning

Workstyle Survey: Important Instructions
You are about to fill out a work-style assessment that will ask
you questions about things such as how friendly or outgoing
you are at work. We’d just like to let you know that we can
verify responses on the following work-style assessment to
ensure everyone is being honest. This allows us to hire the
most well-suited person for the job.
We use two methods to verify answers.
Method 1: Reference Checking.
•

•

•

•

•

You’ll be asked to provide personal references. That is,
people who are familiar with your general work-style. This
could include employers, coworkers, or clients.
A trained consultant can verify with your references,
aspects of your work-style that can be observed by
others.
o For example, the consultant may call your references
and ask about how talkative you are in large groups.
If so, the trained consultant will look for consistent
differences between your answers on the work-style
assessment and the responses provided by your
references.
If we find many differences between your scores on this
assessment and the answers provided by your references,
this will lead to a one-on-one interview with the
consultant.
The consultant will request that you explain why
discrepancies exist and defend your answers to any
question where a discrepancy exists.
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Method 2: Internal Integrity Checks.
We have included questions that assess whether you tend to
provide answers that are unlikely to be honest. These
questions have been developed and vetted by scientists and
experts For example, imagine you were asked, “How often do
you follow the rules?” Your first thought might be that you
ALWAYS follow the rules. However, have you ever broken even
a small rule for a coworker or customer? Have you ever broken
a rule you that you thought was outdated or served no real
purpose?
•

•

These questions are inserted throughout the work-styles
assessment. So please think carefully before answering
each item in this assessment, and answer honestly.
If you are detected as answering dishonestly, this will lead
to a one-on-one interview with the consultant. Here, you
will need to explain your answers.
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Appendix C: Future Authentication Warning

Workstyle Survey: Important Instructions
You are about to fill out a work-style assessment that will ask
you questions about things such as how friendly or outgoing
you are at work. We’d just like to let you know that we are
looking for applicants who consistently demonstrate certain
workstyles and that we can verify responses on the work-style
assessment to make sure everyone is being honest. This allows
us to hire the most well-suited people for the job. It also
reduces the chances someone is hired by answering dishonestly
on the assessment. We can do this using a two-step process.
First step. If you are shortlisted and interviewed, the
interviewer will make observations of some aspects of your
work-style during the interview, such as how friendly or
outgoing you are.
•

•

•

A trained consultant will look for consistent differences
between your answers on the work-style assessment and
those provided by others.
Many differences between your answers and the
interviewers ratings will lead to a one-on-one interview
with the consultant.
The consultant will request that you explain why
discrepancies exist between your responses and those
provided by others.

Second step. If you are hired, your supervisor and peers will
examine how your on-the-job workstyle relates to your job
performance.
•

If you are flagged as performing poorly in some aspects of
your job because of your workstyle, you will be referred to
a one-on-one interview with a qualified HR consultant to
defend your original answers
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In both steps, if the consultant determines that you provided
insufficient rationale for your answers on this workstyle survey,
you will be removed from the hiring process or terminated
immediately.
You should also think about the fact that lying during the work-style
assessment may get in the way of your long-term interests.
•
•

You will be unhappy if you get a job that requires a different workstyle than your own
In turn, you will likely perform poorly and not earn promotions or
pay raises.

Thus, it is in your long-term best interest to answer the work-style
assessment honestly.
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Appendix D: Moral Suasion Appeal

Workstyle Survey: Important Instructions

▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪

▪

You are about to fill out a work-style assessment that will ask you questions about things
such as how friendly or outgoing you are at work. Please consider that providing dishonest
answers is immoral. Doing this violates what most people consider moral behavior. Honest
responses ensure that the most well-suited candidates are hired.
Now we want you to imagine yourself in the following
situation. Think carefully about how you would FEEL:
Imagine you’re a customer support worker for an internet
company.
The company just had a major internet outage
The company is receiving more calls than usual.
The customers are furious. Your supervisors are
increasingly demanding.
The customer queue is over 2 hours.
Your boss expects you to work extra shifts. Your time off
is cancelled.
You’ve had to cancel plans to visit your family whom
you haven’t seen in several years.
Later, you learn the internet outage is because of a
careless technician. He cut a major cable line. Instead
of reporting his mistake, he simply covered it up. He
hoped no one would discover that he was to blame.
Now imagine that this technician only got the job
because he answered dishonestly on a work-style
measure such as this one. How upset would you be?

In sum, honest responses ensure that the most well-suited candidates are hired.
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Appendix E: Job Posting

Remote Customer Service Representative (Job Posting)

We're looking for a Remote Customer Service Representative!
We are a research team that works with a large international firm. This firm is
looking for remote customer service representatives who will help customers
with online inquiries and hold live chat sessions. If you are interested, your
answers to our survey will be used as a preliminary screening for employment.
The candidates with the strongest person-job fit will be considered for an
interview and an employment opportunity.
This person will be responsible for:
• Communicating with customers by live web chat session or by e-mail to
provide information about products or services, take or enter orders,
cancel accounts, or obtain details of complaints.
•

Following up with purchases to ensure that customers are satisfied and
offering individualized promotions

•

Diligently check to ensure that appropriate changes were made to resolve
customers' problems

•

Keeping records of customer interactions or transactions, recording
details of inquiries, complaints, or comments, as well as actions taken.

•

Completing contract forms, prepare change of address records, or issue
service discontinuance orders, using remote web interface.

•

Referring unresolved customer grievances to designated departments for
further investigation
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•

Determining charges for services requested, collect deposits or payments,
or arrange for billing

•

Contacting customers remotely to respond to inquiries or to notify them
of claim investigation results or any planned adjustments

Consider applying if you:
• Enjoy working from home with flexible hours.
•

You enjoy communicating with customers and making customers
feel valued

•

You like writing e-mails and live online conversations

•

Enjoy problem solving and helping customers with novel solutions

•

Developing individualized promotions for previous customers and
following up on previous purchases

What We Offer:

- Contractual services that pay you for answering customer e-mails and
following up with customers
- The opportunity to learn and develop in a growing company
-Access to Health and Dental Benefits
-A profit-sharing program
-A positive and respectful work environment
If you are interested in this opportunity, your answers will be used for both
research purposes and for employment screening. You will also still receive
payment for completing the HIT.

If you are not interested in this opportunity, your answers will only be
used for research purposes and you are still eligible to complete the HIT.
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Chapter 4
4

Combating Faking on Personality Tests during Military Recruitment
In this chapter, we investigate whether new faking dissuasion messages that incorporate

accountability theory and morality theory can be used to reduce recruit faking on personality
tests in a military environment, and whether reductions in applicant faking will come at the
expense of negative applicant reactions.
4.1

Abstract

Military organizations use personality testing to select recruits that will perform better and who
be less likely to leave the organization. However, military recruits fake on these tests to
manipulate their chances of recruitment (Boss et al., 2015). We investigated the efficacy of three
different faking dissuasion message conditions to reduce faking among military recruits that
emphasize short-term accountability, long-term accountability, and morality. We also examined
how these new warnings compare to a traditional warning and a no-warning control group. We
tested 466 basic training recruits at the Canadian Armed Forces and asked them to engage in a
selection simulation. We assigned groups of recruits to the different faking dissuasion message
conditions and walked classes through the simulation. The results suggested that only the faking
dissuasion message condition that emphasized short-term accountability, which threatened to
detect fakers by contacting references and through the use of social desirability items, reduced
applicant faking. None of the other messages had any effect when compared to a no-warning
control group. We also found no differences in applicant reactions to the faking dissuasion
messages. Implications for research and practice are discussed.
Keywords
Personality assessment; job applications; faking; faking warnings; military; recruitment
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4.2

Introduction
Envision that you are a captain, commanding a platoon, fighting in a war-torn and

treacherous area of a war-torn country. You have been captured by a group of insurgents and
your platoon is planning a rescue mission. One of your trusted officers is about to take the lead in
your absence. In this hypothetical situation, do you hope the officer is conscientious—detailoriented, diligent, dutiful—or the opposite? This situation makes one thing clear: personality
matters when selecting military recruits. But, what if a military recruit was selected for a critical
position because they faked on the personality test, and were not actually suited for that position?
The purpose of this study was to examine the extent that faking dissuasion messages
could reduce faking on personality testing by military recruits during the selection process. In
this context, military recruits are to the military as job applicants are to civilian organizations.
We developed three faking dissuasion messages that leveraged accountability (Lerner & Tetlock,
1999) and morality theory (Haidt, 2001)—with the intent of improving military selection
decisions, where military recruits may eventually be placed in life and death situations.
Personality testing predicts important outcomes in military settings, including task
performance, counterproductive work behavior, and leadership training (Bartone, Snook, &
Tremble, 2002; Darr, 2011; Darr & Catano, 2016). In a meta-analysis, both Conscientiousness
and Emotional Stability positively predicted military task performance (ρs = .35 and .28
respectively) and negatively predicted counterproductive work behavior (ρs = .28 and -.33
respectively; Darr, 2011). The researchers also found that Extraversion predicts task performance
(ρ = .22) and that Agreeableness predicts counterproductive work behavior (ρ = -.21). In another
investigation, Bartone et al. (2002) found that Conscientiousness incrementally predicted
performance beyond general mental ability, gender, and social judgment in military leadership
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training. Overall, personality appears to be a strong predictor of military performance relative to
other selection tools for lower-ranked military recruits (Darr & Catano, 2016).
Personality testing can also be used to identify military personnel who are more likely to
leave the organization (Darr, 2011). Both Conscientiousness and Emotional Stability negatively
predict turnover intentions (ρs = -.28 and -.32 respectively)— meaning that people who rate
more highly on these personality traits are less likely to leave their current career for another one.
Personality traits can also predict which high school graduates are most likely to join the armed
forces. In another study (J. J. Jackson et al., 2012), researchers found that military recruits were
lower on Agreeableness (d = -.29) and Openess (d = -.15) than civilians, but higher on Emotional
Stability (d = .14). Taken together, recruit personality scores can be used to form prediction
models of who will apply to the armed forces, and that the same traits—Conscientiousness and
Emotional Stability—can be used to select and retain recruits who are a good fit for military
service.
4.2.1 Selecting Military Recruits: Prevalence of Faking
Research suggests that military recruits fake during the selection stage. In a study of 918
conscripted recruits for the Swiss Armed Forces (Boss et al., 2015), self-reported military service
motivation predicted personality scores during initial recruitment: Conscientiousness (r = .50),
Extraversion (r = .45), Team Cooperation (r = .29), and Stress Tolerance (r = .51). Boss et al.
then divided the recruits by their admission of faking. Not surprising, correlations between
military service motivation and personality was highest for those who admitted to “faking good”
and lowest for those who admitted to “faking bad.” Taken together, recruits who were
unmotivated to serve in the military “faked bad” by intentionally scoring unfavorably—with the
hope of being declared “unfit to serve”—and recruits who were motivated to serve “faked good”
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by intentionally scoring favorably. This is troubling for military organizations that rely on
voluntary service—such as Canada or the United States—because most recruits will be
motivated, and in turn, be willing to fake good to join the armed forces. This means that the
motivated recruits who are selected may be a poorer fit for service.
4.2.2 Reducing Recruitment Faking
There is little research on how the military can combat faking by recruits, but they can
draw inferences from research on regular job applicants. The broader faking literature reveals
that faking dissuasion messages are one of the simplest and most effective tool to thwart
applicant faking in non-military settings; reducing faking by up to 50% (Fan et al., 2012;
Landers et al., 2011). The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) created their faking dissuasion
message to utilize best practice, which includes the threats of identification and disqualification
from the selection process (Dwight & Donovan, 2003). However, to our knowledge, the efficacy
of faking dissuasion messages in reducing faking among military recruits has not been
empirically tested.
There are some unique aspects to military recruits that may cause them to respond
differently to faking dissuasion messages than civilian applicants. First, at least in Canada, the
military rejects a low proportion of recruits (Office of the Auditor General, 2006). Theoretical
models of faking suggest that applicants are likely to weigh the risks of being caught against the
dividends provided by faking (Goffin & Boyd, 2009). That is, interested applicants may perceive
a faking as advantageous in a competitive climate; however, in the military context, this means
that recruits have less incentive to fake than would civilian applicants to more competitive
positions. Assuming this is true, faking dissuasion messages that stress the risks of faking—
identification and disqualification from the hiring process—should be a more serious deterrent to

129
military recruits than civilian applicants. Second, the military has a strong masculine culture that
stresses conformity and loyalty (Dunivin, 1994). We speculate that faking dissuasion messages
may carry more weight in a high conformity culture than for a civilian applicant to a regular
organization.
Therefore, we examine the extent that the CAF’s faking dissuasion message is able to
reduce faking among military recruits relative to a no-warning control group. If faking dissuasion
message is effective, military recruits should receive less favorable personality scores than
military recruits in the control group. Because the CAF warning is modelled off the existing
literature, we refer to the CAF’s faking dissuasion message as a Traditional Faking Warning
(TFW).
In addition, building on Study 2, we examined the effectiveness of two new faking
dissuasion messages that increased accountability by describing a credible process by which
personality scores could be verified and by making military recruits focus on the process of
responding to the test, rather than the outcome (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). The Immediate
Authentication Warning (IAW) informed military recruits that the personality test contained test
items that could detect faking and provided examples of an impression management scale. The
IAW also informed military recruits that their responses to personality items could be verified by
calling references that they provided during initial recruitment. Together, the IAW described two
verification mechanisms to boost credibility that faking could be detected. The IAW also
informed military recruits that if they were identified as faking, they would need to defend their
responses to each personality item to a trained Recruiting Officer from the CAF. By having
recruits consider if they could defend their answers to each personality item, in theory, they
should fake less in cases where they would struggle to defend their choices.
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The Future Authentication Warning (FAW) explained to recruits that their Recruitment
Officer would compare their observed personality during training to their answers on the
personality test. The FAW attempted to build credibility by illustrating that the personality test is
assessing behaviors that can be verified by observing them. The FAW explained that any recruit
identified as faking would need to defend their responses to each personality item to the
Recruitment Officer. Military recruits were told that failure to do so would lead to
disqualification from the selection process. This feature also aimed to prompt military recruits to
carefully consider if they could defend their answers to each personality item rather than their
overall test scores. Ideally, this should reduce faking. Finally, the FAW also included an
educational component. It explained to recruits that their personality scores would be used for
placement decisions and that faking may lead to placement in a position that was a poor fit for
the recruit. We explained that being placed in a position with poor fit would lead to lower
performance, and in turn, fewer opportunities for promotion.
Scholars have also postulated that morality is the first issue that test-takers consider when
faking on personality test items, suggesting that “test-taking instructions that appeal to the test
takers’ moral compass (by emphasizing that faking is a form of lying or cheating that violates
most accepted standards of moral behaviour) might add to the success of existing faking
warnings.” (Goffin & Boyd, 2009, p. 158). We tailored a moral suasion appeal (MSA) to the
armed forces by having recruits consider a life-threatening combat situation. Then, we had
recruits imagine how they would feel if an intelligence officer had information about that attack
and forgot to relay the information to their commander—not from malice, but carelessness—
because that person was placed into their position by faking. The goal of the MSA was to prompt
recruits to feel negatively about faking, and in turn, have them answer more honestly. Moral
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decisions are generally informed by affective responses rather than rational decision-making
(Haidt, 2001). Thus, we also included pictures to facilitate thinking about the combat scenario to
maximize the emotional response to the simulation (Lang et al., 1993; Schimmack, 2005).
Research Question 1: To what extent will recruits fake on a personality test when
presented with faking dissuasion messages (IAW, FAW, MSA) as compared to nowarning control group?
4.2.3 Recruit Reactions to Faking Dissuasion Messages
Prior research suggests that faking dissuasion messages with threatening or negative
wording increases test-taking anxiety (Converse et al., 2008). These messages also increase the
cognitive demands of applicants (Vasilopoulos et al., 2005), making the personality tests less
pleasant to complete. Subsequently, the faking dissuasion messages may cause negative
reactions concerning the fairness or legitimacy of the personality test. Recruit reactions are
particularly important because negative impressions can reduce the likelihood a candidate
accepts job offers or recommends the organization to others (McCarthy, Bauer, Truxillo,
Anderson, et al., 2017; McCarthy, Bauer, Truxillo, Campion, et al., 2017). The latter is of
particular concern to the CAF, because they have documented problems recruiting and retaining
talent (Office of the Auditor General, 2006). Each of the faking dissuasion messages alter the
extent they increase accountability, educate recruits, and appeal to recruit morality, so the
different faking dissuasion messages may invoke unique applicant reactions.
Research Question 2: To what extent will the faking dissuasion messages influences
test-taking anxiety and perceptions of procedural justice when compared to the no-warning
control group?
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4.3. Method
4.3.1 Participants
We invited 535 recruits from the Canadian Armed Forces who were undergoing basic
training to take part in our study. A total of 466 (87%) recruits agreed to participate. Consenting
recruits provided their service numbers so that we could obtain demographic information and
earlier test scores (e.g., cognitive ability) from their service files (Mage = 24.50, SD = 5.59, 88
females, 94.9% regular force, and 5.1% reserve). All recruits spoke English as their primary
language except three, whose primary language was French but who were also fluent in English.
4.3.2 Measures
Personality. We measured personality using three measures. The first measure, used
during initial recruitment, was the Trait Self-Descriptive Personality Inventory (TSD-PI; Darr,
2011). The TSD-PI is the CAF’s proprietary measure of the Big Five personality dimensions and
has 75-items that examine Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, Extraversion,
and Openness. Each item is measured using a 7-point scale (1 = “Extremely Uncharacteristic” to
7 = “Extremely Characteristic”). The TSD-PI is reliable (αs = .88 to .93) and each of the five
dimensions correlate with their respective dimension on the NEO (Darr, 2009). Overall
correlations were not provided in the TSD-PI manual, but each item was validated against their
respective NEO marker. The second measure, used during our experiment, was the 20-Item
OCEAN.20 (O’Keefe, Kelloway, & Francis, 2012) developed in conjunction with the Canadian
Armed Forces, which was derived from the full version of their proprietary TSD-PI (Darr, 2009,
2011). We included this measure for parsimony with the original TSD-PI. Accordingly, items
used the same 7-point response scale. The scale is reliable (αs = .74 to .83) and each of the Big 5
personality dimensions converges with their respective TSD-PI markers (rs = .77 to .88). Finally,
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for consistency with Studies 1 and 2, we also measured the Big 5 personality dimensions using
the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP; Goldberg et al., 2006). Similarly, we used the 120item version (Maples et al., 2014), that uses a 5-point response scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 =
Strongly Agree). The 120-item scale has strong internal consistencies between .87 and .90 for the
five dimensions. Additionally, all five dimensions on the 120-item scale were found to parallel
their respective NEO Personality Inventory dimension with correlations between .87 and .90
(Maples et al., 2014).
Faking.
In this study, we were unable to use Residualized Change Scores, which have been
demonstrated as the best faking assessment (Feeney & Goffin, 2015). Residualized Change
Scores require a set of job applicant and non-applicant personality scores for the same people,
which we were unable to obtain for this study. Instead, we used three practical assessments of
applicant faking that were shown to demonstrate both Between-Subjects Faking Sensitivity and
Within-Subjects Faking Sensitivity in Study 1.
Blatant Extreme Responding. We assessed faking using Blatant Extreme
Responding (BER). We used the same approach as in Study 1, which required recoding
personality items so that the most favorable answer for a given item is coded as 1, and the
remaining answers are coded as 0. A composite BER score is calculated by totaling the number
of extreme responses across all personality items used in the analysis. BER has been used in
multiple investigations and has been demonstrated as an effective measure of applicant faking
(Landers et al., 2011; Levashina et al., 2014). We derived two separate measures of BER from
the OCEAN.20 and IPIP personality measures.
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Communal Impression Management. We measured Communal Impression
Management, which is the extent that applicants engage in “denying socially deviant impulses
and claiming pious attributes” (Blasberg et al., 2013, p. 523). Communal Impression
Management is assessed using 10 items measured on 5-point response scales (1 = “Strongly
Disagree” to 5 = “Strongly Agree”). An example item is “I don’t gossip about other people’s
business.” Internal consistencies exceeded .70 across two studies, and there is evidence of both
convergent and discriminant validity (Blasberg et al.). These items were embedded randomly
throughout the Personality assessment.
Idiosyncratic Item Responding. We also assessed faking using Idiosyncratic
item responding, which differentiates interested applicant responses from uninterested applicant
responses (Kuncel & Borneman, 2007). We created an Idiosyncratic Item Responding scale by
selecting the 10 items with the largest mean differences between our CAF recruits and the
Uninterested Applicant sample from Studies 1 and 2. Idiosyncratic Item Responding scale scores
should be positively correlated with applicant faking. Example items include “I start tasks right
away” and “I find it difficult to approach others.” These items are derived from the scores on the
personality measure. One potential concern with developing and using a scale within the same
sample is that it can capitalize on sample specific variance, and in turn, the findings may not
generalize to other samples (Cureton, 1950). To address this concern, we also used an
idiosyncratic item responding scale derived from another study, but the results were comparable.
As a result, for simplicity, we report the one measure derived using this sample. The
Idiosyncratic Item Responding scale is located in Appendix F.
Procedural Justice Perceptions. We assessed Procedural Justice Perceptions using three
dimensions from the Selection Procedural Justice Scale (SPJS; Bauer et al., 2001), which
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included Job-Relatedness, Information Known, and Chances to Perform. The composite scale
had 9 items that used a 5-point response scale (1 = “Strongly Disagree” to 5 = “Strongly
Agree”). Example items for Job-Relatedness, Information Known, and Chances to Perform were
“Doing well on the test means a person can serve well for the CAF,” “I knew what to expect on
the test,” and “I could really show my skills and abilities through the test,” respectively. The
SPJS has strong evidence of internal consistency (α = .88) and validity (Bauer et al., 2001). The
scale also demonstrated construct and criterion-related validity (Bauer et al., 2001; McCarthy et
al., 2013).
Test-Taking Anxiety. We measured Test-Taking Anxiety using the Comparative
Anxiety subscale from the Test Attitude Survey (Arvey et al., 1990). Test-taking anxiety was
measured using 10 items on a five 5-point response scale (1 = “Strongly Disagree”, 5 =
“Strongly Agree”). The Test Attitude Survey has evidence of internal consistency (α = .80) and
criterion-related validity. The scale was previously validated using reactions to the Armed
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (Arvey et al., 1990; Hunter, Crosson, & Friedman, 1985).
4.3.3 Procedure
We ran the experiment with 13 different groups in a classroom setting, with a range of 29
to 52 recruits per class. We informed recruits about the study, stressed that participation was
voluntary, and explained that their responses would not influence their military careers. Recruits
within each classroom were assigned to the same condition, where they received either the TFW,
IAW, FAW, MSA, or NFW personality test instructions. We used a random number generator to
determine the order of the condition assignment and assigned our first 10 groups to these
condition in order. We then assigned the last two groups to conditions with smaller samples. We
used this approach to minimize differences in group size. Still, we had an unequal distribution of
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recruits across faking dissuasion message conditions (ns: MSA = 107, IAW = 84, FAW = 54,
TFW = 83, NW = 114). In a couple of instances, recruits joined the classroom too late to take
part or were withdrawn during the simulation for military operations, creating unequal group
sizes.
After recruits were seated, we provided a general overview of the experiment, including
why personality measures are important for recruitment decisions into the Canadian Armed
Forces. In order to comply with ethics, we minimized deception and informed all recruits that the
CAF was looking to improve the accuracy of their personality test by piloting different sets of
test instructions. However, we did not inform recruits of our hypotheses and the same script was
used for all groups.
We instructed recruits in the four separate warning conditions to engage in a selection
role-play exercise, where they would fill out the surveys as if they were initially trying to secure
employment with the CAF. For each faking dissuasion message condition, the experimenter
guided recruits through the study by displaying the roleplay instructions and warnings on
PowerPoint slides, which were displayed on multiple monitors. The PowerPoint presentations
included test instructions and faking dissuasion messages for the IAW, FAW, MSA, TFW, and
NFW are presented in Appendices A through E. We used this approach to ensure that recruits
were aware of the instructions before filling out the surveys and to keep recruits at a similar pace,
so that we could better control the group. Next, these recruits were asked to fill out our
personality measures, the OCEAN.20 and IPIP, as if they were trying to be recruited by the CAF.
After completion, recruits were directed that the role-play was over and to fill out the remaining
surveys honestly. Recruits in the no-warning group did not engage in the roleplay, were
encouraged to respond as honestly as possible, and completed the personality test as they would
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without the simulation. To encourage recruits to follow our instructions, we reminded recruits
that their responses would be unassociated with their personnel file and would not influence their
military service careers in anyway. Recruits then completed a measure of procedural justice
perceptions and test-taking anxiety. As before, the experimenter guided recruits through each
measure—at a time—using PowerPoint slides and read instructions aloud. The experiment took
30 to 35 minutes per group.
4.4

Results

4.4.1 Preliminary Analyses
We did not have true random assignment, and as a result, we tested to see if mean
personality scores varied between our faking dissuasion groups prior to our study. If there were
differences prior to the manipulation, they could provide alternative explanations for any
differences between our faking dissuasion message conditions. To test for this, we conducted a
MANOVA with faking dissuasion message condition as the independent variable and the Big
Five personality scores on the TSD-PI during initial recruitment (at baseline, and prior to the
experimental manipulation) as the dependent variables. There was a significant multivariate
effect for faking dissuasion message condition, F(20, 1496.75) = 1.84, p = .01, Wilk’s Λ = .92.
The univariate analyses revealed significant main effects for Openness, F(4, 455) = 3.51, p =
.008, p = .03, and Emotional Stability, F(4, 455) = 2.47, p = .04, p = .02. Tukey’s B post-hoc
test revealed that recruits in the MSA and FAW conditions scored significantly higher on
Openness at baseline (prior to group assignment) than did recruits in the TFW condition.
Recruits in the FAW condition scored significantly higher on Emotional Stability than did
recruits in the IAW condition. No other differences were significant, suggesting there were no
systematic differences that would confound our main analyses. Applicants generally do not fake
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on Openness (Birkeland et al., 2006), leaving only one significant difference that could
complicate results. Rather than controlling for scores on Emotional Stability, which could
influence all findings, we used this information to inform any differences between the IAW and
FAW on Emotional Stability in the main analysis. All means, standard errors, and 95%
confidence intervals of the TSD-PI scores are presented in Table 10.
4.4.2 Faking Dissuasion Message Efficacy on OCEAN.20
To examine the efficacy of our faking dissuasion messages, we conducted a MANOVA
with faking dissuasion message condition as the independent variable and Big Five personality
scores from the OCEAN.20 as the dependent variables. We found a significant multivariate
effect of faking dissuasion message condition, F(20, 1493.43) = 2.87, p < .001, Wilk’s Λ = .88.
The univariate analyses revealed significant main effects for: Openness, F(4, 454) = 3.31, p =
.01, p = .03; Conscientiousness, F(4, 454) = 5.25, p < .001, p = .04; Agreeableness, F(4, 454)
= 3.85, p = .004, p = .03; and Emotional Stability, F(4, 454) = 2.73, p = .03, p = .02. To
further probe these effects, we conducted Tukey’s B post-hoc tests for each personality
dimension. For Conscientiousness, recruits in the IAW condition scored significantly lower than
recruits in the FAW, MSA, TFW, and NFW conditions. Further, recruits in the IAW condition
scored significantly lower on Agreeableness than recruits in the CAF condition, but not lower
than those in the NFW condition. Recruits in the NFW condition scored significantly lower on
Agreeableness than recruits in the FAW condition. Finally, recruits in the IAW condition scored
significantly lower on Openness than recruits in either the FAW or MSA condition, but not lower
than in the NFW condition. All means, standard errors, and 95% confidence intervals of the
OCEAN.20 scores are presented in Table 11.
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Table 10. Recruit Scores on the Trait Self-Descriptive Personality Inventory during Initial Recruitment.
Trait Self-Descriptive Personality Inventory
Warning
Openness
Conscientiousness
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Emotional Stability
n
Condition
M
SE
95%
M
SE
95%
M
SE
95%
M
SE
95%
M
SE
95%
CI
CI
CI
CI
CI
MSA
113 4.74 0.08 [4.58, 5.59 0.06 [5.46, 4.57 0.09 [4.39, 5.85 0.05 [5.74,
5.43 0.07 [5.29,
4.90]
5.71]
4.75]
5.95]
5.57]
IAW
85
4.53 0.09 [4.35, 5.49 0.07 [5.35, 4.47 0.11 [4.26, 5.70 0.06 [5.58, a5.23 0.08 [5.07,
4.71]
5.64]
4.68]
5.82]
5.39]
FAW
60 b4.77 0.11 [4.55, 5.41 0.09 [5.24, 4.44 0.13 [4.19, 5.78 0.07 [5.63, a5.60 0.10 [5.41,
4.99]
5.58]
4.69]
5.92]
5.79]
TFW
86 b4.39 0.09 [4.20, 5.47 0.07 [5.33, 4.37 0.11 [4.16, 5.76 0.06 [5.64,
5.49 0.08 [5.33,
4.57]
5.61]
4.58]
5.88]
5.65]
NFW
116 4.46 0.08 [4.30, 5.51 0.06 [5.39, 4.48 0.09 [4.30, 5.85 0.05 [5.74,
5.39 0.07 [5.25,
4.61]
5.63]
4.66]
5.95]
5.52]
Note. This table displays the estimated marginal mean personality scores on the Trait Self-Descriptive Personality Inventory
prior to our experiment. Personality items are on a 7-point scale (1 = Extremely Uncharacteristic, 7 = Extremely
Characteristic). MSA = Moral Suasion Appeal. IAW = Immediate Authentication Warning. FAW = Future Authentication
Warning. TFW = Traditional Faking Warning. NFW = No warning.
a
Emotional stability was significantly higher in the FAW condition than in the IAW condition
b
Openness was significantly higher in the FAW condition than in the TFW condition
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Table 11. Recruit Scores on the OCEAN.20 Personality Inventory during the Application Simulation
OCEAN.20 Personality Inventory
Warning
Openness
Conscientiousness
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Emotional Stability
n
Condition
M
SE
95%
M
SE
95%
M
SE
95%
M
SE
95%
M
SE
95%
CI
CI
CI
CI
CI
MSA
113 4.42 0.12 [4.18, 5.19 0.10 [5.00, 3.56 0.12 [3.33, 5.38 0.08 [5.22, 5.49 0.11 [5.27,
4.66]
5.39]
3.80]
5.54]
5.70]
IAW
84
3.80 0.14 [3.52, 4.53 0.11 [4.30, 3.51 0.14 [3.24, 5.07 0.10 [4.88, 5.42 0.13 [5.17,
4.08]
4.75]
3.78]
5.26]
5.67]
FAW
57
4.40 0.17 [4.07, 4.98 0.14 [4.71, 3.40 0.17 [3.07, 5.20 0.12 [4.97, 5.85 0.15 [5.55,
4.74]
5.25]
3.73]
5.43]
6.15]
TFW
87
4.09 0.14 [3.82, 5.03 0.11 [4.81, 3.55 0.14 [3.28, 5.55 0.09 [5.36, 5.55 0.12 [5.31,
4.36]
5.24]
3.81]
5.74]
5.80]
NFW
118 4.23 0.12 [3.99, 5.01 0.10 [4.82, 3.84 0.12 [3.61, 5.41 0.08 [5.26, 5.25 0.11 [5.04,
4.46]
5.20]
4.06]
5.57]
5.46]
Note. This table displays the estimated marginal mean personality scores on the OCEAN.20 Personality Inventory prior to
our experiment. Personality items were measuring using a 7-point scale (1 = Extremely Uncharacteristic, 7 = Extremely
Characteristic). MSA = Moral Suasion Appeal. IAW = Immediate Authentication Warning. FAW = Future Authentication
Warning. TFW = Traditional Faking Warning. NFW = No warning.
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4.4.3 Faking Dissuasion Message Efficacy on IPIP
In addition, we examined the efficacy of our faking dissuasion messages by conducting a
MANOVA with faking dissuasion message condition as the independent variable and Big Five
personality scores from the IPIP as the dependent variables. We found a significant multivariate
effect of faking dissuasion message condition, F(20, 1447) = 1.85, p = .01, Wilk’s Λ = .92. The
univariate results suggest that only the univariate test assessing the effects of faking dissuasion
message condition on Conscientiousness was significant, F(4, 440) = 3.42, p = .01, p = .03.
Tukey’s B post-hoc tests revealed that recruits in the IAW condition reported significantly lower
scores on Conscientiousness than did the FAW, MSA, TFW, and NFW conditions. All means,
standard errors, and 95% confidence intervals of the IPIP scores are presented in Table 12.
4.4.4 Faking Dissuasion Message Efficacy on Faking Measures
We also examined the extent that the faking dissuasion messages reduced scores on our
faking measures. To do this, we ran another MANOVA with faking dissuasion message
condition as the independent variable and Communal Impression Management, Blatant Extreme
Responding, and Idiosyncratic Item Responding as the dependent variables. We found a
significant multivariate effect of faking dissuasion message condition, F(16, 1283.76) = 2.01, p =
.01, Wilk’s Λ = .93. There were significant univariate effects of faking dissuasion message
condition on Blatant Extreme Responding derived from the OCEAN.20, F(4, 423) = 4.26, p =
.002, p = .04, and on Blatant Extreme Responding derived from the IPIP, F(4, 423) = 4.37, p =
.002, p = .04. Tukey’s B post-hoc tests revealed that recruits in the IAW condition had
significantly lower scores on Blatant Extreme Responding derived from both the OCEAN.20 and
the IPIP than recruits in the FAW and MFW conditions. There were no significant main effects
of faking dissuasion message condition on Communal Impression Management or IIR.
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Table 12. Recruit Scores on the IPIP Personality Inventory during the Application Simulation
IPIP Personality Inventory
Openness
Conscientiousness
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Emotional Stability
n
M
SE
95%
M
SE
95%
M
SE
95%
M
SE
95%
M
SE
95%
CI
CI
CI
CI
CI
MSA
113 3.23 0.04 [3.16, 3.76 0.04 [3.68, 3.47 0.04 [3.38, 3.51 0.04 [3.44, 3.55 0.04 [3.47,
3.31]
3.84]
3.55]
3.58]
3.63]
IAW
84
3.11 0.04 [3.03, 3.58 0.05 [3.49, 3.36 0.05 [3.26, 3.49 0.04 [3.41, 3.47 0.05 [3.38,
3.19]
3.68]
3.45]
3.57]
3.56]
FAW
57
3.22 0.05 [3.12, 3.76 0.06 [3.64, 3.54 0.06 [3.42, 3.48 0.05 [3.38, 3.69 0.06 [3.57,
3.33]
3.87]
3.67]
3.58]
3.80]
TFW
87
3.22 0.04 [3.14, 3.80 0.05 [3.71, 3.55 0.05 [3.45, 3.63 0.04 [3.55, 3.59 0.05 [3.50,
3.30]
3.89]
3.64]
3.70]
3.68]
NFW
118 3.20 0.04 [3.13, 3.77 0.04 [3.69, 3.47 0.04 [3.39, 3.50 0.03 [3.43, 3.53 0.04 [3.46,
3.27]
3.85]
3.56]
3.56]
3.61]
Note. This table displays the estimated marginal mean personality scores on the IPIP Personality Inventory during our
experiment. Personality items were measured using a 5-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree). MSA =
Moral Suasion Appeal. IAW = Immediate Authentication Warning. FAW = Future Authentication Warning. TFW =
Traditional Faking Warning. NFW = No warning.
Warning
Condition
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All means, standard errors, and 95% confidence intervals of the IPIP scores are presented in
Table 13.
4.4.5 Faking Dissuasion Message Efficacy on Recruit Reactions
We examined the extent that the faking dissuasion messages influenced recruit reactions.
To do this, we ran a MANOVA with faking dissuasion message condition as the independent
variable, and Test Anxiety and three components of Procedural Justice Perceptions (Job
Relatedness, Information Known, and Chances to Perform), as the dependent variables. The
multivariate analysis did not approach significance, F(16, 1354.03) = 1.27, p = .21, Wilk’s Λ =
.96. All means, standard errors, and 95% confidence intervals of the IPIP scores are presented in
Table 14.
4.5

Discussion
We examined if faking dissuasion messages could thwart applicant faking among

military recruits and if these messages engendered negative reactions. In contrast to Study 2, our
results provided support for the IAW. The IAW reduced personality scores on a measure of
conscientiousness relative to other faking dissuasion messages. The IAW also reduced BER
scores – an index of faking –derived from both the OCEAN.20 and IPIP, suggesting that the
IAW prevents recruits from responding with extreme responses (such as “7 = extremely agree”).
However, the IAW did not appreciably reduce faking on other personality traits relative to other
faking dissuasion messages, and also failed to reduce scores on two faking indices—Communal
Impression Management and Idiosyncratic Item Responding. Results from Study 1 suggest that
researchers and practitioners should aim for convergence across faking indices. Reducing faking
on only one faking assessment is encouraging, but needs to be interpreted with caution. It is
possible that the IAW is reducing one style of faking, but not others.
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Table 13. Recruit Scores on the Faking Measures during the Application Simulation
Faking Measure
n
OCEAN.20 BER
IPIP BER
IIR
BIMI-C
M
SE
95% CI
M
SE
95% CI
M
SE
95% CI
M
SE
95% CI
MSA
105 2.20 0.24 [1.73,
18.28 1.32 [15.69,
3.16 0.03 [3.10,
2.68 0.03 [2.62,
2.67]
20.87]
3.21]
2.75]
IAW
76
1.47 0.28 [0.92,
13.86 1.55 [10.81,
3.23 0.03 [3.16,
2.73 0.04 [2.65,
2.03]
16.90]
3.29]
2.80]
FAW
52
2.71 0.34 [2.04,
19.98 1.87 [16.30,
3.18 0.04 [3.10,
2.60 0.05 [2.51,
3.38]
23.66]
3.26]
2.69]
TFW
83
2.46 0.27 [1.93,
18.65 1.48 [15.74,
3.23 0.03 [3.16,
2.73 0.04 [2.66,
2.99]
21.56]
3.29]
2.80]
NFW
108 3.02 0.24 [2.55,
21.82 1.30 [19.27,
3.25 0.03 [3.19,
2.66 0.03 [2.60,
3.48]
24.38]
3.31]
2.73]
Note. This table displays the estimated marginal means for our four faking measures. For each faking measure, higher scores
reflect more faking. MSA = Moral Suasion Appeal. IAW = Immediate Authentication Warning. FAW = Future
Authentication Warning. TFW = Traditional Faking Warning. NFW = No warning.
Warning
Condition
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Table 14. Recruit Reactions Scores to the Application Simulation
Recruit Reactions
Test-Taking Anxiety
Job Relatedness
Information Known
Chances to Perform
M
SE
95% CI
M
SE
95% CI
M
SE
95% CI
M
SE
95% CI
MSA
109 2.40 0.06 [2.29,
2.90 0.07 [2.76,
3.53 0.07 [3.4, 3.66] 2.39 0.07 [2.25,
2.52]
3.05]
2.53]
IAW
86
2.59 0.07 [2.46,
2.98 0.08 [2.82,
3.48 0.07 [3.34,
2.53 0.08 [2.37,
2.72]
3.14]
3.63]
2.69]
FAW
54
2.52 0.08 [2.36,
3.01 0.10 [2.81,
3.68 0.09 [3.5, 3.86] 2.56 0.10 [2.36,
2.68]
3.21]
2.77]
TFW
86
2.60 0.07 [2.47,
2.76 0.08 [2.6, 2.92] 3.51 0.07 [3.37,
2.35 0.08 [2.19,
2.73]
3.66]
2.51]
NFW
116 2.56 0.06 [2.45,
2.89 0.07 [2.75,
3.42 0.06 [3.29,
2.49 0.07 [2.35,
2.67]
3.03]
3.54]
2.62]
Note. This table displays the estimated marginal means for the recruit reaction measures. Recruit reactions were measured
using a 5-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree). MSA = Moral Suasion Appeal. IAW = Immediate
Authentication Warning. FAW = Future Authentication Warning. TFW = Traditional Faking Warning. NFW = No warning.
Warning
Condition

n
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It is also possible that the IAW is not reducing applicant faking, but instead, changing the way all
applicants respond to the personality test. For example, even non-fakers might be less likely to
engage in “extreme responding”—even when the extreme answer is most representative of them.
Indeed, this has been a criticism of using faking warnings on personality tests (McFarland,
2003). As a result, the IAW may have utility in reducing applicant faking, but it is difficult to
draw firm conclusions without convergent reductions in Communal Impression Management or
Idiosyncratic Item Responding.
There are a few reasons the IAW showed some utility in the present study, but not in
Study 2. First, CAF has high selection ratios, which changes the risk to reward ratio for faking.
Faking is less likely to be advantageous since high scores are less essential to secure
employment, and in turn, being detected as faking is more likely to cost applicants a job that they
would have otherwise obtained. Theoretical models of faking suggest that applicants do weigh
the risks of detection and the benefits of faking (Goffin & Boyd, 2009). By contrast, Study 2
presented a screening opportunity, where higher scores were essential just to obtain an interview,
not even an offer of employment. As a result, the risk to reward ratio may have favored faking
despite the faking dissuasion message. This would suggest that the efficacy of faking dissuasion
messages may depend on where personality testing is used in the selection process. In the IAW
condition, there were also built in mechanisms for verification of personality including reference
checks. This threat may have seemed more credible in CAF context, where they were close to
securing real employment, whereas it may have seemed less credible in an applicant screening
scenario. References are typically one of the last steps in the selection process, as they take a
substantial amount of time. In Study 2, where the IAW was ineffective, our mTurk applicants
may have been aware of the improbability that references would be contracted. This last
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mechanism may explain why the IAW was effective in Study 3, but the TFW was ineffective,
which threatened disqualification without a credible mechanism.
Additionally, we expected the extra threat of verification in the IAW to produce negative
testing reactions among the recruits, but found little evidence of increased negative reactions or
lower ratings of procedural justice when compared to the other warning conditions. There are
two potential explanations for why the IAW did not produce more adverse reactions. First, and in
accordance with Goffin and Boyd’s (2009) faking decision tree model, applicants go through a
serious of decisions when choosing to fake on each test item (e.g., considering the morality of
faking; the chances of detection; whether faking will lead to disqualification; etc.). The CAF
recruits may have experienced the same decision-making process during the application
simulation, regardless of their condition, and in turn, the same cognitive burden or anxiety across
faking dissuasion messages. Second—and more concerning—is that the recruits may not have
experienced negative reactions because we had them engage in a simulation without real
meaningful consequences. However, these findings are consistent with Study 2, which found that
job applicants did not have more adverse reactions to more threatening warnings, even when
they provided real contact information for references and thought there was a real job.
By contrast, the MSA and FAW failed to thwart applicant faking, although these results
are still informative for the field. Several scholars have postulated that “softer” faking dissuasion
messages that appeal to morality, educate, and have applicants consider long term consequences
will reduce applicant faking—rather than threaten applicants (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; Pace &
Borman, 2006; Uruena & Robie, 2011). The results of our studies do not support this
speculation. In addition, we found that a faking dissuasion message, which capitalizes on shortterm accountability and immediate consequences, are more effective than traditional warnings,
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yet do not engender negative reactions in stimulated application scenarios. Together, these
findings provide no incentive to further investigate these “softer” messages. Instead, future
research on faking dissuasion messages should try to maximize short-term accountability by
implementing more compelling descriptions of how faking can be detected. Our findings suggest
that faking dissuasion messages may be unable to convince applicants to consider the morality of
faking, or to be more concerned about the long-term consequences of faking beyond their
dispositional inclinations.
Our findings suggest the MSA and FAW were ineffective in preventing faking, as other
factors are more important to the decision to fake. Based on accountability theory, we expected
that recruits in the FAW condition would worry about the long-term potential of verifiability and
the need to defend their answers during a one-on-one observation; clearly, our findings do not
support these ideas. We entertain three potential explanations for this finding. First, the recruits
believed that the short-term reward of securing employment in the Canadian Armed Forces
simply outweighed the risks of being detected at a future time. The recruits may also have
believed that they could emulate the personality they portrayed, and in turn, genuinely viewed it
as low-risk to fake (Goffin & Boyd, 2009). Second, the recruits—like applicants for large
organizations—felt “faceless” and in turn, did not believe their faking would be noticed. Finally,
as discussed earlier, recruits participated in a simulation and may not have been able to imagine
the scenario as they would experience in a real job application. However, this is unlikely, as the
recruits had recently applied for a position within the CAF, and therefore, should have been able
to imagine the application scenario. Additionally, job applicant simulations with real employees
tend to provide realistic estimates of faking when compared to student samples (Goffin, Jang, &
Skinner, 2011).
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We also found that moral prompts about the negative outcomes of faking did not reduce
faking by the recruits. This finding mirrors those reported in Study 2. Goffin and Boyd (2009)
suggest that the morality of faking is the first decision that applicants consider when answering
personality items during the hiring process. It is possible that applicants may not consider
morality first in the decision-making process; instead, applicants may view faking as the “norm”
and believe that faking is normal. Indeed, the majority of applicants do fake (Donovan et al.,
2003; Feeney & Goffin, 2015; Griffith et al., 2007; Holden et al., 2017).
Another possibility is that there may be external factors that are too powerful for test
instructions to override. For example, if an applicant or recruit is applying for a position when
they do not have enough money to support their family, they may view faking as a lesser evil
than not providing for their family. Thus, morality may be relative to the applicant’s need for
employment and external considerations. If this is the case, then test instructions appealing to
morality are unlikely to be effective. Similarly, the moral consideration of applicant faking is
dispositional rather than situational. For example, we know some people are higher in trait
integrity than others, and that these traits predict workplace delinquency (Lee, Ashton, & de
Vries, 2005). Therefore, virtuous applicants may be unlikely to fake, regardless of the test
instructions, whereas others may not care about the morality of faking. Unfortunately, due to
time constraints, we were unable to ask the recruits about their reactions after the simulation.
4.5.1 Limitations
The main limitation of our study is that we used a recruitment simulation with the
recruits, and in turn, their results may not generalize to recruits or applicants undergoing the high
incentive to perform in a real scenario. We used a simulation because both the CAF and our
university comply with national ethics policies from the Social Sciences and Humanities
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Research Council, which would forbid administering different test instructions to real job
applicants, as some applicants may be disadvantaged relative to others as a function of our
research. It was paramount that participants’ futures, or possible careers not be affected by the
experimental outcomes as it might reward applicants in one condition, while punishing
applicants in another condition. Therefore, every effort was made to re-create the initial
application process—including auditory and visual cues present during the initial recruitment
appointment (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014).
The second limitation is that the recruits were assigned to us in large groups (29 to 52)
and we assigned groups (rather than individual recruits) randomly to our different experimental
conditions. We also had to defer to military operations in some instances, which may have
confounded our assignment. For example, our smallest group had several recruits removed in the
early stage of our study for administrative purposes. The groups also had substantial variations in
reading speed, and for logistical reasons, we moved at the average pace of recruits. This lead
some recruits who were behind to skip sections or submit their package prematurely—which
may have produced some systematic bias, especially for survey questions at the end of our study.
Finally, we assumed that all recruits paid sufficient attention to and internalized instructions for
each of the manipulations; however, findings suggesting the relative effectiveness of IAW
condition in preventing faking provide partial evidence of the manipulation’s success.
4.5.2 Implications and Conclusions
Our findings have three primary implications for researchers and human resource
practitioners. The first implication is that faking dissuasion messages that emphasize short-term
accountability are the most effective at combatting applicant faking. This effect is best utilized
by making applicants or recruits believe that there is a credible process to verify their answers,
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such as threatening to check applicant responses with personal references they provided prior to
the personality test. The second implication is that there is little incentive to continue
investigating “softer” faking dissuasion messages, which emphasize educational or moral
suasion, as they may not appreciably reduce faking and may lead to more positive applicant
reactions compared to more threatening messages.
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Appendix A: Immediate Authentication Warning: PowerPoint Presentation
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Appendix B: Future Authentication Warning: PowerPoint Presentation

163

164

165

166

167
Appendix C: Moral Suasion Appeal: PowerPoint Presentation
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Appendix D: Traditional Faking Warning: PowerPoint Presentation
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Appendix E: No Faking Warning: PowerPoint Presentation
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Appendix F: Idiosyncratic Item Responding Scale

Item
1. I start tasks right
away
2. I sympathize with the
homeless
3. I fear for the worst
4. I love a good fight
5. I act without thinking
6. I insult people
7. I rush into things
8. I do not like art
9. I jump into things
without thinking
10. I do not enjoy going
to art museums

Interested Applicants (Time 1) Uninterested Applicants (Time 1) Mean Difference
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Time 1 – Time 2
4.24
0.84
3.27
0.92
0.97
4.15

0.96

3.23

0.96

0.93

3.54
4.06
4.38
4.61
3.98
4.40
4.10

1.24
1.18
0.82
0.74
0.99
0.97
1.04

2.61
3.13
3.51
3.75
3.13
3.56
3.25

1.09
1.27
0.98
1.05
0.98
1.09
1.04

0.93
0.93
0.87
0.86
0.85
0.84
0.84

4.15

1.15

3.31

1.16

0.84
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Chapter 5
5. General Discussion
This dissertation had two primary objectives: a) help improve the assessment of faking in
research and practice; and b) develop practical tools to help reduce applicant faking on
personality testing. The first goal addressed a major gap in the faking literature, where to my
knowledge, no study has comprehensively compared common faking indices in a single study.
Without such study, researchers and practitioners may choose faking assessments without
knowing which ones best distinguish faking behaviours, and without knowledge that different
faking assessments are, in fact, assessing the same construct.
The results from Study 1 suggest that, consistent with prior research, Residualized
Change Scores was the most consistent faking index (Feeney & Goffin, 2015). This index was
the second-best measure at distinguishing when between people’s applicant versus non-applicant
personality profiles, and between job interested and uninterested responders. That being said,
Residualized Change Scores were not the single best in either set of analyses, suggesting that it
may be advantageous to use multiple faking indices. Second, Residualized Change Scores are
impractical, requiring both job applicant and non-applicant personality scores, which employers
are unlikely to have. Three other indices stood out as having utility in discriminating between
applicants and non-applicants, which were Blatant Extreme Responding, Communal Impression
Management, and Idiosyncratic Item Responding. All three indices may be easily used in applied
settings. One concern is that these measures did not converge, as more than 50% of the variance
in each faking index was unexplained by the others. In turn, correcting applicant scores or
disqualifying applicants using only one of these measures would be inappropriate. Instead, we
suggest a triangulation approach: we recommend the combined use of Idiosyncratic Item
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Responding, Blatant Extreme Responding, and Communal Impression Management, and when
possible, Residualized Change Scores.
Interestingly, our results suggested that Bogus Items—a common faking measure in the
literature—were ineffective. This is problematic as it raises questions about the implications of
any study that relied exclusively on Bogus Items as a measure of faking (c.f., Dwight &
Donovan, 2003; Fan et al., 2012; Levashina et al., 2009). There have been other studies that cast
doubt on the validity of Bogus Items. For example, Overclaiming (Bing et al., 2011; Paulhus et
al., 2003), a close cousin of Bogus Items, assesses the tendency of applicants to misrepresent
their general knowledge. In a prior investigation, overclaiming was ineffective in measuring
applicant faking (Feeney & Goffin, 2015). Additionally, Overclaiming appears to be conflated
with personality measures (Dunlop et al., 2016). Similarly, we found that two covariance indices
(Christiansen et al., 2017) were also ineffective, as they failed to predict applicant faking or
relate to any other measure of applicant faking. We speculate this is due to the reliance on nonapplicant samples, where applicant faking tends to be much more severe (R. Hogan, 2005; Ones,
Dilchert, Viswesvaran, & Judge, 2007)
The findings also suggest that researchers and practitioners should likely question the use
of several faking indices, as they appear to perform less well than other existing options. For
example, Percent Agreement and Individual Change Scores both performed well at
discriminating between applicant and non-applicant personality scores, but were inferior to
Residualized Change Scores, and were both confounded with legitimate personality variance.
Within-Subject Correlations and Within-Subjects Variance of the Differences both demonstrated
little utility in differentiating applicants from non-applicants, and also failed to converge with
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their stronger alternatives. Given that both faking indices require a repeated measures design,
they may not offer practicality nor validity.
An additional objective of this dissertation was to develop three faking dissuasion
messages that were either more effective than standard warnings or perceived less negatively by
job applicants and military recruits. Data from Study 2 revealed that none of the messages
reduced faking or fostered more positive applicant reactions. By contrast, in Study 3, we found
that the IAW was effective in reducing faking among military recruits, but that none of the other
messages—including one used in prior studies—were effective relative to the control group.
Overall, these results have several potential implications for the field.
The most plausible explanation for the reason the IAW worked in Study 3—but not Study
2—is that faking dissuasion messages are only effective when applicants believe that they have
something to lose by being caught. Military recruits fill out the personality inventory well into
the selection process, and in turn, would know they are close to placement. In their case, the risk
of being caught for faking is considerably higher. The recruits also completed the personality
assessments in military facilities, and in turn, they may have found the threat of detection more
credible. By contrast, our job applicants in Study 2 were in the earliest stage of the selection
process, and therefore, were aware that they needed to score favorably to pass screening. In this
case, the benefits of faking may have outweighed the costs of detection. As a result, none of our
faking dissuasion messages were able to dissuade job applicants from faking. This may present a
conundrum for practitioners; the utility of personality tests is in the early screening stages, as
they are inexpensive and easy to administer, but this is when applicants are most likely to
misrepresent themselves—possibly weakening the validity of the personality scores.
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The second major take-home is that warnings of immediate consequences are more
effective than “soft messages” that try to gently dissuade people from faking. Scholars have
suggested that the latter approaches may work (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; Pace & Borman, 2006;
Uruena & Robie, 2011), and yet to-date, there is no compelling evidence that these messages are
as persuasive as threats of immediate consequences. We know that the majority of applicants
fake (Griffith et al., 2007; Holden et al., 2017), and perhaps most applicants already know this is
occurring. This might explain why “soft messages” that appeal to morality or long-term
consequences do not sufficiently dissuade applicants—they believe they will not secure
employment unless they fake. By contrast, a faking dissuasion message that emphasizes
immediate disqualification for faking with a credible explanation for how faking can be detected,
targets applicants where their primary interest lays—securing employment. As a result, we
suggest that future studies focus on teasing apart new ways to make that message resonate
louder. The persuasion and decision-making literature may help improve the potency of these
messages.
The third lesson is that people do not react strongly to faking dissuasion messages under
motivated conditions. Across two studies, we found limited evidence that job applicants or
military recruits responded negatively to our faking dissuasion messages. Yet, motivated
responders’ major goal appears to be securing employment, and such, these responders may give
little thought to how the faking dissuasion message reflects the hiring organization. These
findings are consistent with the literature; three studies have found inconsistent findings in how
applicants react to faking warnings (Converse et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2012; McFarland, 2003). It
is possible that applicants are responding to some other aspect of the procedure or materials used
in the testing, and in turn, this may explain why there are inconsistencies across studies.
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The final and more general application from my dissertation is that Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk can be used successfully to measure employment scenarios even when
motivated job applicants are required. We employed an innovative design where mTurk users
believed they were being screened for a real position. This allowed us to discern between both
those who were interested and those who were not, providing unusually rich data. We were also
able to recruit the same pool of interested applicants for a follow-up session, where they served
as normal unmotivated respondents. As a result, we were able to assess the effect of our job
application simulation both between samples and within the same sample, allowing for firmer
conclusions. This type of research design may help benefit researchers in the future who would
like to test this same sample. The one caution is that researchers may want to ask participants if
they have previously participated in similar studies, so that the same type of deception is not
being employed with the same people, and in turn, weakening the credibility of the manipulation.
5.1. Future Directions in Faking Research
Study 1 left a few major unanswered questions: 1) Are the faking assessment results
generalizable to more competitive jobs and to different personality instruments? 2) How should
an organization use these scores? 3) Once an organization triangulates applicant faking with
multiple faking indices, what is the best approach to classifying an applicant as a faker or not?
Unfortunately, the data from this dissertation do not address these questions. The results of Study
1 also prompt an additional question: why did some indices perform poorly in our investigation?
Bogus Items, for example, are commonly used and assumed to measure faking. Study 1 yielded
no evidence that faking on Bogus Items translates into faking on personality assessments. Future
research will need to replicate these findings and seek to uncover why Bogus Items fail, before
firm conclusions about their use may be reached.

187
Future research should also examine how faking prevention methods can be improved to
reduce faking using multiple accurate faking assessments. For example, Jackson and Paunonen
(1980) advocated for the creation of personality measures that are resistant to socially desirable
responding. In the test creation process, items that are likely to receive a socially desirable
response can be removed. In theory, this same approach could be used using Idiosyncratic Item
Responding, Blatant Extreme Responding, and Residualized Change Scores. As a result, a
publisher could produce personality tests that are resistant to multiple forms of faking, rather
than just social desirability.
Finally, scholars have championed faking dissuasion messages as an effective tool to
combat applicant faking. Studies 2 and 3 in this dissertation provide some reason for caution—
faking dissuasion messages are not consistently effective and can not be viewed as a silver bullet.
Future research will need to specifically test what factors moderate the efficacy of faking
dissuasion messages. In a post-hoc literature review, we found that studies that accuse job
applicants of faking during the test tend to be the ones that have the largest effects, whereas
faking dissuasion messages tend to be ineffective in applicant screening scenarios or when
applicants perceive that they have little to lose by faking. These findings tend to converge on risk
serving as a potential moderator of when faking dissuasion messages are effective. Future
research could test this directly and also seek to determine other contributing variables. Research
in this area will better contribute to our understanding of applicant faking and provide guidance
for practitioners in our field.
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